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ABSTRACT
The thesis uses Bangladesh as a model to test a "dependence paradigm". It 
posits that the sudden influx of resources that foreign aid brings does not necessarily lead 
to the social development and equitable economic growth which might have been 
expected because micro-economic forces tend to predominate over conventional macro- 
economic development theory. Instead it results in increasing inequity. The government 
and upper classes divert the largest proportion of the resources being provided and use 
them for reasons other than that for which they were meant. More inequitable 
distribution of income in turn justifies the continued need for foreign aid. The aid pro­
vided, justified by poverty, becomes a necessary part of the government's resources, 
discouraging domestic resource mobilisation and self-reliance.
The dimensions of poverty and the nature and evidence of the country’s depend­
ence are reviewed. As the amount of aid "appropriated" increases, the government is in­
creasingly dependent on its continuation and more constrained by the conditions attached 
to it by the donors.
The paper then goes on to explain that foreign aid donors tolerate this diversion 
of aid resources because they measure the results of aid in terms of quantity, not quality. 
Nor are they prepared to provide adequate means by which to plan, administer, monitor 
and evaluate the use to which aid is put. The quality of aid is not an issue that serves 
either their domestic needs or foreign policy objectives.
The successes in Bangladesh are shown to be attributable either to market forces 
or to foreign aid which does not lend itself to diversion by the upper classes. Some com­
parisons show that the phenomenon of a "resource windfall" leading to "appropriation" 
by the upper classes exists in other countries and is not unique to Bangladesh.
The study concludes that unless appropriate aid is provided with sound ad­
ministration, which uses, to the fullest, available expertise in the country, then increasing 
inequity and dependence are bound to result.
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INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh has been called "an international basket case".1 This term was ap­
plied during the civil war in 1971 which led to the secession of East Pakistan only a few 
months after a devastating cyclone had hit the coastal areas of the country killing estim­
ated hundreds of thousands of people.2
When Bangladesh gained independence in December 1971, following the inter­
vention of India, the international community was quick to respond with aid. Except for 
Pakistan, the United States and China, there was little opposition to its secession, al­
though there was considerable criticism of India’s intervention. Independence was fol­
lowed by a massive emergency aid effort led by the United Nations which found imagina­
tive ways to mount a programme in a country that was not even as yet a member state.3 
In contrast to such other breakaway states as Katanga and Biafra, its existence and legi­
timacy were soon recognised at the United Nations.4*
The emergency phase was terminated on schedule in 1973,5 but a famine in 1974 
resulted in another wave of foreign aid. By this time there was an emerging realisation 
on the part of the donors that assistance to Bangladesh was going to have be a long term 
effort. Aid continued to flow generously throughout the remainder of the decade and into 
the 1980s without its impact and benefits being seriously questioned by the donors. An 
increasing number of scholars, however, questioned whether the harm foreign aid causes 
to the recipients does not outweigh the benefits it brings.
In 1984 the Like-Minded Group** in Dhaka made up of the heads of the five aid 
programmes of Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada expressed
"Despite its acceptance by most nations its entry was vetoed by China, as a member of the Security Council, the first time that 
it was proposed.
**The Like-Minded Group in Dhaka although it owes its name and area of interest to the Like-Minded Group started by Jan 
Prank, Minister of Development Cooperation for the Netherlands, in 1974, is essentially an informal group comprising the heads of 
aid for Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, all of whose programmes share an interest in rural development 
and small scale agriculture.
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skepticism at the optimistic tone of the World Bank, Bangladesh’s largest donor,6 in the 
1984 country economic memorandum (CEM). The World Bank lauded the Government 
for progress that had been made toward achieving adequate levels of caloric intake and 
self-sufficiency in food production.7 It also congratulated Bangladesh for taking "coura­
geous decisions to stabilise the economy".8 The Like-Minded Group’s skepticism was 
based on more subjective observations in the countryside as experienced development 
officers, and their belief that the Government was not doing enough for the rural areas 
with the resources that it had at its command.* The decision of the Group was to 
undertake a complementary report.
A year later, in 1985, the North-South Institute of Ottawa produced a report, 
"Rural Poverty in Bangladesh: A Report to the Like-Minded Group" which concluded, 
among other things, that:
The picture which emerges is that of a vicious circle in which the government seeks to legitimize 
through a patronage system, aided by external assistance [emphasis added] but which merely strengthens 
the self-preserving ruling coalition who is content to contain the discontented majority. This coalition 
is committed to sustaining non-productive social and economic structures which generally results in the 
failure to achieve a critical minimum effort for growth, much less for equity, despite the horizontal 
expansion of financial resources and technical assistance.9
This conclusion is not consistent with the underlying objectives of development 
assistance, to promote both growth and equity. As the Brandt Report states:
It [development] refers, broadly speaking, to desirable social and economic progress, . . . Certainly 
development must mean improvement in living conditions, for which economic growth and in­
dustrialization are essential. But if there is no attention to the quality of growth and to social change 
one cannot speak of development.10
Lord Bauer, noted aid critic, takes strong exception to the objective of 
"equality" as a justification for foreign aid stating:
The misconception that the incomes of the well-off are somehow obtained by exploitation 
rather than earned has often had disastrous consequences: for example, it has led to spurious justifica­
tion for the expropriation, and even destruction, of economically productive groups . . .n
There is considerable evidence that suggests that much of the wealth of the 
well-off in Bangladesh in fact does not have its origins in productive enterprise. Rather it 
depends on the exploitation of foreign aid which was provided ostensibly to promote 
growth and alleviate poverty. Lord Bauer may well be correct, of course. The debate 
regarding the merits of public over private ownership of productive enterprise is still
*The writer was a member of the Dhaka Like-Minded Group (L-MG) and attended the meeting at which this decision was 
taken. No minutes were kept during the meetings of the L-MG.
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open, and the expropriation of viable industries and businesses in Bangladesh may well 
have contributed to some of Bangladesh’s economic problems. Aid, provided to promote 
development and improve the standard of living for the poorest, has become a more 
lucrative source of wealth than productive enterprise. The result is that productive enter­
prise, which might have developed, has been stifled leaving the country increasingly de­
pendent on foreign aid. It has stifled Government initiative to rely on the country’s own 
resources, leaving government policy vulnerable to pressure from varied, and sometimes 
conflicting foreign interests.
This study offers an explanation of why the process of providing foreign aid 
has not resulted in development. It accepts the view of Lord Bauer:
Giving more aid is equated with doing better; increased aid is used interchangeably with improved aid 
performance and countries giving a higher percentage of their national income in official aid are 
described as better performers than others giving a small percentage.12
It will show that aid, badly administered or spent on the wrong kinds of projects, results 
in harm to the recipient country. It argues that certain kinds of aid do have the potential 
to contribute to improved standards of living and equity in the Third World, but that 
frequently this does not happen because aid is either given for the wrong reasons, or 
given for the right reasons, but to the wrong projects. Furthermore, aid is often 
inadequately planned and inadequately administered. It will show that aid often en­
courages corruption resulting in increased impoverishment and inequity. Thus aid, like 
any fine tool in the hands of a craftsman, can produce excellent results. When the 
craftsmen are not well-trained, however, the slap-dash results that ensue can be dis­
astrous. Bangladesh is used as the example because it is one of the largest very poor 
countries in the world and provides a wide range of experience. It is, however, possible 
to draw parallels with the experience of other countries.
Chapter I will review the nature of the country and its economic problems. It 
will then describe the importance of Bangladesh to development practice and theory. It 
will propose a model for the analysis of dependence on foreign aid, suggest a hypothesis 
and review the evidence that we would expect to find in order to substantiate a trend of 
increasing dependence.
We propose a two-country model termed an "aid-dependence paradigm" to 
show that a country which has been the recipient of a very large amount of aid within a 
short period loses its national sense of purpose and the will to achieve increasing self­
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reliance. It also loses sight of the objective of trying to provide an acceptable standard of 
living for its citizens. Instead its policies are increasingly designed for, and dependent 
on, the pursuit of large quantities of the aid. This aid can then be "appropriated'’ by the 
middle and upper classes* for their own ends. The increasing impoverishment and in­
creasingly inequitable income distribution that results serves as a rationale to seek more 
aid from donors. The process is not the result of any particular malevolence on the part 
of the country’s leaders. Rather, it stems from the process of making a series of rational, 
but very short term, micro-decisions. The donors, in their turn, continue to make aid 
available allowing the country’s leaders to follow policies that could not be sustained in a 
self-reliant country.
A review of the evidence will show that such a country follows a logical path 
in accepting all the aid that it can. It thereby manages to avoid many of the difficult 
decisions that have to be made about the allocation of scarce resources. Likewise, donors 
who provide aid are content to continue to provide it, although it may not achieve what it 
was designed to do.
Chapter II will review the economic and international relations theory relating 
to the motives for the acceptance of foreign aid. It will relate conventional development 
theory to both the strategies proposed and the strategies that were followed by various 
governments since independence in Bangladesh. We indicate the periods examined and 
why they were chosen. It will then suggest the areas to be examined and the evidence 
that should indicate whether the strategies were successful or not.
Chapter III will examine the empirical evidence in the particular areas that we 
have identified as being critical to the development of Bangladesh.
Chapter IV will describe the evidence of increasing poverty and dependence in 
specific areas of the economy.
Chapter V will outline the international relations theory of aid-giving and relate 
it to the manner in which the donors operate. The origins of aid, first provided as relief 
by the international community following the civil war,** the famine of 1974, and how
*For the sake of stylistic simplicity we will simply refer to these groups which comprise the middle class, the upper-middle 
class and the upper class; which we understand to comprise the rural power structure, the bureaucracy, the modern private sector and 
the most monied families; as the upper class. We will refer to the marginal farmers and the landless as the poorer class.
**Henceforth referred to as the War of Liberation.
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aid became institutionalised are described together with the effects that this aid has had on 
the country.
Chapter VI outlines some of Bangladesh’s success stories, the growth of the 
garment industry, the development of the Grameen Bank, the growth of wheat 
production, et al. It analyses briefly what the successful projects had in common that 
other efforts have lacked. We compare the experience of Bangladesh with that of some 
other countries which have been the recipients of resource windfalls: South Korea, Cam­
bodia and Taiwan.
In Chapter VII we sum up the findings and conclusions about the provision of 
foreign aid. We show how the indiscriminate use of aid can result in the breaking down 
of a country’s sovereignty and lead to increased dependence. The conclusions are related 
to the hypothesis suggested in Chapter I, and the evidence that we expected to find.
A note on the statistical information used in the study is in order, given the 
difficulties of data collection in Bangladesh. There are, for example, at least two dif­
ferent sets of national accounts for the early years of the 1980s. One set is calculated by 
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and the other by the World Bank Mission. These 
may differ by as much as 20 per cent for various years. We have for the most part used 
the Government statistics since they are more complete and, in the opinion of some 
scholars, more accurate than those used by the World Bank.* Statistics should, however, 
be interpreted with care and they are used here as indicators of trends rather than as exact 
measurements.
Some limitations to the study are also worth noting. Corruption is difficult to 
document under any circumstances. While Bangladesh does offer an unusually wide 
range of examples, the picture is far from complete and there remain many large gray 
areas.
Government departments, of which aid agencies are usually a part, are not 
particularly noted for strong, objective self-criticism. Critical analysis of their operations 
is therefore not abundant in the literature of development. There are three conspicuous 
exceptions. There is an abundance of literature concerning the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID or AID). The question is whether the foremost
*01e David Koht Norbye, of the Chr. Michelson Institute, in a conversation with the writer believes that the statistics produced 
by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics tend, on the whole, to be on the whole more accurate than those of the World Bank.
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objective of AID is the economic and social development of the recipient country through 
the provision of financial assistance. It has been argued that it seeks primarily to 
influence policy to conform with American objectives, and economic and social devel­
opment become desirable byproducts of the process. AID, unlike most development 
agencies, is highly decentralised. The World Bank, as a major and often controversial 
institution, has been subjected to much criticism both from within and from without. The 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has long demonstrated a penchant 
for self-criticism. Other development agencies have carried out studies of their 
operations, most notably the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) 
which has published a series of books reviewing their programmes. There is, however, 
little mention, in this otherwise excellent series of books, of the challenges and problems 
of the administration of overseas aid. The masculine gender is used in this study simply 
for stylistic reasons.
Finally, the writer was resident in Bangladesh from 1982 to 1986 and is con­
versant with many of the examples cited. We have tried, however, to minimise the 
reliance on anecdotal evidence. Where used it is usually placed in a footnote in support 
of other evidence.
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CHAPTER I
THE ISSUE 
Introduction to the Country
This chapter introduces Bangladesh and outlines the problem, the participants 
and their relationships. It suggests, through the use of a model, possible causes for a 
developing country’s failure to achieve self-sufficiency despite access to resources 
necessary to achieve economic and social development. We suggest what evidence would 
substantiate our hypothesis or refute it.
Geographically Bangladesh is located on the delta, at the confluence of the 
Ganges and Brahmaputra (Jamuna) Rivers, where they form the Meghna River. The land 
is flat, broken only by gently rolling hills in the northeast and in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts along the Burmese border and the border with the Indian states of Tripura and 
Mizoram. Bangladesh is criss-crossed by rivers and streams. As a result it is frequently 
inundated by flood waters draining the monsoon rains from the Himalayas of India and 
Nepal. About one third of the country is underwater about one third of each year. The 
soil is fine and fertile. The region is subject to a monsoon which usually lasts from June 
until October.1 The average annual rainfall is from 1.4 to 5 metres,2 most of which falls 
between the months of May and October.3 The temperature in Dhaka,* the capital, ranges 
between 12 and 27 degrees Celsius in January, the coolest month, and between 25 and 34 
degrees Celsius in May, the warmest month.4
Bangladesh has some 100.6 million (1985)5 people living in an area of 
144,000 square kilometres. This makes it the most densely populated country in the 
world, outside the city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore. In 1985 it had a
*The spelling of Dacca, the capital, was changed in 1982 to Dhaka. The current spelling is used throughout this paper.
16 Chapter I
17
population density of 699 per square kilometre, and 1062 per square kilometre of arable 
land.6 This latter ratio of population to arable land is high, but by no means unique. The 
United Kingdom, China and Japan have comparable ratios. Taiwan, South Korea and 
Haiti have only half the cropland per capita that Bangladesh has.7 Bangladesh has, 
therefore, some scope for achieving food autarky.
Bangladesh was established as a secular state* with a unicameral legislature 
first under the Provisional Constitution Order issued on the day Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman,** founding father and first Prime Minister, returned to Dhaka.8 Government 
was by parliamentary system under a figurehead President who acted on the advice of a 
Prime Minister,9 basically a Westminster style of government. This was modified by 
Sheikh Mujib in January of 1975 by an amendment to the constitution effectively 
changing the form of government to a presidential system.10 With this change power was 
shifted from the Prime Minister to the President and Sheikh Mujib became President.
This form of government has lasted ever since, although it has been broken 
by long periods of Martial Law. The assassination of Sheikh Mujib in August (l985\was  ^
followed by the brief regime of Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed which lastea until 
November 1975 when he could no longer keep the military in line. A series of abortive 
coup attempts took place and A.M. Sayem, then Chief Justice, was appointed President 
and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).11 Major General Ziaur Rahman,*** then 
Chief of Staff of the Army, effectively seized power on November 23, 1975,12 becoming 
Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator (DCMLA) and Minister for Finance and for 
Home Affairs. With direct control over both the finances of the country and 
responsibility for the police and intelligence services he became de facto Head of 
Government.13 General Zia ruled as DCMLA for a year, becoming CMLA on November 
30, 1976. On April 21, 1977 he forced President Sayem to resign and assumed the 
Presidency.14 On May 30, 1977 he held a referendum to confirm himself as President. 
He won a 98 per cent majority.15 The slight edge the Awami League won in the 
municipal elections the following summer did, however, cast some doubt on the 
legitimacy of this overwhelming majority.16 On June 3, 1977 Justice Abdus Sattar was
"Bangladesh became an Islamic state in 1988.
* "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is generally referred to as Sheikh Mujib or President Mujib and will be so referred to in this paper.
"""General, later President, Ziaur Rahman is generally referred to as General or President Zia and will be so referred to here.
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appointed Vice-President.17 A year later on June 3, 1978, President Zia held presidential 
elections and won.18 On February 18, 1979, parliamentary elections were held, which he 
won handily with a majority of 205 seats out of 300, and the country was returned to 
nominally legitimate rule.19
President Zia was assassinated on May 30 of 1981 while visiting Chittagong. 
The attempted coup was put down and the presidency was passed peacefully under the 
terms of the constitution to the Vice-President, Justice Abdus Sattar,20 who shortly 
thereafter, in November 1980, called elections and was elected as President in his own 
right.21
On March 24, 1982 Lt. Gen. H.M. Ershad, Chief of Army Staff under both 
Presidents Zia and Sayem, seized power. Once again Martial Law was imposed using the 
necessity to end corruption as the main justification.22 On March 27 Justice Abul Fazal 
Mohammad Chaudhury was named President. General Ershad ruled as CMLA until 
December 11, 1983 when President Chaudhury resigned and Ershad was named 
President.23 A referendum was held in early 1984 to confirm his appointment. 
Parliamentary elections were held in April 1986, and Presidential elections took place in 
October 1986. After some delay in ratifying the actions of the Martial Law Government, 
the country was once again returned to nominally legitimate government. Bangladesh 
has, therefore, enjoyed seven and a half years of nominally legitimate rule in the first 
fifteen years since independence.
During the period following independence there was initially a determined 
attempt to build on the links that were beginning to be established between East Pakistan 
and the Soviet socialist bloc.24 Sheikh Mujib’s first foreign visit following independence 
was to the Soviet Union. This was an attempt to diversify the economic ties that had 
developed between Pakistan and the West, and to build on the relations that had existed 
between East Pakistan and the Soviet bloc during the period immediately preceding the 
War of Liberation.25 As the country faced growing economic problems in 1973 and 
1974, and Mujib needed American aid, he changed direction and made a determined 
effort to bring his country closer to the United States.26 This move corresponded with an 
improvement in relations with the World Bank. Since 1975 Bangladesh has tried to 
remain on good terms with the western countries which supply the bulk of the foreign aid 
it receives. Relations with India, its closest neighbour, have been generally cordial over
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the years, although there have been periods of tension. They have warmed slightly since 
the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).* 
Bangladesh is also a member of the non-aligned group,27 and a member of the Group 
of 77.
Foreign aid dominates the foreign policy of Bangladesh, and has ever since 
the first days of the regime of Sheikh Mujib. President Zia encouraged the increase of 
foreign aid and actively sought more aid, visiting the United Kingdom in June 1980 in an 
attempt to increase the United Kingdom’s assistance.28 Zia also cultivated Robert 
McNamara during his last year as president of the World Bank. After what Franda terms 
"heavy courting", he managed to elicit from McNamara a commitment for US$ 1,000 
million in additional funding over the next three years.29 President Ershad sought foreign 
aid on his trips abroad to the United States when he called upon President Reagan in 
October 198330 and visited Saudi Arabia, another major donor. At the United Nations 
Bangladesh’s preoccupation has been with increased aid and it plays an active part in 
agencies such as the World Food Programme, of which it is a major recipient.
Economically Bangladesh is an agrarian country. After independence, in 
1972/73, agriculture accounted for 59 per cent of GDP.31** In 1984 agriculture accounted 
for 48 per cent of GDP, industry for some 12 per cent and services for 39 per cent.32 
The country is not self-sufficient*** in food grain production, relying on imports for about 
10 per cent of the its requirements. These figures should be treated with caution since 
the figure for 1972/73 is for a period immediately following the War of Liberation during 
which industry suffered proportionately more than agriculture. Furthermore, in recent 
years there has been disagreement between the Government and the World Bank 
regarding the exact GDP figure. In the agricultural sector in 1976/77 food grains account 
for 72 per cent of the value added in the agriculture sector and jute, the major export
*Formerly known as SARC.
**Estimates for GDP "for 1972/73 through 1979/80 are not directly comparable with those of subsequent years, as wages and 
salaries paid out of the Government’s Annual Development Program were not included in estimates of value added prior to 1980/81" 
(World Bank, Report No. 5409, Note to table 2.1, p. 12. This is reflected in the estimates for Public Administration and Defence. 
Our calculation of the probable impact, based on trends prior to the change, is an increase in total GDP of about 1.2 per cent.
* * * Self-sufficiency is not a clear cut term. Assumptions have to be made about what an acceptable daily ration in terms of per 
capita availability of food. The generally accepted level of self-sufficiency is when the per capita food availability is above 16 ounces 
of foodgrain per day. Figures as low as 13 ounces and as high as 17 ounces have been used in the past. See Robinson, Economic 
Prospects of Bangladesh. Chapter 2 for a discussion of the alternative assumptions. Self-sufficiency does not imply adequate 
nutritional intake. Rather it is a measure of the balance of payments implications of having to import food in order to supplement 
domestic production.
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crop, for 5.7 per cent.33 Growth in agriculture has been disappointing, failing to keep 
pace with population growth between 1970 and 1980.34 The area of most positive results 
has been the introduction of wheat as a crop during the winter season and the 
improvement in the production of boro (winter) rice. Both these crops have benefitted 
from the expansion of irrigation although much wheat is rain fed, utilising only the 
existing moisture in the soil.35 Most minor crops, such as oil seeds, cotton, spices, fruit 
and vegetables, have dropped in production over the years since independence.36
The industrial sector is dominated by jute manufacturing for the production of 
jute products such as hessian, carpet backing and jute bags. These accounted in 1974/75 
for about 32 per cent of value added.37 There has been an increase in the proportion of 
jute manufactured goods for export, as compared to the export of total jute goods, from 
58 per cent to 77 per cent. Other manufacturing industries include sugar, cement, 
fertiliser, pulp and paper and cotton textiles, with match making and tyre manufacturing 
as minor industries.38
Since 1980 the garment manufacturing industry has grown from exports of 
US$3.24 million in fiscal year 1981, when it accounted for 0.5 percent of export 
earnings, to an estimated US$116.2 million in fiscal year 1985, some 12.4 percent of 
exports.39 This made it the fastest growing export product. The rapid growth quickly at­
tracted the attention of garment industries in the United States, France and Canada, all 
three major donors. The result was the imposition, or negotiation, of import quotas 
under the Multi-Fibre Agreement resulting a slowing of growth in this new area.
The rapid growth is attributable to several factors: other traditional exporters 
such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, etc., had completely utilised their quotas; Bangladesh, as 
a least developed country, was not yet subject to quotas. Being labour intensive, the 
industry lent itself to rapid expansion with minimal risk to outside investors and provided 
maximum opportunity to local entrepreneurs.
Fertiliser production has also increased as new factories have been built. 
Another product which has grown quickly in importance, from about 1 per cent of 
exports in 1972/73 to 10 per cent in 1984/85, has been the processing and export of 
frozen shrimp and frog’s legs.40
The modem energy sector accounts for some 75 per cent of energy 
requirements, the balance being made up of cow dung, crop byproducts, and firewood.41
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It has grown quickly, a reflection of the donors’ attraction to capital intensive projects as 
we will see in Chapter V. Natural gas is the only natural resource exploited to date. As 
of 1980, there was an estimated recoverable reserve of some 9.6 trillion cubic feet.42 
Deposits of coal have been located in parts of the country,43 but their depth makes 
extraction uneconomic. There are deposits of peat in the Meghna flood plain,44 but no 
large scale extraction has yet taken place. Studies are underway to examine the 
feasibility of using peat to power thermal generating stations on the western side of the 
country where as yet no gas has been located in commercial quantities.45 While the 
possibility of oil exists, in deposits associated with the gas in the eastern zone, none has 
been found and Bangladesh relies upon gas byproducts and imports to meet its domestic 
needs. Even a basic mineral, such as rock for aggregate used in road-building and 
construction, must be imported or manufactured from kiln-baked brick which is then 
broken up by hand.
The transport sector is characterised by difficult terrain caused by the 
prevalence of rivers,46 frequent flooding, and a topsoil that is vulnerable to erosion. The 
number of rivers result in the requirement for many appurtenant structures, such as 
bridges and culverts for road and rail transport, and in very high maintenance costs. The 
railway system is constructed in two gauges, metre and broad gauge. In the west it was 
designed to allow Calcutta access to its hinterland,47 while the eastern railway was built 
later to give Chittagong port access to Assam. Railway transport accounts for less than 5 
per cent of value added in the transport sector.48 Road transport is the most predominant 
form of carriage, accounting for some 54 per cent of value added by transport, while 
river transport accounts for about 38 per cent.49 The figure for river transport may very 
well be understated as there is less control over traditional water transport than there is 
over road and rail transport. There is also less interest on the part of the Government in 
encouraging its development.
The country suffers from a major structural problem in balance of trade, 
relying heavily on remittances from migrant workers and contributions in the form of 
food and commodities from aid donors to make up the difference in the balance of trade. 
Non-traditional exports,* such as garments, leather, shrimp and fish products have grown
*Some sources consider leather to be a traditional export while others do not. For the purpose of consistency we will not 
consider it to be a traditional export.
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from 7.2 per cent of exports in 1972/73 to a projected 36.2 per cent in 1984/85. Most of 
this growth is accounted for by the garment industry.50 These gains have been offset by a 
deterioration in the international jute market. The outlook for the jute industry is not 
bright as jute products meet increasing competition from synthetics.
Imports exceed exports by a very large amount, ranging from an average of 
191 per cent of exports, in the period from 1972 to 1975, to an average of 225 per cent 
of exports from 1980 to 1985.51 Food has usually been the largest import, accounting for 
some 55 per cent of imports from 1972 to 1975. It diminished to about 19 per cent of 
imports for the 1980 to 1985 period.52 It should be noted, however, that food imports in 
terms of total tonnage decreased from the 1972 to 1975 period to the 1975 to 1980 
period, but have remained at about the same level as the previous period between 1980 to 
1985.53 Capital equipment has increased from about 17 per cent of imports during the 
1972 to 1975 period to 26.5 per cent of imports from 1980 to 1985.54 The pattern 
emerges of a country whose imports are made up of a large portion of consumable items, 
and which depends upon a single crop, jute, for the major share of its foreign exchange 
earnings.
The country has suffered natural disasters such as cyclones and floods on a 
regular basis since recorded history. Although it was once a relatively prosperous 
egalitarian agricultural economy,55 most of the population now live below the poverty 
line.* Per capita GNP is about US$130. The country suffered a serious famine in 1974. 
There are widely differing estimates of its impact. Mortality was officially estimated at 
26,000s6 but some scholars put it as high as 1.5 million.57 Other countries too, such as 
China, have suffered disasters of devastating proportions, but Bangladesh has dwelt on 
them rather more than most countries.58 The Executive Summary of the Third Five Year 
Plan illustrates:
There had been recurrent floods and droughts, some of severe intensities, occurring more frequently 
in recent years, continuously sapping vitality of the farming population. The economy continued to 
remain in fragile state because of the overwhelming dependence of its predominantly agriculture 
sector on weather.59
*The methodology for determining the poverty line is discussed in Chapter IV.
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The Importance of Bangladesh in the Context of Aid
When it gained its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh became 
one of the poorest countries in the world. It is still ranked as the second poorest country, 
of those with populations of over one million people, in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report: 1986.60 The importance of Bangladesh in the context of foreign aid 
and development lies in the fact that, with the exception of the poor in India and China, 
it is the largest group of very poor people in the world. As an independent country, it 
became a recipient of aid rather later than most other developing countries. It was at 
independence, and still is, characterised by extreme poverty and, although the land is 
some of the most fertile in the world, it is producing at far below its potential.61
The standards of living in both wings of Pakistan were comparable at the time 
of partition from India. However, the resources available to Pakistan as a whole were 
not shared equitably. The result was a growing imbalance between the two sides of the 
country which, together with political problems that had plagued it since partition, 
culminated in the War of Liberation of 1971. While independence was achieved in 1947, 
as part of Pakistan, the period preceding the War of Liberation is regarded by most 
Bangladeshis as having been an extension of the colonial era, one during which they were 
subjected to much the same kind of exploitation that they had been during the days of the 
British Raj as East Bengal.
Bangladesh shares many of the problems common to other developing 
countries: overpopulation; an overwhelming reliance on a single major crop, jute, for 
earning foreign exchange; an undeveloped industrial sector; and a relatively unproductive 
agriculture sector. At the time of independence it offered an ideal opportunity as a place 
in which the problems of economic development could be approached and solved by 
applying the lessons learned in the previous quarter century in other developing countries.
On the positive side of the development picture, unlike many newly 
independent countries whose borders crossed ethnic lines, Bangladesh had the advantage 
of having an ethnically homogeneous population, of whom only 13 per cent were 
Hindu.62 As A.R. Khan writes:
More than any other nation of comparable size, Bangladesh has a remarkable linguistic, 
ethnic and cultural homogeneity. A single language, with a single script and a reasonably 
developed literature, is spoken by almost all the people. Except for a minute proportion of border
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tribesmen, the whole population is remarkably similar in cultural habits. Religion, the most 
outstanding source of rivalry among people on the Indian subcontinent, has almost totally been in 
the background for some time. . . .63
This factor alone should have rendered the country immune to much of the internal 
discord that has plagued so many other former colonies with non-homogeneous 
populations, and made it an easier laboratory in which to practice the lessons learned in 
promoting development since World War II. In addition, although its agriculture sector 
was relatively unproductive and the land overpopulated, the soil was very fertile and 
there was scope for improvement of productivity. Bangladesh had the potential of 
achieving self-sufficiency in food grain production and even the potential of exporting 
some crops.
To add further to its attraction, the Government appeared open and prepared 
to listen to the opinions of outside experts. At independence there was also a determined 
effort to bring together the most distinguished minds in the development field to broach 
the problems that the new country faced. The most evident example of this is that the 
International Economic Association held its 1973 conference in Dhaka and discussed the 
problems facing the new country.64
In 1976 Bangladesh was called "the test case for development"65 with respect 
to the development strategies proposed. Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson suggested that 
the technical means were available to increase food production, diversify economic 
activity and broaden the economic base. What was required was strong leadership and 
administration. They concluded by saying:
There is a path, . . . that Bangladesh could follow to reach the goal of a stable population 
and a standard of living offering little luxury but enough in meeting the fundamental requirements 
of life to make existence more than bearable. The path is narrow. Deviation from it could bring 
ruin to the inhabitants of Bangladesh and compel most of them to eke out their days inadequately 
fed and cared for. This can be avoided through the joint endeavours of Bangladesh and the 
international community. If development can be made to succeed in Bangladesh, there can be little 
doubt that it can be made to succeed anywhere else. It is in this sense that Bangladesh is the test 
case for development.66
Chapter I
The Foreign Aid Programme
25
For this study we consider development assistance* to be aid to countries as it 
has evolved since World War II. Some authors have treated resource transfers between 
countries during colonial times as a form of development assistance. While there have 
undoubtedly been transactions of this type that could be interpreted as some variation of 
development assistance they are beyond the scope of this study.
Development assistance as we know it today, and as it relates to the less 
developed countries, owes its origins to the Marshall Plan mounted in 1947 and to 
President Truman’s Point Four Program of 1948. In it he suggested bold and generous 
measures on the part of the West to aid the more unfortunate living in poverty.67 The 
Colombo Plan which came into being in 1950 was another example of the recognition of 
poverty in the countries of Asia.
In the discussion of aid many authors have pointed out that Bangladesh has 
not received an exceptionally large amount of aid vis-a-vis many other recipients either in 
terms of aid on a per capita basis or aid as a percentage of the GNP. This is true when 
compared to the countries of the Sahel for example. An examination of aid as a 
percentage of the GNP in different countries shows that the log of the amount of aid as a 
percentage of the GNP varies inversely with the log of the population of the recipient 
country giving a moderately good fit of r=-0.57.** Thus, countries that have received a 
high percentage of their GNP as aid tend to be small. As recipients increase in 
population the amount of aid that they receive decreases as a percentage of their GNP. 
Figure 1.1 shows a scatter diagram for the low income countries as defined by the World 
Development Report 1986. We see from Figure 1.1 that the only other less developed 
countries with populations of roughly the size of Bangladesh are Pakistan and Nigeria. 
Others, with populations of about half as much are the Philippines, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Thailand, and Turkey.
Some countries are clear anomalies. The reasons why they receive large 
amounts of aid are also evident. Ethiopia has suffered devastating droughts. Egypt, by
‘Development assistance, foreign aid, and aid are considered to be synonymous in the following chapters.
**See Appendix I.
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virtue of its geopolitical position and role in the Middle-East peace efforts has 
commanded very high aid allocations particularly from the United States.
FIGURE 1.1
Scatter Chart of Aid Receipts 
as a Percentage of GNP (1984)
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report: 1986 with a foreword by A.W. Clausen (New York: Oxford 
University Press for the World Bank, 1986), table 21, p. 220-221.
Zaire and Tanzania with populations of 29.7 million and 21.5 million respectively receive 
more and the reasons for this are less straightforward. The former’s geopolitical position 
and importance as a supplier of minerals give it considerable importance in the view of 
some donors. Tanzania is a special case in that it has stated publicly in the Arusha 
Declaration that it would attempt to achieve development with a minimum of external 
assistance. In fact this attempt at self reliance appears to have attracted aid. As Roger 
Young interprets the attitude of the donors of the time:
The Arusha Declaration provided a distinctive approach to development at a time of growing 
disenchantment with the ability of developing countries to alleviate widespread poverty. Regarded 
as an ambitious and just program for moving Tanzania out of the throes of poverty, it brought 
widespread international attention and approbation to Tanzania. It coincided with the earliest signs 
of the "Great Society" and the "Just Society" in North America and the growing discontent in 
Western Europe with the prevailing socio-economic order. It also appealed to the liberal and 
socialist governments of Western and t-astem countries respectively, who were soon to make 
Tanzania the "darling of Africa".6*
Chapter I
2 7
As we go down the scale we see that no other country with a population of 
over 10 million receives more aid, as a percentage of GNP, than Bangladesh. The 
significance of this is that donors have not only been prepared to give aid at a high level 
in proportion to the country’s size, but that they have been prepared to make aid available 
in very large amounts to Bangladesh.
FIGURE 1.2
Scatter Chart of Aid Receipts 
Per Capita (1984)
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report: 1986 with a foreword by A.W. Clausen (New York: Oxford 
University Presa for the World Bank, 1986), table 21, p. 220-221.
The same analysis can be carried out on the basis of aid received on a per 
capita basis with only slightly different results (see Figure 1.2).* We can conclude from 
the position of Bangladesh that it is anomalous. It is both a large country and it receives 
a relatively high level of aid as a percentage of GNP when compared to other countries of 
similar size (see Table 1.1).
Another measure of the importance of Bangladesh in the allocation of aid by 
bilateral donors is shown in Table 1.1. This shows Bangladesh’s aid receipts as a
*See Appendix II.
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percentage of total aid allocated to the least developed countries by major donors for 
selected years.
The significance of Table 1.1 is the relative importance Bangladesh plays in 
commanding access to the resources targeted to the low-income countries. Considering 
that Bangladesh has only 4 per cent of the population of the low-income countries, as 
classified by the World Bank,69 it receives a significantly higher share of the resources 
devoted to low-income countries than its importance would warrant. This is particularly 
apparent when considered with Figure 1.1 which has shown that the predisposition of 
donors is to spend proportionately more on smaller countries. Its position is skewed 
somewhat by the very large populations of India and China. Even when they are 
removed completely Bangladesh still accounts for only some 16 per cent of the popula­
tion of the low-income countries.
TABLE 1.1A 
Bangladesh’s Aid Receipts from DAC Countries 
(Expressed as a percentage of DAC members’ aid to low-income economies)
75/76 76/77® 77/78® 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84®
Australia 13.7% n/a n/a 19.5% 38.9% 37.3% 23.9% 10.8% n/a
Belgium 0.9 n/a n/a 2.2 0.47 0.91 3.3 3.1 n/a
Canada 4.7 n/a n/a 20.8 22.7 25.4 20.5 23.1 n/a
Denmark 8.6 n/a n/a 10.8 8.7 10.7 17.1 15.1 n/a
Finland 4.7 n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 1.2 4.7 0.0 n/a
France 2.1 n/a n/a 3.8 1.9 4.8 7.4 7.5 n/a
F.R.G. 8.3 n/a n/a 12.4 8.0 10.0 10.0 2.8 n/a
Italy 12.1 n/a n/a 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 n/a
Japan 11.1 n/a n/a 19.1 28.9 21.0 28.4 13.1 n/a
Netherlands 11.8 n/a n/a 5.5 6.8 12.2 15.7 9.4 n/a
New Zealand 4.7 n/a n/a 0.1 13.8 1.9 0.0 n/a n/a
Norway 7.9 n/a n/a 4.7 16.2 17.0 17.0 13.8 n/a
Sweden 6.3 n/a n/a 9.8 5.4 6.5 4.8 7.9 n/a
Switzerland 0.0 n/a n/a 1.6 12.8 8.2 11.1 1.8 n/a
United Kingdom 7.5 n/a n/a 21.0 10.5 8.0 6.1 12.9 n/a
United States 22.9 n/a n/a 20.4 25.3 16.7 13.4 16.2 n/a
Sources: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Report: 1986 (New York: Published for the World Bank by 
Oxford Press, 1986), table 20, p. 218-219, and from total aid figures in Bangladesh, Row of External Resources into Bangladesh (As 
of June 30. 19851. External Resources Division, Ministry of Finance, tables 4, 5 and 6, pp. 18-91.
AGreat care should be taken in interpreting these figures since the fiscal period over which the Government of Bangladesh 
calculates its aid receipts differs from that of the World Bank. The table is useful only in considering general orders of magnitude of 
the aid sent to Bangladesh as a percentage of any particular country’s total allocation to the least developed countries, 
fig u res  not available for certain years.
From the above we can conclude that Bangladesh is considered to be an 
important developing country by the largest donors. We examine the record of the major 
donors: the United States, France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Italy. All of these have contributed more than 
US$1,000 million in overseas development assistance to all developed countries in 1985.70
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We find that all, except for Italy which has only given to Bangladesh during periods of 
crisis,71 have made proportionately more of their aid allocated to the low-income 
economies, available to Bangladesh than appears to be warranted from its importance as a 
participant in the international economy or its geopolitical position. The United States, 
Japan and Canada, in recent years the three of the largest bilateral donors,72 have made 
available more than 20 per cent of the resources allocated to low-income economies to 
Bangladesh. Why has Bangladesh attracted the attention of so many donors and why 
have the donors sustained aid programmes over a lengthy period at comparatively high 
levels?
Evidence of Increasing Dependence
Despite the large amount of aid that has been provided to Bangladesh since its 
independence in 1971, the trends of increasing poverty linked with increasing dependence 
are disturbing. In The Crisis of External Dependence. Sobhan identifies several 
indicators which he terms "The Dimensions of Aid Dependence in Post-Liberation 
Bangladesh".73 These are the amount of aid, aid as a percentage of imports, gross 
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP, aid as a percentage of investment, aid as a 
percentage of the Annual Development Plan (ADP) and the percentage of loan financing 
in the development budget. The foregoing, while valid, outline the dimensions of 
dependence only at particular points in time. They do not show the trends of dependence. 
It is important to gain an appreciation of the trends in the process of increasing 
dependence versus the process of development. Table 1.2 gives some of the indicators.
Table 1.2 shows that the balance of trade has widened considerably since 
independence. The budget deficit is almost as serious as it was during the immediate 
post-war period of reconstruction, and well above what it was during the three years 
following independence. Tax revenue has stagnated since 1975/76 while aid has 
continued at relatively high levels. Finally, from the scanty data available, there is a 
perceptible worsening in the distribution of income.
The issue of inequitable distribution of the income is difficult to quantify 
precisely because of the paucity of data at the country level. However, measurements 
taken in 1973/7474 and two years later in 1976/7775 show a distinct shift in the allocation
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of household income toward the upper classes. This is particularly true of the wealthiest 
ten per cent.76 There are, however, other indications that the trend is continuing. What 
is striking is the very small increase in resources available to the poorest segments of the 
population as GDP increased (see Chapter IV, Tables 4.1 and 4.2.). Kuznets, Chenery 
and others argue that the U-hypothesis holds for very low income countries. This posits 
that income of the poorest 40 per cent of the population will tend to fall until incomes 
reach a certain level, after which it will start to rise again. Other scholars maintain that 
cross-country studies do not show a clear relationship between the income share of the 
poorest 40 per cent first dropping and then rising in relation to rising per capita GNP. 
Saith in analysing the work of Kuznets and Ahluwalia concludes by saying:
As a paradigm, the cross-country U-hypothesis is arguably more of a hindrance than an aid to our 
comprehension of the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. It obfuscates 
more than it clarifies.77
That living conditions in the rural areas have deteriorated has been amply 
documented by scholars. It is summarised in the Report on Rural Poverty in 
Bangladesh.78 The number of people living below the poverty line has grown as a 
percentage of the rural population during the period since independence (see Chapter IV, 
Table 4.5). There is a net outflow of resources from the rural areas.79 The rural sector 
imports fertiliser and other inputs from urban areas for agriculture, but it is constrained 
from exporting food grains to the urban areas because they receive a large proportion of 
their food needs from the Food Distribution System.
There is equal justification for believing that the standard of living in the 
urban areas for the poorer elements of the society has also deteriorated. There has, 
however, been less research conducted in this area as urban dwellers account for only 12 
per cent of the total population.80* The problem has not yet achieved the visibility in the 
research literature that rural poverty has, because Bangladesh is still largely a rural 
country.
Some estimates of urbanisation are much higher, but the Government changed the methodology of determining who were 
urban dwellers. There is no question but that urban poverty is rapidly becoming a serious problem, but it is relatively small when 
compared to the rural areas where the majority live.
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TABLE 1.2 
Economic Indicators 
(As a Percentage of GNP)
72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85A
Balance of Trade -6.6 -6.2 -7 . 4 -12.1 -6.0 -9.9 -9.9 -14.4 -12.8 -14. 7 -13.4 -11.0 -11.4
Budget Deficit 10.3 5.0 2.2 6. 1 8.2 8.0 8.8 11.1 8.2 9.9 10.2 9.1 9.9
Government Revenue 5.0 5. 5 5.4 8.2 9.4 9.5 8.6 9.2 9.8 9.7 9. 4 9.3 10.6
Foreign Aid 9. 1 5.0 6.4 11.1 7 . 8 8.6 9.1 9.6 8.0 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.3
Gross Domestic Savings n/a n/a 0.8 -1.9 3.2 2.7 3.0 2.0 2.3 -3.5 1.7 3.4
Distribution of Income-Highest 10% n/a 27 . 0 n/a n/a 32.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
-Lowest 40% n/a 18.2 n/a n/a 17 . 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sources: Balance of trade derived from tables 3.2, 3.3,3.4 and 3.8 in World Bank Report 6049-BD. Deficit is derived from tables 2.5 and 5.1
in World Bank Report No. 5409- Aid figures from Flow of External Resources fas at June 30. 1985 1. Gross national savings from table 2.7 World Bank
Report No. 5409. Distribution of Income from World Bank, World Development Report: 1 9 8 4 . (New York, Oxford University Press for The World Bank,
1984), table 28, pp. 272-273 and World Development Report: 1986 (New York: Oxford University for The World Bank, 1986), table 24, pp. 226-226.
C a l c u l a t e d  from projected budget figures rather than actual figures.
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In addition, there is evidence of growth in corruption parallelling the increase 
in development assistance. This might indicate that a substantial part of the foreign aid 
provided has been diverted into the hands of unscrupulous elements of the community. 
This is more difficult to document since it is such a sensitive subject. However, the 
evidence that is available partly explains the shift in the distribution of resources away 
from the poorer class, for whom they were ostensibly meant. Evidence points to the 
wealthiest segment of the population as the final beneficiaries of much of the benefits of 
aid. Furthermore, there arises the question as to whether much of such diverted 
resources would ever benefit Bangladesh at all, since it is quite likely that some, or all, of 
such gains would be re-exported or spent on imported luxury goods.81 Interestingly, 
studies carried out on income distribution before the secession from Pakistan indicate that 
while there was no reduction in the share of income of the top 5 per cent of the 
population there was significant improvement in the income share of the bottom 5 
per cent and the bottom 20 per cent.82 The trend appears to have reversed during the 
period following independence (see Table 4.2).
Why has this poor, relatively unimportant country been one of the world’s 
major recipients of development assistance particularly when its strategic importance is 
limited, its economic importance to the donor nations is minimal, and its record for 
equitable distribution of aid, a stated objective of most donors, is poor?
Why have donor countries continued to provide aid apparently with little 
regard for the ultimate beneficiaries when indicators show that the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line has been increasing?
An Aid-Dependence Paradigm
The concept of dependence as we have used it in this paper is that of John 
White and it is worth quoting his definition here:
The term "dependence" is used to mean a condition of constraint in which the "dependent" 
power is unable to make certain domestic choices, within some recognised and conventionally 
accepted set of options, unless some sort of permissive or enabling action is taken by the dominant 
power, and in which such constraints are very unevenly distributed between the two.83
He then goes on to differentiate it from inter-dependence:
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. . . Where such constraints are evenly distributed, one tends to speak of inter-dependence, which is 
a feature of the external relations of any country which is not completely autarkic, but is more 
conspicuous in the relations of developing countries with each other.84
Dependence as it relates to foreign aid, therefore, means that the dependent 
country is unable to carry on the regular operation of its economy without some second 
country taking enabling action, i.e., providing, or continuing to provide, foreign aid. 
Many developing countries which accept foreign aid, are not dependent. That is to say, 
while they may accept aid, they have the option of rejecting it and still being able to 
continue the regular operation of their economy, albeit at some cost in growth or the 
provision of services. Examples might be China or India, although the latter has 
experienced periods when its options were dangerously limited by an over-reliance on 
foreign aid. The implications of dependence are that the options open to the policy­
makers and leaders of the country are decreased, as they are increasingly constrained by 
the terms of donors, many of whom choose to influence their domestic policies. Some of 
the policies advocated by donors may be fundamentally opposed to the development 
philosophy the recipient espouses. If the recipient country has reached a stage of 
dependence, its leaders have no choice but to accede to the donors’ demands. Otherwise 
they will be unable to carry on the normal workings of government. Worse still is the 
position of the dependent country that receives conflicting advice from different donors. 
It is worth noting here that "dependence" is not to be confused with "dependency" 
theory".
The term "appropriation" is used throughout the study to mean the use of aid 
for purposes for which it was not originally intended by the donor. As such it covers 
both misappropriation and diversion by the recipient government to legitimate, but 
unintended uses. The former case clearly covers corruption and malfeasance; the latter 
could entail such uses as the sale of food aid to cover administrative or transport costs.
We will explain, through the use of a two-country model, an "aid-dependence 
paradigm", how a country changes from one seeking increased self-reliance and a better 
life for its people, to one caught in a position where its main objective has become the 
acquisition of foreign aid in order simply to continue functioning.
In terms of international relations theory Rosenau describes the former as one 
that is "intransigently adaptive",85 facing very strong demands from within the country. 
The phenomenon of dependence changes the nature of the country’s foreign policy to
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what he describes as "acquiescently adaptive".86 The government of the dependent 
country’s main preoccupation then becomes the attraction of foreign aid. Furthermore, 
we will show, in the case of Bangladesh, how it uses its extreme poverty as a rationale 
for continuing aid. However, the aid it receives contributes to an increasingly inequitable 
division of the very scarce resources available rather than to the alleviation of poverty or 
to the improvement of the standard of living of those who most need it. Increasing 
poverty in turn continues to serve as a justification for demanding still more aid.
The model will examine the role of the foreign aid donor and explain how the 
donor’s modalities of giving aid, and the evolution of the aid relationship contribute to 
growing dependence. The development of this situation is, however, the result of an 
entirely rational chain of decisions by individuals and a politically logical approach to the 
use of resources by the recipient government or by those individuals. In other words it 
stems from the pursuit of rational expectations by the policy-makers.87
By rational expectations we mean that people, in this case that the policy 
makers, form their views by taking account of all available information, including their 
biases as to how the economy works, and formulate their decisions accordingly.88 The 
model shows that in the environment of a developing country there are frequently factors 
that make rational short term expectations less rational in the long term. In the short 
history of development assistance there is only beginning to be a "long-term" from which 
to draw our conclusions. Furthermore, the lessons to be learned for our view of the long 
term are not without ambiguity. Our definition of "rational decision-making" in the 
model is therefore as follows. Decision-makers will draw upon their experience and 
knowledge and apply it to solve the most pressing problems facing them. Problems that 
are less urgent will tend to be deferred until there is time, and the resources are available 
to attend to them. In the urgency of keeping a poor country functioning in the 
international economic environment with very limited resources, this may be a long time.
The government in our model does not consciously seek to exploit the less 
endowed citizens of the country, nor to favour those that are already relatively well off; 
they simply take decisions that will solve the immediate problems they face. 
Furthermore, the problem is not easily dismissed by the explanation that the inefficiencies 
are simply inherent in the system of any developing country. Many senior decision­
makers in developing countries have experience in areas outside their home environment,
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in such organisations as the international development banks, multilateral agencies or 
trans-national corporations. They have acquitted themselves well in those environments. 
Indeed, some examples are available where they have succeeded even within the 
environment of the developing country.
The model is composed of two parts. The first describes the country’s 
reaction to a "resource windfall". The process takes place initially over a relatively short 
period of time. Therefore, it is not applicable to countries which, for example, are 
primarily dependent on natural resource based industries that have been developed over a 
long period or have developed an export-oriented agricultural sector. We term this 
sudden growth in access to resources a "resource windfall".
The second part of the model shows the symbiotic relationship that develops 
between the two principal parties: the established governing upper class which controls 
the economy and bureaucracy, and the aid bureaucracies of the bilateral and multilateral 
donors.
The model shows that even leaders of a country who have tried to improve 
the lot of the poorest of the poor have been led to a series of policies, when faced with 
the political realities of governing an emerging nation with scarce resources, well suited 
to remaining in power, but not necessarily appropriate to solving the problems of a 
population living at the very margin of subsistence. Furthermore, this misallocation of 
the resources that have been made available has to a significant extent subverted the 
society’s traditional values leaving it even more open to abuse. The response of the 
donors is to accept the status quo. Thus, the provision of aid has continued.
The result is that decision-makers follow an entirely rational decision-making 
process in accepting all the aid that they can. They avoid making difficult decisions 
regarding the mobilisation and allocation of the country’s very scarce resources. Donors 
continue to provide aid with little regard for the effects that it has on the long term 
economic objectives of the country’s economic development and on the fabric of the 
society. Poverty remains a justification for aid. In other words poverty becomes a 
resource in itself. It is a political resource rather than a tangible one but, like a strategic 
geographic position, it can attract aid. The closest analogy might be a scenic 
environment in a country, which together with the appropriate information and 
infrastructure, attracts tourists and with them foreign exchange. Poverty with the
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appropriate presentation, the right rhetoric, a few well publicised disasters, etc., attracts 
donors, and with them foreign exchange.
There are examples in the real world. The large number of refugees in 
Somalia attracts aid. The existence of the Palestinian refugees justifies the existence of 
the PLO and the funds that they seek to establish a Palestinian state.
There are several kinds of "resource windfall" sharing certain common 
characteristics. The type that we are concerned with in this paper is that of a sudden 
influx of foreign aid. It might be in the form of emergency relief which might follow a 
disaster, and which then evolves into a development programme. The "resource 
windfall" might also be caused by a change in the political acceptance of a regime, such 
as Zimbabwe. Another example is the 1987 Peace Accord signed between President 
Jayewardene of Sri Lanka and Prime Minister Gandhi of India designed to bring an end 
to the communal strife between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority. Some 
examples of occurrences that stimulate an aid "resource windfall" might be natural 
disasters, such as the cyclone in 1970 in Bangladesh, the 1974 famine in the same 
country, the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s, the Ethiopian drought of the same 
period, the Ethiopian drought of the early 1980s, or the earthquakes in Nicaragua and 
Mexico. A "resource windfall" of foreign aid may alternately be a response to a man- 
made disaster such as the American effort to win the "hearts and the minds of the people" 
in South Vietnam during the war. Another was the influx of Americans into Cambodia 
in the early 1960s and again following the invasion of that country in 1969. Yet another 
comparison might be the Philippines following the demise of the Marcos regime and the 
assumption of power by Mrs Aquino.
Other examples of "resource windfalls" might be the discovery of oil, or a 
rapid rise in the price of oil or some other natural resource, such as has happened in 
Nigeria, Indonesia, the Middle Eastern countries, the United Kingdom, Norway and 
others. These do not share the same international relations context that aid has, because 
the resource originates from within the country, although there is an international context 
since the wealth is derived from its value in the international marketplace. Another sort 
of "resource windfall" might be the sudden influx of capital for a project such as the 
building of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the late nineteenth century.89
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A further, but slightly different, example of a "resource windfall" is the rapid 
growth in production of the raw material for the manufacture of narcotics. There is an 
international relations context in this case, and while it may share some of the attributes 
of foreign aid as countries search for alternate resource generating occupations by 
attempting to introduce new crops, the international relations context is quite different 
because there are conflicting forces: one, the drug cartel, is trying to encourage the 
growth of the resource; the others, domestic and international drug enforcement agencies, 
is trying to discourage the growth of the resource.
What makes the case of aid interesting is that the resources being provided are 
the result of largesse on the part of a group of countries outside the recipient country. It 
is fair to presume that they have certain expectations about how their resources are put to 
use. The perceptions and reactions, or lack thereof, of these donors to the effects of the 
aid that they provide form the second part of our model.
The more developed the country, the less attractive this kind of windfall is to 
those who would "appropriate" it. Relief goods, for example, are of less interest to a 
well endowed population of a with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income than 
they are to the population of a very poor country with very little in the way of material 
goods. Thus, the misuse of relief goods tends to be higher in a very poor country than it 
is in a wealthy country.
Clearly the degree of dependence that the "resource windfall" generates will 
differ from case to case, although it is probably present to some degree in most 
examples. For example, the Norwegian economy has both benefitted from a "resource 
windfall", North Sea oil, and has suffered from the fall in the international price of oil in 
the middle 1980s. The strength of the country’s social institutions, however, precluded it 
from conforming to the model we propose for developing countries. Other developing 
countries, such as Tanzania and Botswana, have survived the "resource windfall" with 
less effect perhaps because the windfall itself was slower in coming, but more likely 
because of the integrity of their leadership and the strength it provided to the country’s 
institutions.
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It will be easier to conceive of the effects of this if it is presented in the form 
of a narrative describing our hypothetical two-country model in which the following
actors take part:
Country A The recipient, a low-income country.
Country B The donor, an industrialised country also having 
trading interests.
Importer M An established agent and contractor in Country A 
representing Manufacturer X.
Importer N A new agent who responds to new market 
opportunities and represents Manufacturer Y.
Manufacturer X A manufacturer of transportation equipment in Coun­
try B who is a traditional exporter to Country A.
Manufacturer Y A competing manufacturer of transportation 
equipment in Country B who is not a traditional
exporter.
Phase I: the origin of the windfall: Country A is independent and has a large 
peasant population engaged mainly in subsistence agriculture in the informal sector. The 
small upper class are for the most part engaged in the modern sector. Agricultural 
produce is the main export crop and the proceeds therefrom are the prime source of 
revenue for government. As with most mono-crop economies, Country A suffers from 
the fluctuations of the international marketplace, deteriorating terms of trade and balance 
of payments problems. The revenue that accrues to the government has hitherto 
depended on the relatively low rate of private savings, some overseas investment and pos­
sibly some foreign aid to finance investment. Growth has been slow because resources 
are limited. Country A is characterised by a dual economy comprising traditional and 
modern sectors. The investment that has been made to date has been largely in the 
modern sector, because the traditional economy is difficult of access. Some organisations 
for tackling the problems of the development of the rural areas are in the process of 
formation, but still in the embryonic stage. Social infrastructure is minimal, literacy 
rates are low and markets, even within the country, relatively undeveloped. The 
traditional customs of the country such as the extended family, etc., tend to provide the 
care and services which in the industrialised countries are part of the social welfare 
system.
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The political system, has been modelled on a western democratic model, but 
has evolved into a system where the political power is in the hands of a minority, linked 
by family ties or business connections, and having in common the benefits of education 
and comparative wealth. It retains the trappings of democracy. Even the members of 
the judiciary are drawn from this same relatively small group of people who make up the 
upper class. This makes it is subject to the same rules as the rest of the elite. In short 
our hypothetical Country A has the characteristics of most underdeveloped countries.
Country B is a modern industrialised nation with a strong surplus agriculture 
sector. It exports both agricultural produce and finished goods. It maintains a small 
embassy and relations are cordial.
The "resource windfall" of foreign aid has been a response to a major crop 
failure. The reaction of Country B is to give food aid in order to alleviate the possibility 
of starvation or widespread malnutrition. This also provides balance of payments support 
since Country A would otherwise have to import food to make up the shortfall.
Whether Country A is a food deficit country or not, the usual response to an 
emergency is with food aid. This is because food is the fastest disbursing form of aid. 
Conceivably Country B might have responded first through an international emergency 
relief organisation, and may do so in any case, but Country B wants the much higher 
political visibility that comes with bilateral aid. Country A is the sudden recipient of a 
large quantity of food.
The first reaction of the government to the "resource windfall" is to allocate it 
to the traditional sector which comprises the majority of the poor, who have been most 
affected by the disaster, by distributing food to them. Problems are encountered in the 
distribution of the food aid because the inadequate transport facilities which exist rapidly 
become congested. Therefore, not all the food can be distributed. Once an initial effort 
has been made to allocate some of the resources to those who have suffered, Country A 
requests Country B’s permission to divert a portion of the food aid for public sale. The 
proceeds are to be used to make up the deficiencies of the transport system and to 
monitor the distribution. Permission is granted. An allocation is made to investment in 
the modem sector for new trucks to improve the efficiency of distribution to the 
traditional sector ("appropriation" of aid by government). All this takes time and while
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the food is in storage, pilferage occurs ("appropriation" through low level corruption). 
Monitoring at this point is not yet in place and, therefore, controls are inadequate.
Country B has an embassy in Country A, but Embassy personnel are unable 
to detect pilferage since there is unlikely to be anyone experienced in the bulk handling of 
food grains. Pilfered food is either put onto the market or smuggled to neighbouring 
countries to be sold. Even if theft becomes blatant and is detected, there is little that the 
embassy can do about it other than to make representations to the government of 
Country A. They are given assurances that steps to monitor the food transportation more 
carefully have been taken.
Country A’s government turns to the private sector to acquire more trucks. 
The Government hires more personnel to run and maintain an expanded transport fleet 
and turns to contractors to supplement it. In the small modern transport sector private 
contractors vie for the contracts to supply trucks to the Government. They are prepared 
to pay inducements to the decision-makers for them (high level corruption). A well 
established private domestic contractor with friends in the government, Importer M, is 
awarded the transport contract. He represents Manufacturer X.
Truck Manufacturer X is an established builder and exporter of trucks from 
Country B. The contract is awarded at an inflated price. The excess profits are kept 
outside Country A to avoid exchange controls. This is done by over-invoicing.* Profits 
may be invested abroad or spent on luxury goods. This allows Importer M to maintain 
foreign exchange abroad either for offshore investment or to spend on luxury goods. 
Manufacturer X has developed a new or expanded market for which he has paid 
inducements through Importer M to officials in Country B to maintain his position in the 
face of competition from other importers (high level corruption from outside). 
Importer M has become dependent on government contracts, and indirectly on food aid, 
to maintain his enterprise and his higher standard of living.
The government of Country A has come to rely on "appropriated" aid to 
cover the distribution of the food. Since this is a time of hardship, it has deferred the 
imposition of taxes to cover the new costs. Nor has it decided to forego any other 
activity to economise. Some food aid, originally destined to ward off a potential famine,
*The foreign exchange monies are not all paid to Manufacturer A. The difference between the real cost and the inflated price 
charged for the equipment, is banked offshore in the name of Contractor M.
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is used to cover day to day recurrent administrative costs in the transport sector. The 
withdrawal of the food aid once it is no longer required would result in the necessity of 
the Country A’s government releasing newly hired government employees, not a 
politically popular step. The Government of Country A has become dependent upon 
continued supplies of food to maintain a part of its civil service establishment.
This reallocation of the "resource windfall" supplements the resources of the 
state, at least on a temporary basis, and is justified to make more effective use of the 
"resource windfall". This is a better alternative for Country A’s government than 
taxation. The use of the "resource windfall" to defer increases in taxation, particularly 
direct taxation, on a "temporary" basis is perceived as a great advantage by Country A’s 
decision-makers. Finally, the government of Country A uses some of the funds 
generated to hire additional drivers to drive the new trucks and new personnel to monitor 
the food delivery.
Phase II: Consolidation of the windfall: The response of Country B to the 
event which triggered the "resource windfall", a major crop failure, leads to closer 
political ties between the two countries. This, together with the response of private 
citizens in Country B, leads to increased awareness of the needs of Country A. Increased 
awareness in turn results in both private aid through non-governmental organisations and 
longer term food aid to supplement the emergency food aid. Thus, the consolidation of 
the windfall "resource windfall" occurs.
Distribution of the food aid in the traditional sector proves to be difficult. 
There are few institutions equipped to absorb and distribute it. The institutions that do 
exist are not sufficiently developed to handle the greatly increased flow very effectively. 
An increasing portion is, therefore, sold to support other activities. Since Country B has 
given the food aid for developmental reasons, it stipulates that the funds derived from it 
cannot be used for direct budgetary support. They must be used for development 
activities.
It follows, therefore, that the development activities take the form of 
investment in social infrastructure such as schools, roads and bridges. These are attrac­
tive investments because it is possible to use the private sector to carry out the physical 
construction of such infrastructure. A village school, no matter how badly built, can be 
verified and is tangible evidence of the investment, and attests to government’s sincerity
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in attempting to direct increased resources to the traditional sector. Improved health 
training, more teachers, better agricultural services are also promised to staff the new 
facilities. This gives the decision-makers within the government of Country A the 
opportunity to use the "resource windfall" as a form of patronage.
There emerges, therefore, a vested interest among the clients in seeing the 
resource flow continue, and there develops a group of middle-men who assume certain 
roles, representatives, agents, customs clearance agents, influence peddlers, "facilitators", 
etc. These outsiders who benefit have an interest in seeing the flow continue. 
Furthermore, to the Government, there still exists a need for imports because of the 
revenue they generate within the country.
One of the effects of the "resource windfall" is bound to be inflation. The 
amount of new resources is large in terms of the country’s total resource endowment. 
Increasing demand will bid up prices in an environment of relative scarcity. Personal 
expectations in the civil service, as elsewhere, will rise as others around are seen to 
benefit, but remuneration in the civil service will diminish both comparatively, with in­
creased resources going to the private sector, and absolutely in the face of inflation. 
Decision-making has become marketable. A patron-client relationship grows between the 
businessmen seeking remunerative work, either directly or as agents of foreign 
companies, and the decision-makers.
The award of contracts begins, but the capacity of the government and the 
donor to monitor progress is limited. Abuses occur and with a weak system of law and 
order nothing happens. The legal/judicial system has not yet adjusted to the new tempo 
or benefitted from the new resources.
If a strict moral and legal code is in effect and people feel that they are 
reasonably well off the payment of inducements may well be nipped in the bud and 
violators of the law persecuted. In the case of a poor country this is unlikely to happen 
because even the middle class are not very well off when compared to the middle-classes 
of the developed countries. In a country where aid, with expensive technical assistance, 
is in evidence this division becomes increasingly obvious. In order to sustain the system, 
inducements are therefore shared with others to keep them satisfied.
Decision-makers are the key to access to this resource for those who have 
limited resources insufficient to finance the overseas training. Beneficiaries are selected
Chapter I
43
because they are available and because there is a premium to be gained from their 
selection. Decision-makers are susceptible to inducement. There is a government bias 
against technical assistance. First, outsiders are bound to try to influence the manner in 
which the resources are used. Second, their remuneration is a great deal larger than that 
of their counterparts and thus become a source of resentment. The greater remuneration 
that they receive is also likely to make them less susceptible to inducement.*
As the boom in truck imports continues Importer N seeks to establish his 
position, and obtain a share of the new resources, by offering favours to decision-makers, 
people in influential positions in government ranging from the country’s political leaders, 
through civil servants, to locally elected officials in local councils, in return for 
consideration in the allocation of the resources. There is a feeling of urgency that he 
must acquire his share as quickly as possible while the windfall lasts.
Meanwhile, exporters from Country B are vying for what has become, with 
the new resources now available, a growing market. Manufacturer Y sees an opportunity 
and turns to Importer N to try to penetrate the truck market. One of the most effective 
means of breaking the hold of those established importers is to offer more inducement to 
the decision-makers. Despite increasingly stringent domestic regulations against such 
payments in the export countries, Manufacturer Y is usually willing to take the risk and 
ensure that adequate inducements can be paid. He can do this, first, because the amount 
of inducement in a developing country is not comparatively great, and second, because it 
is almost impossible for the government of Country B to differentiate between a 
legitimate agent’s commission and a legitimate agent’s commission with sufficient surplus 
to pay an inducement to a decision-maker.**
The officers of the Embassy of Country B, one of whose functions is to 
promote trade, ignore wrongdoing, first, because they are probably not aware of it. 
Second, even if they are aware, they find it almost impossible to prove wrongdoing in 
their own courts given lack of cooperation in Country A. Third, because they would 
conceivably not be able to find support from within the bureaucracy or leadership of
*This is not always true and Lifschultz in The Unfinished Revolution, p. 41 recounts how at least one foreign relief worker 
managed steal over $1,000,000 and to finance the purchase of a hotel in Sardinia during the 1974 Bangladesh famine.
**The Lockheed scandal was an example where the amounts paid were so large and paid to such senior people that it became 
impossible to hide. It emerged because the people who wanted to expose it were relatively well off and not motivated by need, hence 
not as susceptible to inducement.
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Country B’s government. They do not want to be seen to be in conflict with 
Country B’s trade objectives, particularly when the companies, Manufacturers X and Y, 
which stand to gain, may be the patrons of a party in power in Country B.
It does not take long for the administrative system of Country A to be 
undermined. Decisions are no longer made on a basis which meets development needs, 
but rather for personal gain. When many individuals within a system are compromised 
the whole system becomes compromised. The efficiency of the administration suffers 
because it is impossible to enforce authority without becoming vulnerable, although 
punishment for wrongdoing will still be meted out if it is so blatant as to be embarrassing 
to those in power.
At more senior levels, relations between officials of both countries become 
closer. This is supported by discreet lobbying by Manufacturer X who wishes to 
maintain his market. Country B decides to mount a complete development programme of 
regular food aid to supplement the emergency aid. The embassy is given an aid section 
to administer the programme. The net addition of food that is sold on the open market 
accrues to the government of Country A as additional revenue and reduces the need to 
raise taxes. Supervision is improved and pilferage is reduced, but the systems for 
diverting food both legally, to cover administrative expenses, and illegally, to compensate 
decision-makers for making the "right" decisions, are already established and functioning. 
Short of monitoring the food at every step, from the ship to the mouths of the people, 
clearly impractical given the structure of the aid administration system, it is supposed to 
feed there is virtually no way the aid personnel of Country B can be assured that it all 
gets there.
The Embassy in our model now also comprises the overseas arm of 
Country B’s foreign aid agency that is delivering aid in addition to fulfilling its trade 
function. With the "resource windfall" component of our model defined, let us examine 
the role of the embassy with more specificity in our example.
We must bear in mind that it is not the supply of food per se that causes the 
system to start to break down. It is the provision of a large quantity of a resource that 
strains the existing system, in our example, transport. This creates precedents, selling 
some of the food and contracting the transport, which, once established, in a manner that
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makes them vulnerable to abuse, causes the existing system, hitherto honest, to start to 
break down.
It would be possible to develop the model further, but it may be of more 
utility to return to the real, and much more complex world, in order to analyse the 
reactions to a "resource windfall" that has actually occurred in Bangladesh. Other 
examples will be reviewed in Chapter VI.
The model will be used to trace the origin and growth of aid in Bangladesh in 
the following chapters. Bangladesh is, however, by no means a unique situation. 
Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and the countries of the Sahel all offer similar models. The only 
additional element that we will have to consider with the addition of foreign aid for relief 
is the transition from aid provided for relief to aid designed to promote the development 
of the country.
The term development is more open to a number of interpretations so for the 
sake of clarity we will adopt the definition of development given by John White:
Development is a process of social change which:
1. Increases the total benefits available;
2. Distributes new benefits in some inverse ratio to the distribution of benefits already acquired;
3. Offers some assurance of being a process that can be sustained over time.90
This then is the theoretical objective of development assistance. This 
differentiates it from emergency relief aid, which is aimed at the alleviation of suffering 
caused by some disaster, natural or man-made. Emergency aid is designed to relieve 
those who are suffering and, if possible, to restore them to the same standard that they 
enjoyed before the disaster. It consists of a basket of standard responses depending on 
the nature of the emergency. These might be the provision of food, clothing, shelter and 
medical supplies designed to increase the total benefits of a particular part of the 
population. Hence, distribution among different socio-economic groups should not be an 
issue, although we shall see that it does, indeed, become an issue.
We are now faced with a problem. We have seen from the above the use to 
which the "resource windfall" is being put does not coincide with the definition of 
furthering the development of Country A. The first part of the definition of develop­
ment is met and the total resources of the country are increased, whether by the exact 
amount of aid provided or not, is not necessarily determined. There may be some
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leakage as illegally acquired gains are exported to safe havens. The second part of the 
definition is not met. The additional resources are accruing to those who already have 
benefits in a direct ratio rather than an inverse ratio. The third part of the definition is 
clearly not being met. Relief aid is by definition transitory. It must now be converted 
into development aid to begin the next phase.
The resources provided are not going to make the poorer elements of society 
more productive, although they may conceivably be invested and contribute to economic 
growth. As we have seen growth is not necessarily equated with development.
With the introduction of a foreign donor we are faced with another 
complication. Since we are considering a "resource windfall", in this case in response to 
a crop failure. Those who have suffered most from this disaster are likely to be a clearly 
identifiable segment of the population: people without access to food. Donors who enter 
the scene for this reason will be interested in providing relief, in making available 
resources to those who suffered to correct the problem and return them to the same state 
that they were in before the disaster.
Relief programmes are usually mounted for humanitarian reasons alone. 
Given their suddenness and their unexpected nature, it is unlikely that donors enter into 
relief programmes for the political and economic reasons that will be outlined in 
Chapter II. The primary motivation is humanitarian. The experience in Ethiopia 
supports this contention. Despite the fact that there was a Marxist government with close 
ties to the Soviet Union in power at the time of the famine in the early 1980s, most 
emergency relief aid came from the western countries. Their governments were moved 
to action by individuals and groups shocked by the reports of famine that trickled out. 
Few western countries had substantial development programmes in Ethiopia at the time.
In order for the relief aid to evolve into development assistance there must be 
some reason. This will differ from country to country. It is usually for the reasons 
outlined in Chapter V, political, economic or humanitarian, or a combination of them. It 
is conceivable also, but less likely, that following the relief effort, aid reverts to its 
previous status at a significantly lower level. There are several reasons why this is not 
likely to happen except when the political philosophies of the two countries are 
diametrically opposed. The domestic public of Country B contribute to an emergency 
through private non-governmental agencies, and, therefore, some elements in Country B’s
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community will develop a continuing interest in the recipient. New political linkages are 
also forged by the provision of relief aid, as are in time, new economic linkages. The 
development problems of Country A are perceived in a new light by the government and 
citizens of Country B. Interest may be stirred amongst parliamentarians and this factor 
alone can be important in the level of aid a country receives.91 A new relationship is 
formed and a coalition of interest groups develops, business, humanitarian and political, 
with an interest in transforming the relationship to a more permanent one. Depending 
upon the sophistication of Country A ’s government they may even make a deliberate 
effort to cultivate Country B’s media and government officials with a view to continuing 
the new partnership.
Three areas are not so clear, however; the tolerance of impropriety by 
Country A’s civil servants and members of Country A’s government in the dispensation 
of inducements that may not be in the public interest, and the ostrich-like attitude of 
Country B’s diplomats, for example. There are too many factors that could sway the 
argument one way or the other that are not included in our model. The complexity of 
dealing with misappropriation may vary from government to government amongst donor 
countries, or even from ministry to ministry within a donor country. The attitude of 
trade promotion people may be a wink and a shrug to a practice that goes on the world 
over. An aid administrator might take a different view, but he would think twice before 
jeopardising an important commercial transaction, even if it was financed by aid. A 
Ministry of Justice would likely take a very stem view of a bureaucrat’s responsibilities, 
but whether it would be translated into action is moot. In the meantime a bureaucrat who 
might have cost a company considerable sums would be very vulnerable indeed. Suffice 
it to say that there is evidence, which we will see in Chapter III, that blatant corruption is 
ignored by donor governments who are tom between the desire for accountability and the 
fear of being criticised for callousness.
Nevertheless, we have identified some key decision points that bear further 
analysis. We will show in subsequent chapters that some kinds of foreign aid have been 
a major contributory factor in the increasingly inequitable distribution of income. 
Furthermore, the donors who have emphasised their desire to help the poorest in society 
appear to be oblivious that most aid does little towards improving the quality of life for 
the poorer parts of the society. Problems that have been identified continue not to be
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addressed. Aid continues to flow in much the same manner as it did before the problems 
were identified. In sum, we find that much foreign aid is not contributing to 
development as we have defined it.
The final stage, that of dependence, comes when the government can no 
longer continue to operate a viable economy without aid. When the proportion of aid 
that has been "appropriated" by the government is critical to the continued operation of 
that government, and insufficient alternative sources of revenue exist to replace those 
resources, then we can say that it has become dependent, the normal functioning of the 
government ceases and it is replaced by a system imposed by whatever group was able to 
wield enough power. Alternatively, it results in anarchy. The dependence stage may be 
inevitable for some countries that simply do not have the resources to be viable and self- 
sustaining, but for others it is brought about by an over-reliance on external resources and 
a neglect of the development of the county’s own potential. Despite this, donors have 
continued to provide economic assistance with little critical analysis of the negative 
effects.
Some Limitations to the Model
This very simple example of a two country relationship has a number of 
limitations. It cannot replicate precisely the problems that a developing country faces in 
the real world since these vary from country to country and from region to region and 
even among different regions in the same country.
The relationships among countries, particularly among developed countries 
and low-income countries vary widely depending on the political nature and economic 
situation of each. In Chapters II and V, we will examine the motivations for both 
accepting and giving aid and see that they vary widely. What the model is designed to 
do is to highlight some aspects that bear close examination in the context of the particular 
country, or countries, that we are concerned with. It is a road-map showing us the route, 
but not the scenery.
As we see in Chapter V, donors too have widely varying motives for 
providing aid, ranging from those who take a continuing interest and even participation, 
in the management of the economy and making their assistance contingent on certain
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economic and political policies being carried out, to those who provide aid on a once-off 
basis as a gesture which that be a response to a disaster or a symbol of solidarity at some 
political stance.
The external economic environment will have considerable bearing on the 
manner in which different countries utilise foreign aid. This means that reactions will 
differ over time depending upon whether the external economic environment is having a 
positive or negative effect on development at any particular moment in time.
The cultural aspects of both donors and recipients vary. As we will see in 
Bangladesh, one of the aspects of the society is concerned with the patron/client 
relationship. Similar phenomena are observable in other countries and we find that parti­
cular traits or customs in the society have much to do with the manner in which foreign 
aid, or for that matter, some other "resource windfall" is treated.* In Bangladesh the 
concept of day a. grace or blessing ". . .implies an indulgent redistribution of wealth, 
abstract goodness, and personal aura. It is an essential component of the Bengali 
conception of hierarchy."92 Likewise, in Bangladesh, the personalisation of authority93 
and the appearance of excessive authoritarianism94 lead to different reactions to the 
appearance of wealth than would be regarded as acceptable in Western society. So when 
we refer to inducements being paid in our model, they are not necessarily done in the 
same cultural context as bribes would be regarded in the United Kingdom or Canada. 
These variations make the assessment of the impact of development assistance very 
difficult to ascertain. Should its impact be assessed in terms of the prevailing customs of 
the donor or the recipient? This study does not pretend to provide an answer to this 
question, but it does raise it as a difficulty faced both by donor and recipient in the 
provision and utilisation of foreign aid.
The country’s resource endowment has an effect. The resource endowments 
of various developing countries vary widely from the oil rich countries of the Middle East 
to the micro-states of the Pacific. The domestic development of local wealth, such as 
the nationalisation of gold mines in Ghana, or allowing its controlled exploitation by 
outsiders, such as the policy followed by Botswana, are examples. These situations vary
*For example in West Africa origins of the "dash”, a tribute of respect paid to someone senior, was frequently misunderstood 
by Westerners. The traditional custom, while retaining its original meaning, was over time corrupted by the increase in resources 
available to become a bribe rather than simply a token of respect.
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widely with such factors as the political views, educational level, access to financial 
resources from country to country and result in widely differing results. Differing 
political philosophies in turn lead to different utilisation of foreign aid.
The strengths of individual institutions vary widely. Some institutions have 
developed, through good management and continuity of leadership, into organisations 
well equipped to administer a "resource windfall". Others are barely capable of 
continuing to operate. Although governments tend to be associated with one type or 
another of the two extremes, many variations are found in between. Some examples of 
these success stories, developed by strong institutions or individuals, are described in 
Chapter VI to show that even a chronically unstable country such as Bangladesh, has the 
potential to succeed when given the opportunity.
A Hypothesis
From the model it should be possible to formulate a hypothesis that will 
predict the likely course of events in the event of a "resource windfall". The aid 
resources that accrue to a country are used to further the economic and social 
development of that country, assuming the ruling government has as an objective the 
improvement of the interests of the majority of the country’s population as one of its 
foremost objectives. A proportion of the aid resources is deducted by the government as 
a charge for facilitating the channelling of resources to the poorer elements of the society. 
Some resources will also be "appropriated" by the wealthier elements of the society. 
However, as long as the available amount of the resource remains relatively scarce, and 
any significant diversion would be readily noticed, the rule of law will moderate the 
amount that can be "appropriated". When the resources provided begin to exceed the 
opportunities for investment, the proportion that can be "appropriated" will rise, and to a 
new higher proportion. As government seeks to optimise the activities that were funded 
with its share of the resources, the upper class will seek to further improve further their 
standard of living. The rationale for permitting this is that misused resources are better 
than no resources at all.
When the situation is reached where the resources exceed the opportunities for 
useful expenditure for the purpose for which they were provided, the two parties closest
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to the resources, the government and the upper class, will find alternative uses for the 
resources rather than refuse to accept them. The resources in excess of absorptive 
capacity will, therefore, benefit the government and the upper class, but not the poorer 
elements of the population. This is so because the channels by which resources are 
delivered to the poorer elements are congested. Part of the portion "appropriated", being 
illegal gains, will not be taxed and will probably be largely removed from the system 
through deposits in foreign accounts and or expenditures on foreign made luxury goods.95
It is possible to predict that, if the amount deducted by the government plus 
the amount "appropriated" by the upper class exceeds the proportion of income 
distribution that the upper classes receive, then the foreign aid, even in a period when aid 
is rising in real terms, will tend to result in a negative distributive effect.
Put in a slightly different way, if the ratio of aid "appropriated", deducted by 
the government plus the amount diverted by the upper class, to the amount of aid spent 
on the poorer elements of the society exceeds the ratio of income distribution between the 
upper class to the poorer classes, taking into account both aid for consumption and for 
investment, then, other things being equal, the foreign aid will tend to increase the 
proportion of wealth in the hands of the rich and decrease the proportion in the hands of 
the poor. It should be borne in mind that one of the main characteristics of developing 
countries is that they have a small upper class in proportion to their poorer classes and 
exceptis excipiendis an unequal distribution of income. The upper class generally 
controls a large proportion of the resources and commands a greater share of the income. 
The implication for donors is that in order to bring about a positive shift in income 
distribution it is necessary to concentrate a larger proportion of aid on the poor than their 
share of the existing income distribution. Thus, as long as a greater proportion of the 
investment is spent in the modern sector where, in the short term, it will benefit largely 
the upper class, since the poorer classes are for the most part in the traditional sector, it 
will tend to shift income distribution further toward the upper classes.
It is possible to posit further that if the "resource windfall" lessens, the 
proportion that has been "appropriated" will rise since, as the upper class control the 
allocation of the resource, they will seek to preserve their share in real terms, although 
demonstrating it goes beyond the scope of this study. The government will behave 
likewise, having institutionalised its "appropriated" portion, and will continue the activ­
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ities which originated when the aid started. Consequently the amount of the resources 
devoted to the economic development and the social betterment of the poorer elements of 
the society will diminish, not only in proportion to overall resource availability, but by a 
greater factor, as the government and the upper class seek to maintain their share in real 
terms.
The upper class, having gained influence by virtue of their access to greater 
resources and consequently the ability to influence the decision-making process, will also 
be better able to influence the government to preserve its share, should the flow of re­
sources lessen. This in turn will result in increasing economic problems for the poor 
which will justify a renewed appeal to the donors for more aid. Donors may at some 
point demand some concessions on the part of the government in terms of the economic 
policies that they are pursuing, but they are unlikely to direct greater amounts of aid 
toward the poor elements of the society. Thus, as the share of the poorer elements 
decreases there will be increasing justification for increased flows of the resource to 
counteract the continuing or increasing need.
From the perspective of the donor there are many factors in addition to the 
betterment of the lot of the least advantaged that govern both the eligibility of a country 
for foreign aid, and the quantity of aid that it is prepared to make available. The 
situation will appear stable, at least for some period of time, and the donor will continue 
to provide aid, subject to its availability in the face of conflicting domestic demands. In 
an aid environment in which total aid is not growing in real terms the process described 
in the two preceding paragraphs will occur, albeit not in as dramatic a manner as it would 
in a case of aid decreasing in real terms. The process is, however, dynamic rather than 
static, and at some point there is likely to be either dissent (rebellion or revolution), a 
depression or some other internal event which causes disruption in the recipient country. 
Likewise the donor country will continue until the diversion of resources begins to cause 
domestic political problems at which point it may, as a final resort, cut aid, thus resulting 
in an acceleration of the process.
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From the simple model that we have outlined above it should be possible to 
draw some conclusions as to the characteristics and evidence of dependence which would 
be found in a real country caught in the same predicament as our Country A. In the 
Chapter II we will look at conventional development theory and the characteristics that 
we would expect to be found in a country which conforms to conventional theory. In 
Chapter III, we examine a real situation, that of Bangladesh, and compare the evidence 
with the predictions from the "aid-dependence paradigm" and the predictions from the 
conventional theory.
The political economy of an aid-dependent regime. In considering the 
evidence that would support the dependence paradigm and its impact on the political 
economy, one would expect the regime to be characterised generally by an ineffectual 
approach to the process of promoting development. The leadership and the administrative 
machinery, inexperienced and weak, have never had the opportunity to develop and 
mature. They would be unable to cope with the difficult choices to be made regarding 
the allocation of resources. Instead, the administration’s concern would focus on the 
objective of consolidating the power base with the objective of achieving sustained stab­
ility and growth, although rhetoric will pay appropriate attention to the problem of 
poverty. We expect a tendency on the part of the leadership to equate the conferring of 
favours upon political supporters with the sharing of benefits with the population as a 
whole. Political supporters would sustain this misconception. Gradually the resources 
available would be directed to short term objectives as problems arose. Increasingly 
resources would be "appropriated" to meet the requirements of patronage. We would 
also find that the government would seek to divert attention from troubling economic 
issues by emphasising a common mutual danger, loss of cultural identity, a hostile 
neighbour, etc.
The bureaucracy in turn, even that part of it that was not compromised, 
would fight a losing battle in trying to convince political authorities to devote more 
resources to a coherent development plan, as the temptation for patronage proved 
increasingly irresistible to a yet immature political leadership.
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The result would be a loss of the idealism which had characterised the country 
before the '’resource windfall" and a reduction in expectations of what it could potentially 
accomplish. This loss would result in the departure of those who maintained integrity, 
the co-option of many who did not, and the increasing isolation of those who were 
honest, but did not have the luxury of alternative employment elsewhere.
The quality of administration would consequently not improve quickly as 
turnover occurred and new players entered the system as part of the patronage package of 
the political leadership. This too would contribute to the decreasing efficiency and 
increasing corruption and would consequently lessen the ability of the bureaucracy to deal 
with legitimate problems. In the rest of this section we will examine a number of 
specific areas with a view to identifying what evidence we would expect to find.
In short the regime would be characterised by:
Short term objectives,
A loss of idealism,
Poor administration.
The Food Distribution System. Because a government food distribution 
system exists in Bangladesh, it is worth some detailed consideration. It is the mechanism 
through which the largest homogeneous element of the foreign aid which formed the 
original "resource windfall" passed. Food rationing systems, while not universal, are 
certainly not rare in the developing world. Countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, India and 
Sri Lanka have all used various means to distribute food, particularly in times of crisis. 
Secondly, since it is a basic staple, food has potential impact on growth in the agriculture 
sector.
The system in Bangladesh was originally established in 194396 to ensure that 
there was no repeat of the disastrous Great Bengal Famine of that year. Potentially such 
a system, in addition to providing an emergency reserve, could also have such a far 
reaching impact both on the price of food and the market for agricultural produce. It 
could ensure that the poorest in the society are assured of one of the basic necessities at a 
reasonable price. The Food Distribution System in Bangladesh has absorbed almost 25 
per cent of the aid provided between 1971 and 1975.97
In our "aid-dependence paradigm" such a system, which has been designed to 
distribute a basic necessity to the society in very large quantities, is likely to be subjected
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to abuse, both in the political sense, because such a redistribution system is a powerful 
tool given the resources it commands. We would expect almost any government to be 
unable to resist the temptation to "appropriate" some of the resource in order to meet 
administrative and patronage obligations. We should also expect to find that there was 
widespread abuse of the system by the bureaucrats and politicians responsible for its 
distribution.
Where a part of the resource is obtained at little or no cost and a government 
is able to subsidise the distribution of a resource at little cost to itself, there will be less 
stringent controls on the manner in which the proceeds are used. An important 
complementary factor in this is that the nature of food aid, where it is distributed in 
substantial quantities, i.e., "dumped" by food-surplus countries, is that it is not fungible 
in terms of alternate forms of foreign aid. It, therefore, has no opportunity cost. The 
refusal of food aid, in the hope of obtaining aid in another, perhaps more useful form, 
would likely result in a reduction of aid, because food donors are unlikely to be willing 
to convert the food into an equivalent of some other form of aid.
The Food Distribution System would be characterised by:
Diversion and misuse of food,
Growing importance as a general source of revenue,
Growing importance as a tool for retaining power over resource distribution. 
Agriculture. In our model a growing elite was "appropriating" funds or 
resources where they were relatively abundant. Given that the agriculture sector is the 
largest sector both in terms of employment and as a proportion of the GDP in most 
developing countries, there will be an effort to target a substantial amount of aid there. It 
is, however, a traditional sector and experience tells us that it is one of the most difficult 
sectors in which to mount programmes because of the lack of modern institutional 
development. Agricultural investment is different from that in other sectors, particularly 
in modem sectors such as energy, where investments in such things as generating plants 
and transmission lines are relatively straightforward. It is, rather, geographically diffuse 
and made up of a combination of small investments in different areas all of which have to 
function in consort with each other. Even where the possibility exists of making large 
investments, such as in irrigation schemes, these are very much more complicated than a
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project that deals with a single organisational entity, such as an electrical power board 
which is centralised and functions largely in the modern sector.
We would expect an agriculture sector that was basically conservative and 
resistant to change. The government reaction to this would, in the face of lack of 
progress, be to mount periodic crash campaigns, largely of rhetoric designed to impress 
donors, but most investment would be geared to the modem sector or, if in agriculture, 
to the modem part of that sector which is concerned with capital intensive, high 
technology projects. Irrigation and mechanisation are the logical sub-sector to attract 
such investment, but if there is a weak institutional base the benefits are likely to accrue 
largely to those who are better off. Agriculture would not likely be a sector of dynamic 
growth.
Furthermore, the profits that do accrue from agriculture are unlikely to be 
reinvested in productive investment given the weak institutional base. With alternate 
investment opportunities limited, the traditional investment in a tangible asset such as 
land would tend to attract funds from other areas and bid up the price of land. We would 
not, however, expect there to be much of a corresponding increase in the productivity 
because absentee ownership does not usually increase productivity, and tenant labour has 
little incentive to invest in the improvement of the land without some assurance of 
security for that investment.
A weak government administration would fail to mobilise the inputs required 
for any dramatic increase in productivity resulting in unreliable and haphazard delivery of 
such essentials as seed and fertiliser to the areas where they are needed when they are 
needed. Even in a system reverting to a private sector approach, the controls on 
purchasing, etc., will be constrained by the inefficient functioning of the market and the 
weak institutional base to deliver both technology and credit. The result will be the loss 
of confidence of the farmers and a reluctance, given the traditional peasant’s inborn 
conservatism, to adopt new higher yielding methods of cultivation.*
‘Traditional peasants are often reluctant to abandon the practices of their forefathers because, fundamentally, they worked. The 
problem is that with such pressures as population, wasteful agricultural practices, for example, "slash and burn" cannot be sustained. 
The problem is not so much convincing traditional fanners to change. They will. Once! When the necessary inputs, HYV seed, 
fertiliser, etc., fail to arrive on the market the next year they will revert to traditional practices, and having risked and lost once, will 
become risk minimisers reluctant to take chances the next time some extension worker comes around with a good idea.
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Finally since we have included the Food Distribution System, which relies on 
imported food to supplement consumption, there is likely to be a reduction in the market 
for domestic food. This would tend to depress prices to a point where it reduces the 
incentive for increased investment in high yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds and fertiliser 
in order to be able to attain greater productivity.
The agriculture sector would be characterised by:
Appropriation of resources,
Concentration on capital intensive investment,
Lack of effort in the area of institutional development.
Economic growth. With sources of productive investment constrained by the 
poverty of the country and the loss of savings, most investment will derive either directly 
or indirectly from foreign aid. Economic growth will not necessarily be poor. This will 
depend on a number of factors: the external economic climate, terms of trade, the amount 
of investment in productive enterprise from savings and aid, as opposed to consumption 
or investment in non-productive enterprises and luxury goods. Growth will, however, 
generally be concentrated in sectors of the economy where it is relatively easy to invest: 
energy, industry and infrastructure. Thus we may find that aggregate growth is quite 
acceptable in traditional economic terms, but that it benefits only a small proportion of 
the population.
Economic growth would be characterised by:
Acceptable, or even healthy, growth in the modern sector,
A stagnant traditional sector.
Business and industry. Under the conditions posed in the dependence 
paradigm we expect to find that business was geared more to the procurement and 
importation of goods than to their manufacture. Consequently investment would tend to 
be mainly in the business of importing, where there is quick turnover and high profits. 
As the "resource windfall" continued to generate profits for the middle class, there would 
be a tendency for the growing middle class to become a pressure group attempting to 
influence government to continue to seek aid. The pattern of business development one 
would expect to find would favour trading and there would be idle capacity in of the 
industrial sector as goods tended to be procured outside the country with aid funds. 
Profits will not necessarily be invested in the country for a number of reasons. Windfall
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profits attract attention, hence, will often flow to bank accounts outside. Capital markets 
inside the country are relatively undeveloped offering little opportunity for profitable 
investment. What remains inside the country is often spent on luxury goods or land.98
Aid financed investment may well be under-utilised for two reasons, first, the 
pressure of local agents to import because of the quicker profits and, second, the 
propensity of aid agencies to favour the importation of goods rather than local
99procurement.
Business and industry would be characterised by:
A capital intensive bias to investment,
The neglect of labour intensive approaches to investment,
The export of capital.
Growth of the middle and upper classes. With the increasing "appropriation" 
of aid the upper class will thrive as their share of the "resource windfall" exceeded the 
proportion of the population that they occupied. They will become an increasingly 
influential group in the government and private sector. Investment would continue to 
return to areas where profits will be maximised while investment in productive enterprise 
will languish in the doldrums. The poorest elements of the population would 
consequently lose in the competition for resources.
The middle and upper classes would be characterised by:
The increasing inequity with the poorer elements of the society,
The increasing "appropriation" of available resources.
Foreign aid. In our model we expected the government to make every effort 
to maximise the flow of foreign aid. Once it reached the dependence stage, this would 
include following donor-suggested policies concerning the economic and political policies 
being followed. The government would try to extract the maximum from. Every effort 
would be made to move aid to more liquid forms regardless of the country’s needs. The 
upper class in turn would use their influence to support this and will try to participate to 
the greatest extent possible in the process.
Foreign aid would be characterised by:
A continuing concentration on disbursements,
An acceptance of poor administrative performance,
The tolerance of increasing corruption at all levels. 4-8068
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CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY
The International Relations Context
The political environment. Most literature in the field of development and 
development assistance deals with the subject purely from the perspective of economics. 
There is, however, a growing appreciation that the constraints to development go beyond 
those problems that can be addressed through the application of pure economic policy. 
Political considerations are often the dominating factor both at the level of international 
relations and with respect to the adoption of domestic policies. We have in recent years, 
for example, seen ethnic considerations exert profound influence over the economic 
progress of such countries as Sri Lanka and Fiji. Bangladesh, was born of such an ethnic 
factor as was Pakistan during the 1947 partition of British India.
Bangladesh, during the early days which followed independence, provides an 
interesting example of a newly independent country dealing with a diverse group of 
nations. Their interests differed widely from one another in providing aid. First, there 
were those whose strategic interests predominated such as the United States,1 the USSR,2 
China,3 India4 and the United Kingdom.5 Next there were those whose primary interests 
were humanitarian, Canada,6 the Scandinavian countries,7 the Netherlands and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Finally, there were those with strong commercial interests: the 
United Kingdom, Japan, France. The state of the economy, severely damaged by the 
war, limited Bangladesh’s capacity to participate in the world trading system. The 
principal means by which to influence the new nation was through economic aid. We 
shall see that in Bangladesh this one external influence has had more impact in 
determining the nature of the development of the country than almost any other.
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Bangladesh had won independence from Pakistan following the failure of the 
West Pakistan to accede to the will of the majority in the 1970 election. This would have 
allowed the Awami League, of which Sheikh Mujib was the leader and which had gained 
a majority of the seats, to assume power. After discussions between President Yahya 
Khan and Sheikh Mujib broke down,8 there was a crackdown by the Pakistan Army9 
followed by a declaration of independence by Mujib10 culminating in the War of 
Liberation. India had intervened to make independence possible after efforts to find a 
peaceful solution had failed.11 After the War Sheikh Mujib returned from his period of 
incarceration in West Pakistan with great confidence and fierce determination to create a 
socialist Bangladeshi12 society.13 It was rather directed against the western countries, 
particularly the United States14 and institutions closely associated with it, such as the 
World Bank.15
During the War the United States had entered into discussions with Khandakar 
Moshtaque Ahmed* of the Provisional Government in Exile in Calcutta. The United 
States wanted to bring an end to the hostilities lest they jeopardise the demarche with 
China being planned by Henry Kissinger, in which Pakistan was to play a vital role in 
achieving a rapprochement between the United States and China.16 This secret approach 
to Moshtaque, when it came to the attention of then acting Prime Minister, Tajuddin 
Ahmed, led to Moshtaque’s being denied the opportunity to represent Bangladesh at the 
United Nations in its plea for recognition. It also led to his dismissal as Foreign Minister 
after the Provisional Government had assumed power, although he remained in the 
cabinet.17
The United States had, despite these cool relations, made aid available for the 
refugees in India during the war.18 Biswas describes the period as follows:
. . . conditions within Bangladesh were very hostile towards the US and consequently American 
influence was almost completely removed from the country.19. . . To further fuel the hostility20 the 
United States did not recognise Bangladesh until April 4, 1972.21
The hostile Bangladesh view of the World Bank derived mainly from its 
association with American interests, and from the role it was perceived to have played in 
Pakistan. There, with the Harvard Advisory Group, it had been closely associated with
*Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed, later to be briefly President of the country, was regarded as being the most pro-American 
member of the senior echelon of the Awami League. Also variously spelled Mushtaq, Moshtaq.
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the policies of President Ayub Khan. These were seen by the new leaders to be based on 
an inegalitarian philosophy of growth.22
Their hostility manifested itself in the attitude toward the World Bank and the 
refusal of the Government to form a donor consortium in the usual World Bank pattern.23 
Although most development assistance is given by the Western donors and institutions 
supported by them the Government of Bangladesh was prepared to virtually snub Robert 
McNamara, the President of the World Bank, when he visited Bangladesh for the first 
time in February of 1972. Sobhan, then a member of the Planning Commission, recalls:
The mood in post-liberation Bangladesh was, however, far from receptive to the imperial 
benevolence of the Bank. The political mood at that stage was highly nationalistic and focussed 
against the United States. The Bank’s President was regarded as a card-carrying member of the 
Washington power elite.24
This mood derived both from the political views of the leaders of the Awami 
League, particularly Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed.25 The view was also held by the 
members of the newly created Planning Commission. Tajuddin Ahmed, the first Minister 
of Finance and Planning,26 went so far as to suggest that they ignore his visit, but he was 
overruled by the Prime Minister.27 McNamara was met at the airport by the Governor of 
the Bank of Bangladesh but snubbed by Members of the Planning Commission.28 His 
suggestion of a lunch with old acquaintances, whom he had known in Washington, was 
vetoed by the Prime Minister.29 It was not an auspicious start.
From the perspective of domestic political ideology, Bangladesh was a 
country trying to make a break with the free enterprise, open market system30 that had 
characterised Pakistan. This attempt to change the political system had a considerable 
effect on relations with the various foreign donors.
Rosenau describes officials of such societies as being unwilling to bargain 
with their foreign policy environment and to have a stake in keeping such foreign policy 
issues, in this case the dislike of the United States, openly debated and before their 
public.31 The behaviour of the political and bureaucratic officials in Sheikh Mujib’s early 
government conforms to this pattern. Rosenau gives as examples of other such societies: 
South Africa, Israel, Rhodesia following the unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI).32 Another such might be the Indonesian government of Sukarno during 
Konfontasi with Malaysia. The Sihanouk Government of Cambodia would also qualify 
for the period from its renunciation of American aid in 1963 until 1969. These are
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regimes that were unwilling to modify their views or policies even in the light of strong 
pressure from the outside community. The rhetoric of such countries tends to be ideo­
logical in character.33
Almost immediately the views and behaviour of the leaders began to change 
to what Rosenau terms "acquiescent adaption".34 The transition began with the departure 
of several of the more militant members of the Awami League’s radical wing35 as early as 
1972. It was almost complete by the time in mid 1974. The Government, in a concerted 
attempt to obtain more aid,36 announced a new investment policy on July 16, 197437 
raising the ceiling on investment and declaring a moratorium on nationalisation. This 
concession to World Bank and IMF pressure was strong evidence of the change in 
outlook of a government that had been so hostile to both the World Bank and free 
enterprise only a short time previous.38
The point that marked the completion of this transition, from "intransigent 
adaption" to "acquiescent adaption", a transition which Rosenau maintains is quite 
improbable under ordinary circumstances,39 was the dismissal of Tajuddin Ahmed prior to 
the visit of Henry Kissinger in November 1974.40 At this point Sheikh Mujib was 
prepared to accede to what he perceived to be the wishes of the largest bilateral donor, 
the United States. Until shortly before this time he had stood firmly in opposition to the 
United States, by whom he had been snubbed on his visit to Washington in the early fall 
of 1974. Another indicator was the agreement of the Government to the formation of a 
traditional donor consortium, of the type preferred by the World Bank. This had been 
firmly resisted the previous year in favour of a donor meeting hosted by the Government.
By 1974 the economy was facing severe problems. Terms of trade had 
deteriorated and the volume of aid to Bangladesh had dropped by some estimated $90.2 
million.41 The donors were reluctant to pledge more financial assistance.42 Dependence 
on foreign aid had risen from a projected 66 per cent of the budget to some 75 per cent.43 
Ironically the floods and ensuing famine were the saviors of the economic situation and 
brought a new flow of aid that pleas to the donors only a few months before had not.44
During the latter days of the regime, Sheikh Mujib, to strengthen his position 
during a time of increasing uncertainty, had also begun to rehabilitate some of the figures 
prominent in the police and the security forces. Many of them had been trained by the
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United States during the time of Pakistan,* and had been implicated in the last bloody 
days of the Pakistan rule of the East.**
The assassination of Sheikh Mujib by Major Rahman and Major Farook in 
1975, ended what was left of the experiment in "democratic socialism" that had been the 
dream of Bangladesh’s planners in 1972. Out of the coup emerged Moshtaque, the pro- 
American Awami Leaguer. It was during Moshtaque’s short regime that the "rehabil­
itated" officials consolidated their power, in such financially powerful government 
organisations as the Dhaka Improvement Trust, the Consumer Supply Corporation, the 
Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, the Ministry of Fisheries, Livestock and Forestry, 
the Jute Mills Corporation and the Sugar Corporation.45 All of these were the
government departments and state corporations handling the bulk of the new resources 
flowing into the country. Almost all these rehabilitated officials still held positions either 
in these organisations or in National Security Intelligence (NSI) or the para-military 
police at the end of the decade.46 The murder of some of the strongest opponents of 
closer relations with the West, Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Manzoor Ali and 
Kamiruzzaman,47 all former cabinet ministers, was one of the last acts of Moshtaque’s 
regime and reinforced the new direction. The elimination of Tajuddin is significant too, 
in that he was one of the strongest critics of corruption and of the incompetence with 
which the good will of the world had been squandered.48 This period also coincides with 
the beginning of the first modest American military assistance after the assassination of 
Mujib.49
The Moshtaque regime was in power for too short a time for us to ascribe to 
it particularly unique characteristics of its own. We can safely assert, however, that it 
did not deviate markedly from the path which the country had begun to take under Sheikh 
Mujib. It formed the basis from which General Zia was able to continue the trend.
‘According to Lifschultz, The Unfinished Revolution (p. 189) the Americans trained 113 Pakistanis at the International Police 
Academy (IPA) and IMPOLSE of which 40 were from East Pakistan. (He points out this figure is quite high when compared to the 
number trained from Viet Nam from where 414 were trained and where American interests were far more prominent.)
“ There are various groups and subgroups in the Bangladesh power structure. In the Military the few officers, such as Zia, 
who fought for an independent Bangladesh, the Freedom Fighters, untrained villagers who were often undisciplined, but who were 
the were the heart of the movement, and who became a very strong influence after independence only to be forgotten as time went 
on. Finally there were the repatriates, interned in Pakistan but who did not commit themselves one way or another until the war was 
over. This latter group have grown in influence to occupy many important positions in latter-day Bangladesh.
In die Police Service, according to Lifschultz, The Unfinished Revolution (p. 189), only one senior office in the 
police/intelligence cadre supported the struggle for liberation. In the Bangladesh civil service those who rose from the Civil Service 
of Pakistan are regarded as the elite while those who entered though other avenues, such as the Police Service, rank lower.
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The Zia regime actively sought closer ties with the West and encouraged 
foreign investment through such policies as the guaranteed repatriation of capital and 
taxable dividends and generous tax holidays.50 It also tried to diversify the sources of 
foreign aid and reestablish the ties with the Soviet bloc countries.51 The investment 
incentives met with only limited success, some US$61 million flowed into the country 
between 1972 and 1979.52 Unquestionably, however, his efforts were responsible for 
increasing flows of aid from the Western donors during the same period which totalled 
some.
President Zia publicly condemned corruption,53 but tolerated it on a grand 
scale. He released some of the most notorious people who had been imprisoned for 
corruption, Ghazi Ghulam Mustafa, who had been head of the Bangladesh Red Cross 
during the 1974 famine, and Abdul Mannan another politician convicted of corrupt 
practices.54
The Zia regime was characterised internally by harshness in dealing with 
rebels in the army and Zia himself was described as "a man who could kill with one hand 
and eat with the other".55 Although Zia enjoyed personal popularity with the people he 
was not, despite a reputation as "a soldier’s soldier",56 popular with the military. He 
survived some 20 mutinies, attempted coups and assassination attempts during the five 
and a half years he was in power.57 He did make an effort to mobilise the people to self- 
help schemes in canal-building, but dependence on foreign aid continued to increase as a 
percentage of GDP (see Table 1.2.) The Government continued to move closer toward 
the free-market, free enterprise economy advocated by the two largest donors, the World 
Bank and the United States. Zia also visited Britain seeking increased aid as part of his 
efforts to diversify and increase the flow of aid.58
The Sattar interregnum, like that of Moshtaque, is difficult to classify since it 
was so short and there was little in terms of concrete accomplishments on which to judge 
it. The first part of the period following the assassination of President Zia was taken up 
with the organising of elections. There was also debate within the Bangladesh National 
Party about whether Sattar should seek the Presidency or not. The latter part of his term 
was concerned with the severe balance of payments problem the country was facing. It is 
fair, however, to classify it as a continuation of the "acquiescent adaptive" regime that it 
followed. For example, the response to the severe balance of payments problem it
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encountered in late 1981 and early 1982 was to turn to the foreign donors for increased 
assistance.
The Ershad regime can certainly be characterised as "acquiescently adaptive" 
in its foreign relations. It has pursued close relations with the United States and other 
Western donors who provide the bulk of the foreign aid that Bangladesh receives. 
Ershad’s all-consuming efforts to "legitimise" his government while continuing to retain 
power indicate how sensitive he was to donor perceptions in the early days of the regime.
Development Theory
Background. Modern development assistance has its origins in the immediate 
post-World War II period. Humanitarian aid through multilateral agencies predominated, 
particularly to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in which the 
United States met some 70 per cent of the costs.59 This was followed shortly by the 
Marshall Plan. It was implemented with the objective of reconstructing Europe following 
the destruction caused by the Second World War, but was motivated mainly by strategic 
considerations.60 An alternative proposal, the Morgenthau Plan, had proposed reducing 
both Japan and Germany to subsistence economies, i.e., stimulating underdevelopment 
rather than promoting development. It was rejected.61 The results of the Marshall Plan 
are well known. It introduced some $12,000 million, into European economies.62 
Consequently the recovery of Western Europe was, in the view of most observers, 
hastened considerably.
There are still, however, some dissenting views on the impact of foreign aid 
even during that period, most notably those of Lord Bauer.63 In any event, regardless of 
the extent that aid did play in the European post-war recovery, the success of the 
European recovery had a profound influence on the theory of development and the role of 
foreign aid during the next decade. Whether or not there was a causal relationship 
between aid and European recovery, one was certainly assumed by development theorists 
who followed. Dissenters were in the minority. It is now also clear that the conditions 
preceding the recovery in Europe were vastly different from those prevailing in the 
colonies as they gained independence during the immediate post-war era. Western 
Europe had been industrialised before World War II and the population was educated and
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trained to meet the needs of a modern industrial state. They responded and Europe 
underwent an astonishing recovery.
On the basis of the European experience there emerged a perception, mainly 
on the part of the Western countries, led and encouraged by the United States, of a need 
to help the emerging nations to acquire the benefits of the democratic world. It was 
initially based largely on humanitarian assistance and generous contributions to the 
multilateral agencies.64 Guess maintains that the early post-War aid efforts of the United 
States were probably the only time in American history where consideration of social 
justice dominated United States foreign policy.65 The attainment of independence of 
former colonies, such as India and Pakistan, during the early post-War period, and 
indications that many other colonies would soon be independent, combined with 
increasing Soviet influence, changed American thinking to a more development oriented 
approach.66
Early planners in the field of development assistance modelled their assistance 
to the developing countries after that provided to Europe with the expectation that the 
same kind of development would occur. Foreign aid, the transfer of capital, resources 
and skills, were perceived to be the manner best suited to accomplish this entry of the 
newly independent countries into the international economy.
By the mid to late 1960s, the first United Nations Development Decade, it 
had become increasingly evident that the developing countries were failing to follow the 
path of post-World War II Europe. Rural-urban drift of population combined with 
growing unemployment and underemployment signalled that investment in large 
infrastructure projects was not in itself the answer to improving the standard of living of 
the poor. Development assistance theory broadened to consider how different strategies 
could assist the process. Lacking any clear alternative, investment in infrastructure 
remained one of the fundamental tools of the development practitioner, the rationale 
being that the benefits from growth would finance equity.
The expansion of agriculture grew in importance as it became evident that 
industrialisation alone would not yield a solution. Increasing use of high yielding 
varieties of crops required irrigation and fertiliser. This in turn demanded increasing 
supplies of energy, making attractive investments for donors seeking both investment in 
infrastructure and a rationale that their aid was indirectly helping the poorest. Some
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development agencies moved more quickly than others to shift the emphasis of their aid. 
Most still retain vestiges of the capital investment approach to promote development.
Linear stage models. Since development assistance as we know it began, 
several economic growth theories have been in and out of vogue. Rostow’s theory of the 
five stages of growth and the Harrod-Domar Model, in its various forms, relate 
development almost solely to economic growth. The former’s recognition of the 
importance of agricultural development is a precursor to later theories. Both approaches 
virtually ignore the sociological and the domestic political aspects of the development 
process as they affect either growth or the distribution of resources. The answer to the 
question of how the poorest elements of society were to benefit from development was 
left to what became known as the "trickle down" process. This was devised more as an 
ex post facto attempt at justification for the capital intensive approach, than as a real 
development theory. It postulated that increased benefits would reach the poorer 
elements of the society through their exposure to increased employment opportunities. 
The "trickle down" theory was seriously questioned at the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s, most notably by Grant. It is dismissed today by scholars, 
although it is surprising how many adherents remain among the practitioners of aid in the 
development agencies.
The issue of poverty and the impact that development was likely to have on 
the distribution of income was, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, regarded as an 
important omission from the field of development theory. In the meantime, theorists 
analysing the structure of growth and its impact on society began to pay attention to the 
effect economic development had on the poor. Simon Kuznets hypothesised that as 
development took place there would initially be increasing inequity in the distribution of 
income, the so called "Cross-Country U-Hypothesis".67 Later empirical evidence based 
on cross-country data analysed by Adelman and Morris, Chenery and Syrquin and others 
appears to confirm Kuznet’s hypothesis. They showed that inequality in the distribution 
of income tended to worsen as per capita income rises until it reached about US$600 in 
1975 prices. These conclusions are by no means wholly accepted, given the limitations 
of cross country analysis.68
The explanation for this phenomenon is that the poorest elements of society 
are usually employed in the traditional sectors of the economy. These elements have not
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benefitted from growth because access of the poor to resources, such as education, credit 
and land, continues to remain limited as growth takes place in the modern sector.69 Their 
share of the resources declines relative to that of those in the modem sector. There are 
countries, however, that have implemented policies to counteract or at least minimise this 
effect such as Korea and Taiwan.
Leading Sector. Some aid theoreticians suggest that developing countries, 
with only limited resources, should concentrate on one sector, often the agricultural 
sector. They contend that this concentrates on an area where there is existing expertise 
and optimises the limited resources available for investment. As the sector develops, it 
pulls with it sectors that are linked to it. For example, industry would benefit from 
increased demand for fertiliser. Small scale manufacturing of implements would grow as 
demand increased for improved tools. The backward integration of the leading sector 
would encourage other sectors to grow. This is probably the most realistic strategy since 
it takes into consideration the limited resources available for promoting growth. Its 
major shortcoming is that it potentially neglects initiatives in new areas that can take 
place within the economy and which may lead to increased growth or the development of 
new markets.
"Big Push” or Balanced Growth. Another theory, the "big push" theory of 
development, takes the view that growth must take place in all sectors simultaneously. 
This is so that they can provide mutual support for each other. The theory holds that all 
sectors must advance together since they can then be mutually reinforcing. This provides 
the inputs for other sectors as they are required. As a theory, its main shortcoming is 
that it presupposes that there are sufficient resources to provide the necessary investment 
to allow all sectors to grow at similar rates. Furthermore, historical evidence tells us that 
economic growth is a far more complex process than simply encouraging sectors to grow 
at the same rate. Development has shown us that growth does not take place at a 
constant rate in all sectors simultaneously, nor is it particularly desirable for it to do so. 
The importance of different sectors changes relative to one another and changes over 
time. This is usually a trend away from agricultural sector driven-growth toward the 
manufacturing sectors in more developed economies, and from there to the development 
of the service sector.
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Basic Human Needs. The basic needs approach to development like the 
theory of equitable growth owes its origins to the growing disillusionment with the 
growth oriented philosophies that development theorists and practitioners advocated 
following the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Its core is as follows:
All people have certain needs without which life would be impossible, these "life-sustaining" needs 
include, indisputably, food, shelter, health, and protection. When any of these is absent, or in 
critically short supply, we may state without reservation that a condition of "absolute under­
development" exists. A basic function of all economic activity, therefore is to provide as many 
people as possible with the means of overcoming the helplessness and misery arising from a lack of 
food, shelter, health and protection. To this extent, we may claim that economic development is a 
necessary condition for the improvement in the "quality of life" which is "development." Without 
sustained and continuous economic progress at the individual, as well as the societal level, the 
realization of human potential would not be possible.70
The basic human needs approach is less a theory of development than an ethic which 
attempts to guide development investment.
Equitable Growth. Equitable growth is a term coined in an effort to counter 
the accusations that were beginning to be made at the end of the 1960s and the beginning 
of the 1970s. These maintained that aid had concentrated on capital intensive strategies 
and on economic growth to the detriment of the elements within the societies that the aid 
was supposedly designed to help.71 It was an effort to maintain growth as an objective in 
providing foreign aid while trying to satisfy the critics who advocated a basic change in 
the focus of development assistance to the "basic needs" approach.
High yielding varieties and population control were the foundations of the 
theory of "equitable growth" in the 1970s. It was an alternative to the emphasis on 
growth and the "trickle down" effect which by this time were clearly shown not to be 
having the desired impact on poverty. The failure of growth theory was associated with 
very slow, or negligible rates of growth of food consumption, employment rates which 
lagged behind population growth. The development of basic services was only being 
extended in urban areas and overall economic performance was disappointing.72 It was an 
attempt to find a middle ground between the advocates of growth and those who stressed 
concentration on "basic needs". Waterson and Ward73 warn against reliance solely on 
agriculture and stress that strategies must be devised to ensure that the surplus not does 
benefit the rural elite alone. Mahbub ul Haq and James Grant counter that broad based 
strategies alone will be very slow to bring about change and favour land reform,
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improved access to credit, health, education and family planning services but do not 
explain how these are to be delivered.74
Dependency Theory. Dependency theory owes its origins the structuralist 
approach developed in the Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) under the 
direction of Raul Prebisch. They maintained that neither inflation nor balance of 
payments problems were the result of "irresponsibility" on the part of finance ministers 
and their governments, but rather that these problems were the result of supply 
inelasticities in the face of widespread pressure to achieve higher rates of economic 
development and the ability of the stronger elements of society to preserve their real 
incomes. In the face of such problems it was believed that the imposition of limits on the 
quantity of money in circulation was unlikely to curb inflation or the demand for imports. 
This resulted in a reliance on the export of raw materials, which was subject to both the 
long term deterioration and fluctuations in the terms of trade. The answer to this 
problem was the imposition of trade barriers and the promotion of import substitution 
policies.
Problems arose, however, when it was perceived that while this resulted in 
decreasing imports of consumer durables, it also resulted in the increase of imports of 
capital equipment, intermediate products and fuel. This realization led dependency 
theorists to conclude " . . .  that the world consisted of a ‘core’ of dominant nations and a 
‘periphery’ of dependent ones",75 now a fundamental tenet of dependency theory. The 
result was that the capitalist countries of the core dictated the economic structure of the 
economies of the "periphery" countries.
There is considerable evidence that this theory does not hold. The theory 
tends to de-emphasise external factors and assumes that countries are large and have, 
what Seers terms, "room to manoeuver".76 This is an attribute necessary if, to break the 
dependency relationship, a country tries to "delink" from the international economy. 
Other factors that are not given sufficient weight are the cultural relationships with 
trading partners, physical location of the country and natural resources as a bargaining 
tool.77
Export Led Growth. With the demise of the "basic needs" approach there 
was a renewed interest in the role of markets. The argument has been put forward 
favouring the promotion of labour intensive industry as a source of employment which in
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turn provides a growing market for agriculture and incentives for increased production.78 
Mellor argues, however, that the effect of this strategy is to focus exclusively on export 
markets to the detriment of the broad based domestic markets thus de-emphasising 
investment in the social infrastructure is essential to the development of agriculture.79 
Adelman suggests the export oriented strategy, but cautions that market penetration is 
difficult for countries which do not already have a foothold in the international 
marketplace.80
The Types of Foreign Aid
Each form of aid* has its own distinct characteristics which impinge upon its 
effectiveness. Bangladesh has been a recipient of all four types of aid discussed below.
Food aid. Food aid is perhaps the most common form of aid in the mind of 
the public. It is often associated with the kind of disasters that receive generous 
publicity, such as the droughts and famines of the Sahel and Ethiopia. Food aid is often 
provided as assistance in times of emergency, but it is also a regular part of the 
development programmes of donors. Food is usually provided by food surplus countries 
such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These countries are also the major 
contributors to the World Food Programme (WFP). The most well known programmes 
of these are the United States’ Public Law 480 (PL 480) food programme.
Food aid usually consists of food grains although other items such as oil 
seeds, cooking oil, powdered milk and even frozen fish** have been used as food aid in 
various countries. One major advantage, in the eyes of both donors and recipients, that 
food aid has over other forms of aid is that it is rapid disbursing. Specifications are 
relatively uniform and well understood internationally. Delivery times are determined by 
the time that it takes to obtain authorisation, call for tenders and arrange for delivery. It 
has an added advantage from the donor’s perspective. This is particularly useful to 
donors who wish to attach specific conditions to their aid, often called "conditionality" or
"Military aid is not considered in this paper.
**The writer was involved in the provision of frozen fish to Egypt by Canada in early 1982. The rationale was that it was to 
serve as a demonstration of political support by the Government of Canada for President Mubarak’s new regime following the 
assassination of President Sadat. It was initiated by bureaucrats within Department of External Affairs. It bore no relationship either 
to past requests for wheat as food aid, or to Egypt’s traditional trade with Canada.
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sometimes "performance lending". The purpose of such conditions can vary. There are 
sector specific policy items such as, for example, USAID’s condition in Bangladesh that 
soybean and cottonseed oil be sold through private sector wholesale and retail outlets.81 
There may also be conditions that span the whole economy. If the recipient fails to meet 
the conditions in the agreement then the programme can be halted without jeopardy to the 
sunk investment. This is rarely possible with project aid which envisions a complete and 
operating enterprise, such as a school or a generating station, which must be completed to 
be useful. The portion of the investment already spent would be lost if the recipient 
failed to meet conditions of the agreement and the donor halted the project. The 
justification for the provision of food aid, in other than emergency situations, is as 
balance of payments support to food deficit countries who would otherwise have to spend 
scarce foreign exchange to import sufficient food for their population.
Since food aid generally comes from food-surplus countries it is, for the 
donor, a means by which it can both meet a domestic problem while fulfilling an 
international obligation. We must recall that it is not fungible as a form of aid and hence 
has little or no opportunity cost with respect to other forms of foreign aid. Food aid 
foregone will rarely be replaced by another form of aid in the same amount. It can, 
however, be given an opportunity cost if the donor allows the recipient to convert it into 
another form through sale or exchange as this allows the recipient to divert resources to 
other uses. Sale outside the country is usually prohibited under food agreements to 
prevent the recipient from interfering with the donors established markets for food. Its 
sale within the country is useful only for generating local currency which limits its 
flexibility in the eyes of the recipient but still leaves room for some fiscal manipulation. 
The balance of payments aspect is somewhat limited since most food aid recipients must 
still agree to the purchase of its usual marketing requirement (UMR). The UMR is 
determined by the historical import pattern of the country and requires it to purchase, or 
undertake to purchase a certain amount of food before it accepts food aid. Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) require this under the principles of surplus disposal so 
that food aid will not disrupt food exporters traditional markets.
Programme Aid. Programme aid is a rather general term usually used to 
refer to lines of credit for which the recipient has some discretion in the choice of 
imports. It may consist of industrial commodities. Alternately, it may simply be limited
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to allow the purchase of materials and capital equipment appropriate to a particular 
sector. It tends to be used primarily for commodities since major capital projects are 
usually financed by project aid. Conditions governing what can be purchased vary from 
agreement to agreement and from donor to donor. It is similar to food aid in that it is 
not project-specific and can be used to influence the policies of the recipient. 
Conditionality can be narrow in scope, as in the examples given above in the section on 
food aid. Alternately, the conditions attached could be broader in scope. For example, 
the World Bank’s condition that the Bangladesh Government’s New Industrial Policy 
reduce the role of the public sector in industrial activities and encourage private 
initiative.82 Programme aid generally precludes the purchase of consumer items or luxury 
goods, although in particular cases there have been exceptions to this. This form of aid, 
while somewhat more complex than food aid, is favoured by some donors, such as the 
World Bank. It is also favoured by recipients because it provides flexibility that neither 
food aid nor project aid have, i.e., a choice of activities in various sectors.
The justification for programme aid is that, like food aid, it provides balance 
of payments support. A major disadvantage of programme aid is that it is virtually 
impossible to evaluate.83 This is because the activities undertaken with programme aid 
are diverse and the role of the programme aid in the activities can vary from negligible to 
the entire project. As White points out:
. . .  it is virtually impossible for the aid agency to identify the element of performance which is 
directly attributable to [programme] aid. It is thus impossible for the aid agency to assess its own 
performance, i.e., the extent to which it has done what it set out to do. If the recipients 
performance is good by the donor’s criteria, the aid is generally deemed to have succeeded; if the 
performance is bad, the aid is deemed, not to have failed, but to have been frustrated. The absence 
of any criterion for measuring the donor’s performance, in terms of observed outcomes, deprives the 
recipient of effective ways of criticising donors, of setting limits to their legitimate field of interest, 
and of making the case for improved terms or increased quantities based on concrete evidence, this 
is part of the cost to the recipient of programme aid.84
It should be borne in mind that this inability to evaluate the impact of programme aid, 
except with respect to the efficiency with which it has been provided, can be considered 
an advantage by some development administrators since it makes programme aid very 
straightforward in terms of the donor agency’s own accountability. Finally, because it 
can be used to purchase a much broader range of goods, it has a degree of fungibility that 
food aid lacks.
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Project Aid. Project aid is the provision of aid to undertake a specific 
objective such as the construction of a power line or the financing of a rural development 
programme. The advantage for the donor is that the project is focussed upon a particular 
activity, or series of activities, and it is relatively straightforward to evaluate. Projects 
may contain a component consisting of technical assistance (TA).* The disadvantage of 
the project approach for the donor is that, in case of serious dispute between the donor 
and recipient, halting the project usually means that the entire investment is lost. An 
unfinished power station or fertiliser factory serves no useful purpose and, therefore, 
generates no benefits for the recipient.
The usual justification for project assistance is that it provides the recipient 
with a viable enterprise that contributes to the country’s implementation of its 
development policies.*5 Such a project should also contribute to economic growth through 
increased productivity, and provides some balance of payments of payments support for 
the capital components of the project that are financed. Project aid is much favoured by 
donors who are not interested in attaching policy "conditionality" to their aid, but who 
wish to retain a greater element of control over implementation than is possible with food 
aid or programme aid.
Technical Assistance. Technical assistance usually consists of the provision of 
advisors or the training of individuals or groups. Its advantage for the donor is that it 
allows the use of the donor country’s personnel and gives the donor an added element of 
control. The disadvantage is that the cost of providing foreign nationals has become very 
expensive. Furthermore, the results obtained are variable depending upon the nature of 
the project and the advisor’s ability to use his knowledge in a foreign cultural 
environment.86 Its justification is to provide technical knowledge and skills to the 
recipient.
‘Technical assistance is generally considered to consist of the provision of expert advice, usually provided by nationals of the 
donor country, and training, which may be in the donor country or on the job in the recipient country.
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From the recipient country’s perspective we can assume that the government 
in power values two things above all else: the preservation of the country’s sovereignty 
and the security of its frontiers, and the retention of power, except within an agreed upon 
framework for changing governments. The acceptance of aid therefore is based on 
several objectives.
TABLE 2.1 
Recipient Motivation for Accepting Aid
Political Economic Humanitarian
Interna] Stability Economic Growth Equity
Preservation of Power Balance of Payments Emergency Relief
External Stability
International Stature
International Linkages
The various objectives of the recipient may overlap. We propose to analyse 
both the objectives of the recipient and the donor with respect to the kinds of aid being 
provided and to determine what effect a particular form of aid, or a combination of forms 
of aid, have had on the economy of Bangladesh.
Political: internal stability. From a political perspective there are several 
reasons for entering into aid relationships. The preservation of internal stability is of 
paramount importance to any government attempting to rule a country. A country faced 
with food shortages, excessive unemployment or underemployment must make some 
effort to maintain the state of society to prevent civil disorder or revolution. For example 
in Egypt government authorities in Cairo and other centres monitor the amount of bread 
in the shops each morning because experience has shown that if there are shortages there 
is likely to be civil disorder. If shortages are observed, then food is immediately 
delivered from existing government stocks.* For a country with balance of payments 
problems, such as Egypt, food aid provides assistance in maintaining stability without 
having to sacrifice some other aspect of development.
*The description of these measures of for ensuring that food stocks were available was described to the writer on visits to 
Egypt during the period that he was responsible for the Canadian aid programme there.
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Political: preservation of power. If we assume that one of a government’s 
first objectives is to stay in power,* then the preservation of power can be a powerful 
motive for accepting aid. A country that can be seen to be making measurable progress 
in providing its people with the resources for a better standard of living may opt for 
foreign aid as the quickest way to show tangible results. An example of this strategy 
might be the provision of showcase projects which fulfill a "national dream". The 
building of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the 1870s in Canada, is one. There was little 
chance of maintaining Canadian unity following confederation unless the two ends of the 
country were linked. Foreign aid was not the vehicle used, but massive investment from 
overseas was.
One of the problems in developing countries is that the people in power may 
not represent the will of the majority, nor will their interests necessarily coincide with 
those of the majority. The use of aid for the preservation of power may, therefore, be in 
direct conflict with the needs of the majority of the population.
Political: external stability. Foreign aid can be useful in protecting a country 
from external interference in several ways. For a very poor country, where the internal 
stability is in question, the preservation of order may prevent interference from 
neighbours. Alternately the provision of foreign aid may allow the country to divert 
resources from development needs to defence needs with a minimum of internal 
opposition. For example, Israel is able to devote some 39.8 per cent of government 
expenditure to defence.87 This is only possible because it receives some 5.6 per cent of 
its GDP, or one sixth of its total revenue, in official development assistance.88
Political: developing linkages. Aid can be used by recipient governments to 
establish international linkages with donor countries. These can take the form of trading 
relationships that grow out of a familiarity with the donors’ products. The formation of 
linkages between senior officials leading to greater recognition of the recipient 
government’s place in the international community can grow from aid relationships.
*For mature nations this assumption does not usually hold since a developed political system allows a representative opposition 
to become the government in power and to hold power at the will of the people. Many developing countries, some with ancient 
cultures but new political systems, have no such established tradition. A party in power is, therefore, much more reluctant to yield 
power gracefully, even for a constitutionally dictated period, if its leaders fear that major, and possibly irreversible, changes may take 
place in its absence. In the same way an opposition party is just as eager to gain power when it knows that changes, which may 
conflict with its fundamental philosophy, are likely to be made. Both may then be prepared to use methods that go beyond those that 
are legally permitted under the constitution, to maintain or change the status quo.
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Specifically, these can lead to support for candidacies for positions in international 
agencies. The recipient may also wish to develop linkages to prevent the dominance of 
any one particular donor. Thus, aid from the Soviet bloc might be used to counter­
balance a strong American presence.
Economic: growth. Economic growth is usually one of the foremost 
objectives of the government of any developing country. Growth is still often equated 
with development in recipient countries and the pursuit of growth remains paramount 
among the objectives of economic planning. Aid, therefore, is seen in the traditional 
terms of the Harrod-Domar Model as contributing to accelerated growth through the 
increase of capital formation. This is usually low in developing countries because of low 
rates of savings. Foreign investment as an alternative to foreign aid may not be an 
option, either because of the credit-worthiness of the country, or because it has opted for 
a growth strategy that minimises the role of the private sector. The use of foreign aid as 
a surrogate for the free movement of investment capital is common in developing 
countries, particularly those with a strong ideological bias against the free market 
system.89
Economic: balance of payments. Balance of payments is a continuing 
problem for countries which are characterised by mono-crop economies, usually basic 
commodities, vulnerable to the vagaries of the international marketplace. The provision 
of foreign aid, particularly in the form of programme aid, allows some flexibility in the 
choice of imports. For food deficit countries, food aid which can replace necessary 
imports, by allowing other priorities to be met with the freed foreign exchange, making it 
easier to deal with balance of payments problems. The acceptance of aid from bilateral 
donors during difficult periods may also defer the need to be forced to appeal to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is because the IMF may, as a part of an 
adjustment programme designed to address balance of payments problems, impose 
conditions more unpalatable to the government than any imposed by donors. The ability 
to increase imports, particularly imports of capital equipment designed to boost 
production of exports or of import substitutes, may also be a rationale for accepting 
foreign aid. The possibility of increasing the import of consumer items or military goods 
should not be overlooked.
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Humanitarian: relief. Emergency relief is a frequent reason for a government 
to request aid after a disaster. Emergency aid is usually available on short notice and 
tends to be disbursed quickly. It assists the government concerned in maintaining 
services and programmes with minimal disruption while responding to the needs of the 
affected minority. It is demonstrative of the government’s concern for its people. Nor is 
emergency relief limited to the developing countries. Developed countries may also seek 
aid for a disaster, though in this latter case the aid tends to be more the nature of 
specialised services rather than relief goods. For example, medical teams sent to Mexico 
following the recent earthquake, or underground rescue teams to help cope with a mine 
disaster, might be required in a developed country rather than relief supplies.
It is worth noting that there may be a reluctance on the part of a potential 
recipient government to request aid if the disaster is of its own making, or if it could 
have been prevented, thereby reflecting on its capacity to further the interests of its 
people. The famine in Ethiopia in the early 1970s is an example of this, as was the sharp 
decline of nutritional status of the inhabitants of northeast Ghana in 1974 and 1975 at the 
time of the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s.*
Humanitarian: equity. Seeking aid in order to encourage greater equity is probably 
rarer than any of the foregoing rationales. There has probably been more concern for the 
social equity issue on the part of donors and academics; both from the developed and the 
developing world, than there has been from the governments of the developing countries. 
Countries are not particularly eager to admit publicly that their regimes may be 
inequitable. Nevertheless there are two situations where it could conceivably be a 
rationale for seeking aid. The first might be from a regime, such as that of President 
Nyerere which had as a fundamental tenet of its philosophy the increasing equity of the 
people of Tanzania.90 The second would be where a recipient was following what White 
would term a "presentational"91 strategy. This is where the recipient knows that the 
donor considers equity a prime justification for giving foreign aid. The potential 
recipient, therefore, makes it part of the request for foreign aid.
*The writer was resident in Ghana from July 1971 until November 1975 working on projects in the northern part of the 
country. Reports from researchers monitoring the nutritional levels of the north together with the observations of volunteers in the 
same areas were brought to the attention of Colonel Acheampong’s National Redemption Council who refused to acknowledge it 
publicly by requesting foreign aid. Such an acknowledgement would have pointed at the failure of the regime to come to grips with 
some of the more basic problems facing the country.
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Recipient Strategies
Bauer argues that the level of foreign aid, in comparison with domestic 
resources, is so small that the effect is bound to be virtually negligible.92 Nevertheless, it 
is sought after by many governments. Some may even pursue it to the point where they 
are prepared to sacrifice basic tenets of their political philosophies and development 
strategies to qualify for aid from donors who have imposed conditions on their aid. This 
is evident in the increasing sophistication with which foreign aid is requested.
The recipient’s objectives in seeking aid may differ markedly from those of 
the donor in giving it. For example, recipient strategies may be closely related to 
satisfying political needs in a particular area of the country. Alternately they may involve 
responding to the desires of a segment of the population rather than achieving economic 
growth or improving the standard of living of the poor. The recipient’s request may be 
to pursue a development strategy that is markedly different from that favoured by the 
donor. The recipient still, however, has to satisfy the donor that the latter’s objectives 
will be met. This is further complicated when a country draws resources from a wide 
range of bilateral and multilateral donors, many of whom have conflicting perceptions of 
what development goals the recipient should be pursuing. In the face of these conflicting 
objectives the recipient has to formulate a strategy which meets both the donors objectives 
and its own. As White points out, some of these are non-economic objectives and they 
may not meet with approval on the part of the donor.93
One strategy of the recipient may be to accept the aid offered, but to 
"appropriate” it to serve another purpose. The result is that aid is then put to a use for 
which it was not intended by the donor. The recipient uses a project to satisfy its own 
needs and the donor’s expectations. White’s example is of a request for a steel mill that 
a recipient will then locate in a particular area that has nothing to do with the economics 
of steel production, but meets the recipient’s domestic political obligations. Thus, it 
satisfies both the domestic political need for aid and, in this example, the donor’s desire 
to supply a steel mill.94 Neither objective is well served by this approach.
Another strategy open to a recipient country is termed "switching". The 
recipient requests aid for projects that will appeal to the donor using its own resources to
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finance those which it believes donors will consider unattractive.95 Military expenditures 
are frequently made with monies freed by donors having provided foreign exchange to 
finance other imports.
A third option is to pursue a "presentational” strategy. This involves 
proposing policies that the recipient knows will meet the donors requirements, but which 
it has no intention of carrying out.96 This works particularly well with project aid, which 
as we have seen is difficult for the donor to use as leverage because of the potential loss 
of the whole project, which would cause political embarrassment.
In summing up, White makes an important point in maintaining that in the 
assessment of aid it is not sufficient simply to see what the aid has done in terms of the 
stated objectives; aid must also be assessed against the effect it had that was not foreseen. 
We must always ask, "What else did it do?"97
Development Theory: Bangladesh’s Strategy
In the following section we will examine the strategies proposed in the 
various development plan documents in Bangladesh. This will give an indication of what 
we might expect to have been achieved at various periods in time. We use three periods: 
1971 to 1975, 1976 to 1981 and 1982 to 1986. They coincide roughly with the three 
major political regimes: those of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President Zia and President 
H.M. Ershad, although the latter is still in power at this writing.
The first period corresponds with the Mujib era, fiscal years 1971/72 to 
1974/75.* It might be unfair to expect great changes in the economy and concrete 
accomplishments at this point, but there should some evidence that the policies outlined in 
the First Five Year Plan had been put into place to work towards achieving development 
objectives. In all fairness to Bangladesh the period also corresponds to a time of external 
change, the rise in the international price of commodities including the first oil price 
hike. The country was subjected to serious floods in 197498 which were followed by a 
famine of considerable proportions. The period covers the reconstruction of war damage, 
and, while there was still work going on to put the economy on its feet, the rehabilitation
*The Government of Bangladesh fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. All references to statistical data use these periods 
unless otherwise indicated.
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stage had formally come to an end with the withdrawal of the United Rehabilitation 
Organisation of Bangladesh (UNROB) at the end of 1973. It is reasonable, however, to 
assume that Sheikh Mujib had been given sufficient time to consolidate his position and 
to start to bring about the transition of the economy from the Pakistan free market model 
to the socialist model that was envisaged.
The second period is that following the completion of the First Five Year 
Plan, fiscal years 1976/77 to 1979/80. Politically this corresponds to the Zia regime 
comprising as it does both the Martial Law period and the return to nominal legitimacy.* 
It also coincides with the term of the Two Year Plan99 (TYP) and the time during which 
the planning was taking place for the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP).
The final period for examination from 1981 to 1986 comprises the brief Sattar 
government and the Ershad regime. Economically it covers the last four years of the 
Second Five Year Plan and the first year of the Third Five Year Plan (TFYP); fiscal 
years 1981/82 to 1985/86. The Ershad regime had had adequate opportunity to establish 
itself, although nominal political legitimacy** had not yet been established. In this period 
it is possible to look at the results of the Second Five Year Plan. Consideration of this 
period will be briefer than the other two periods because of the relative scarcity of 
published material owing to its more recent origin.
In each of the periods we look at several areas to determine what policy 
decisions have been taken and what can be reasonably expected in the time period 
applicable. Chapter III examines the actual state of the country compared to our 
expectations according to conventional development theory and compared with the 
predictions of the aid dependence paradigm in Chapter I.
Evidence Required to Substantiate Theory
The political economy of an aid-dependent regime: The plans. The objectives 
of the First Five Year Plan were clearly a reflection of the Government’s objective to
*In referring to the Zia regime’s return of the country to legitimate government, and the later the Ershad regime’s return to 
legitimate government, we mean only that the Government had returned to constitutional rule. The means by which both governments 
were returned and the validity of the various referenda and elections may well be open to question.
*‘Parliamentary elections were held in the spring of 1986, but Ershad was not elected President until October 1986 and Martial 
Law was not lifted until later.
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transform Bangladesh into a socialist state. The following outlines the key objectives of 
the First Five Year Plan:
The basic objectives of the Plan are as follows:
(i) To reduce poverty. This is the foremost objective of the Plan. . . .
(ii) To continue and complete the work of reconstruction, and to raise output in the major sectors 
of the economy, particularly in agriculture and industry, to the bench-mark of 1969-70 as 
adjusted for expansion of capacity, by 1973-74.
(iii) To increase the rate of growth of G.D.P. to at least 5.5 per cent per annum, . . .
(iv) To expand the output of essential consumption items with a view to provide fsicl the 
minimum consumption requirement of the masses. . . .
(v) To arrest the rising trend in the general price level, . . .
(vi) To increase per capita income at the modest rate of 2.5 per cent per annum. . . .
(vii) To consolidate the gains made so far in the socialist transformation of Bangladesh; . . .
(viii) To reduce dependence on foreign aid over time through the mobilisation of domestic 
resources and the promotion of self-reliance. . . .
(ix) To transform the institutional and technological base of agriculture with a view to attaining 
self-sufficiency in foodgrains, . . .
(x) to lay the groundwork for an ambitious programme of population planning and control; . . .
(xi) To accelerate the rate of development expenditure and remedy the glaring deficiencies in the 
traditionally neglected fields of social and human resources development by improvement in 
education, health, rural housing and water supplies, etc., all of which will also help to 
improve general capability and efficiency of work.
(xii) To ensure a wide and equitable diffusion of income and employment opportunities throughout 
Bangladesh. . . .10°
The First Five Year Plan suggests a strategy most appropriate to return the 
country its immediate pre-war level and to begin the transformation to a socialist society.
The first objective of the First Five Year Plan was to reduce poverty and encourage 
moderate economic growth. This was to be done through increasing the level of savings 
and investment.101
The second step was to rebuild the damage that had taken place during the 
yearlong civil war that had split the country from West Pakistan. This involved raising 
production levels to bench marks estimated to have been the levels which production 
would have reached, had the economy not been depressed by the War of Liberation. The 
planners believed that this could be accomplished by establishing new trading 
relationships, resuming the import of raw materials, improving labour relations and 
providing adequate incentives to improve production.102
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The third objective, growth, was designed to achieve the First Five Year 
Plan’s targets above the bench-marks.
The planners’ objectives were to create the prerequisites for sustained self- 
reliant growth in agriculture and small industry. This would broach the problem of 
unemployment and under-employment. Autarky in food grain production would be 
achieved and a policy import substitution in the manufacture of consumer goods 
implemented. These would be combined with mass literacy programmes and improved 
rural health care to be delivered at low cost to the rural areas.103 Foreign assistance, 
particularly from sympathetic countries with socialist objectives, was welcomed, but the 
prevailing view was that this was not a substitute for harnessing domestic resources. 
Furthermore, dependence on such foreign aid for more than a helping hand would be 
unconscionable.104
Expectations of the First Five Year Plan. From the strategies proposed in the 
First Five Year Plan, the following results could reasonably have been expected to have 
taken place within the short time space between the preparation of the First Five Year 
Plan and the end of our first period. There would be concentration on the development 
of institutions that were concerned with improving the access to resources of the poor, 
marginal farmers and the landless. It is apparent from its recurring theme in the First 
Five Year Plan that the alleviation of poverty was considered important by the planners.105
The philosophy of the second objective of the First Five Year Plan is very 
much in line with the entitlement approach posited by Sen.106 It implies some effort at 
ensuring a basic set of entitlements to make the essentials of life available, even to those 
on the lowest level of the socio-economic scale. Sen’s approach builds on the premise 
that everyone is entitled to access to a basic package of essential goods through his or her 
own efforts and is an attempt to formulate a practical approach to the problem of meeting 
basic needs. We should expect an improved capacity to reach the poor with services, 
although in the time-frame envisioned real improvements might still be few.
The view was that agriculture would be the leading sector, both by virtue of 
size, and the emphasis placed on its development. It could then be reasonably expected 
there would be sustained investment in training, and, at the very least, the provision of 
the standard "green revolution” package of inputs: fertiliser, increased irrigation and high 
yielding varieties of seed (HYV). The Plan saw concentration on the construction of
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such productive investments as irrigation and drainage facilities and flood control 
projects.107 Construction and energy would also feature in leading economic growth, par­
ticularly the latter, starting as it did from a fairly low base:108
The Plan does not envisage any sharp structural change. It is not marked by rapid 
industrialisation. The share of manufacturing industry in GDP remains relatively small even at the 
end of the Plan period, just over 11 per cent. Thus the Plan avoids the pace and pattern of 
industrialisation based upon modem, borrowed capital intensive technology, except in areas where 
the choice is limited and import substitution is urgently needed [the other exception being energy 
noted above].109
With the expansion of availability of basic consumption items, the 
Government’s attitude was biased towards the promotion of an import-substitution 
strategy.110 One would expect that, combined with investment in increased productive 
capacity in the production of basic necessities, and in line with the fundamentally 
egalitarian approach that underpinned the Government philosophy, there would be 
increasing emphasis on the development of the institutions necessary to deliver the 
benefits to the poor.
The objective of arresting the general rise in price level is fundamentally a 
problem of conventional economics applied to a country emerging from a war. Con­
trolling the money supply and ensuring that the basic commodities are available would be 
expected to do much to stabilise prices. On the other hand, exogenous factors such as the 
external economic environment, which are beyond the managerial control of the 
Government could still bring about unforeseen price increases.
Increasing the growth rate is a standard approach to economic development to 
generate more resources. This was to be attained by introduction of new technology into 
the agricultural sector. Investment in manufacturing was designed to provide more added 
value to exports. Given the Government’s bias toward import substitution, more 
investment in the domestic manufacture of basic essentials that had hitherto been imported 
might be expected.
The socialist objectives of the Government were to be pursued through the 
nationalisation of industries and, to the extent feasible, the distribution system in the 
country.
The objective of reduced dependence on foreign aid would imply making 
optimal use of the aid that the country was prepared to accept. Policies would have to
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focus on increasing the rate of domestic savings and increasing domestic resource 
mobilisation to finance the growth anticipated.
The First Five Year Plan’s focus was on agriculture, the largest sector. The 
strategy was to increasing production dramatically at an average rate of some 8.4 
per cent, or 4.6 per cent111 over the established bench-marks.112 There would have had to 
be a substantial investment in the agricultural inputs required to achieve higher 
production, and the technology required to achieve higher productivity. Finally, they 
would have to develop the agricultural and credit institutions necessary to deliver the 
package to the farmers.
Population pressure was acknowledged to be one of the key constraints that 
had to be overcome if Bangladesh was to achieve real growth on a per capita basis. A 
population programme would have to be mounted and it would require an emphasis on 
institutional development to deliver the message. The low rate of literacy, estimated at 
some 20 per cent in 1974113 would have necessitated an imaginative approach that did not 
rely on the written media. There would have to have been a strong effort to strengthen 
the institutional capability to deliver both the message and the contraceptive product.
The acceleration of the delivery of a programme of improved social services 
presumed an increased rate of saving and a dramatic broadening of the tax base. It would 
also require the strengthening of the governmental systems necessary to administer such a 
programme. Education would certainly figure largely in such an effort since on it 
depended the transmission of information for many of the Government’s other efforts.
The promotion of social equity would have demanded a concerted efforts to 
continue the trend to improving the distribution of income that was underway during the 
period that the country was part of Pakistan114 (see Table 4.4). The modest improvement 
in income distribution at least demonstrated that such an improvement was possible.
The Two Year Plan. The Two Year Plan was an interim plan only. It 
omitted three of the original objectives of the First Five Year Plan: the reduction of 
poverty, the acceleration of development expenditure on the previously neglected sectors 
of education, health, rural housing and water supply, i.e., the social sectors, and, not 
surprisingly, the socialist transformation of Bangladesh.
Expectations of the Two-Year Plan. There was less emphasis on the objective 
of alleviating poverty in the Two-Year Plan, a reflection of changed political ideology of
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the new Government. Accordingly, we would expect to see a continued worsening in the 
number of people under the poverty line and more stress on the objective of achieving 
growth in the modern sector.
The Second Five Year Plan. The Government once again seized the poverty 
issue as the greatest problem facing the country. The Second Five Year Plan states the 
following:
The objectives of the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) have been formulated in the context of 
overwhelming problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy; and malnutrition of the mass, mostly 
living in rural areas. In the past high growth rate of population on the one hand and slow growth 
of the economy on the other have rather accentuated these problems over time. About 85 percent of 
people now lives under condition [sic] of absolute poverty; 74 percent of them cannot read and 
write and about 33 percent of labour force have no work. The problems have become endemic in 
character.115
With this situation in mind the Second Plan document went on to enunciate the 
specific objectives of the Plan:
(i) To ensure an equitable growth in order to bring about a noticeable improvement in the 
standard of living of people by ensuring adequate supplies of the basic needs;
(ii) To reach self-sufficiency in food in the shortest possible time;
(iii) To expand opportunities for gainful employment so that people have access to income and 
resources for their basic needs and to benefits [sic] of growth;
(iv) To eliminate illiteracy and achieve universal primary education as steps for comprehensive 
human resource development;
(v) To reduce the rate of population growth;
(vi) To promote participation of people in development activities through devolution of
administration and development of local institutions; and
(vii) To attain a higher degree of self-reliance through domestic resource mobilisation effort and 
improvement of balance of payment position.116
Expectations of the Second Five Year Plan. What is evident from reading the 
Two Year Plan and the Second Plan is that the sense of idealism and urgency has gone. 
The egalitarian spirit, while still reflected in rhetoric, is less evident and less compelling. 
The bold objectives have been replaced by targets which lack the strategies designed to
carry them out. The socialist tone of the First Five Year Plan is replaced by more
conventional growth oriented objectives.
In 1976 Just Faaland and Professor Parkinson made some projections of what 
it appeared to be possible to achieve in Bangladesh and using conventional development 
theory and common sense. Their predictions about what it might be possible to achieve 
with the resources at hand are presented in Table 2.2.
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TABLE 2.2 
Development Scenario, 1975-2000 
(values in approximate 1974 prices in US$ equivalent)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1. Population 80 93 106 121 136 150
2. GDP 6,400 8,170 10,930 14,630 19,610 26,140
3. Gross Investment 550 1,225 1,965 2,635 3,530 4,710
4. Net Capital Imports 800 980 1,310 1,465 1,570 1,570
5. Domestic Savings -250 245 655 1,170 1,960 3,140
6. Consumption 6,650 7,925 10,275 13,460 17,650 23,000
7. Gross Product pc. 80 88 103 121 145 174
8. Consumption pc. 83 85 97 111 130 153
9. Domestic Savings pc. -3 3 6 10 15 21
10. Gross Investment %GDP 8 15 18 18 18 18
11. Capital Imports %GDP 12 12 12 10 8 6
12. Domestic Savings %GDP A 3 6 8 10 12
1975/80 1980/85 1985/90I 1990/95 1995/2000' 1980/2000 1975/2000
13. Population 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2.4 187
14. GDP 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 401
15. Gross Investment 17.4 10.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 855
16. Gross Product pc. 2.0 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.5 218
17. Consumption pc. 0.6 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.0 184
18. Capital-Output -2.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 n.a.
19. Marginal Svgs Rate -28.0 15.0 14.0 16.0 14.0 16.0 n.a.
20. Marginal pc. Savings -62.0 32.0 24.0 20.0 22.0 21.0 n.a.
Source: Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson, Bangladesh: The Test Case for Development (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1976), 
table V .l , p. 68.
These modest accomplishments were predicated upon the Government’s 
ability to improve the quality of management. They assumed a relatively stable regime, 
although they acknowledged the difficulties that Bangladesh would face in broaching the 
War-related problems and the inherent poverty of the country.
In a straightforward projection of what appeared economically possible, such 
as Faaland and Parkinson’s book, Robinson’s study, or as is reflected in the proceedings 
of the meeting of the International Economic Association117 the tendency was to consider 
the economic theory in relative isolation. These writings reflect a concern with the social 
objectives combined with conventional economic projections.
We might have expected the implementation of the various plans to have been 
characterised by:
A concentration of resources on the poor,
Labour intensive strategies,
Institutional development,
A selective approach to accepting foreign aid.
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The Food Distribution System. The Food Distribution System, also called the 
Ration System, has played a fundamental role in the Government’s attempts to develop 
the economy. One of the problems in Bangladesh has been to control the price of rice 
with a view to reducing the large price swings that occur. Such price increases are now 
generally blamed for the famine conditions that prevailed towards the end of 1974 rather 
than a shortfall in actual food availability. Rice production in fact was at its highest in 
1974, for any year between 1971 and 1975.118 The manner in which such price 
stabilisation might have been achieved is through the use of a strategic reserve119 and a 
domestic procurement programme.120
The other purpose that the Food Distribution System theoretically served was 
to ensure that those who would suffer most through an increase in the price of rice, the 
rural poor and the disadvantaged, were able to procure sufficient rice at an affordable 
price to satisfy their basic nutritional requirements. The System was designed to achieve 
equity and stability in regard to this essential basic commodity.
Faaland and Parkinson suggest, that in a poor country such as Bangladesh, the 
sale of food at far below the prevailing market price is not a realistic solution.121 
However, they maintain it would be more realistic if payment were to be made for work 
done since the lack of paid employment leads to increasing poverty.122 "Fair price" shops 
were established by the Government shortly after independence, but essentially failed 
because the windfall profits during periods when the price of rice was high proved to be 
too much of a temptation to speculators.123 Faaland and Parkinson argue that while such a 
food distribution system has much to commend it in theory, in order to control the price 
of essential commodities, but there is little point in continuing if it fails in this task and in 
addition makes exorbitant profits for individuals.124
The World Bank, in the aftermath of the 1974 famine, stressed the need to 
build food stock reserves125 and to eliminate illegal ration cards which were in relatively 
wide circulation.126 They agreed with Faaland and Parkinson that the price differential 
between the ration system and the open market is too great an inducement to siphon food 
into the free market at great profit and that, in any case, the food did not benefit the rural 
poor or the destitute.127 The subsidy alone for 1975 was estimated to have cost the 
Government some taka 800 million ($US 90.1 million at the prevailing exchange rate of 
taka 8.8759 to the US dollar). We would expect such a system either to be abolished,
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retaining only those elements as a strategic reserve, the Food for Work Programme and
the Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme, which have been demonstrated to serve the
Governments objectives. Alternately, at the very least, there would have been a general 
tightening of administrative controls.
We would then expect this area to have been characterised by:
The tightening of administrative controls,
The possible abolition over time of those parts of the Food Distribution
System which serve no identifiable social need,
The retention of those parts of the System that are designed to address the
very poor.
Agriculture. In a predominantly agrarian society, such as Bangladesh, it 
might be expected that agriculture would play a dominant role; first, in attempting to 
achieve food autarky; second in trying to improve the state of nutritional intake; third, in 
providing increased employment opportunities for new entrants to the work force; fourth, 
in realising an agriculture-driven industrialised sector128 and last, in trying to develop an 
export market for selected non-traditional cash crops.
Agriculture was the largest single sector in the economy accounting for about 
half of the GDP and the employment of 80 per cent of the country’s rural population.129 
While over time its position might be expected to shift to a slightly smaller share of the 
GDP,130 it is unlikely that we would see a substantial shift in the short period under 
consideration although the trends should be evident. Agriculture is probably the most 
critical sector of the economy, both because of its size and its potential. As Rene 
Dumont has noted:
Technically speaking, the agricultural potentialities of Bangladesh by the square metre of arable 
land, are much higher than those of India, China or Japan. The quality of soils are fsicl much 
higher than in India.131
Average yields are low when compared to other countries. Rice, the main 
crop, has a yield of about the same as India, 25 per cent that of Australia, 33 per cent 
that of Japan and 50 per cent that of either China or Taiwan.132 The effort and results in 
the agricultural sector will thus be critical to the success of any programme.
Since the approach that had yielded positive results in other countries was the 
standard "green revolution" approach of high yielding varieties, fertiliser and irrigation, 
the problem was not technology, but effective delivery to small farmers. The 
development of rural institutions would be critical to success in the agricultural sector
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since it was also known that small farmers were generally the most productive members 
of the agricultural community, although they use the least in the way of modern inputs.133 
One would expect a concerted effort in this direction as the First Five Year Plan had 
suggested.
We would therefore expect this sector to be characterised by:
Increased investment in agriculture,
Concentration on the improvement of rural institutions,
A genuine effort to achieve full agricultural potential.
Economic growth. Overall economic growth would depend on both internal 
factors, such as the rate of investment, and exogenous factors such as the terms of trade 
and the market environment for products Bangladesh can produce. It would also be 
contingent on increased purchasing power of the majority of the population who were 
close to the poverty line.
In assessing the outlook for a realistic growth rate was generally agreed to be 
between 5 per cent,134 the view of E.A.G. Robinson, and 5xh  per cent, the view of Hollis 
Chenery of the World Bank.135 Some estimates, such as that of Branko Horvat, put it 
potentially as high as 8 per cent, achieving a sustained rate of growth rate of 10 per cent 
by the end of the First Plan period.136
Faaland and Parkinson maintained that realistically agriculture must be the 
main growth area for the immediate future137 because of its tremendous importance to the 
economy, but that and industrial growth rate averaging 10 per cent would be consistent 
with performance in other LLDCs.138
We would therefore expect:
The stress on economic growth to be concentrated on agriculture,
There to be some determined effort to recognise and encourage growth in the
traditional sector.
Business and industry. The philosophy of the first government which was 
firmly socialist in objectives, so one would expect the element of state control in the 
economy to increase. With later governments this commitment to a socialist philosophy 
was eroded until it eventually formed very little of the Government’s ideological outlook. 
We would, therefore, not expect a very dynamic private sector from the Mujib regime 
during the first period. Succeeding regimes would ease the restrictions on investment and
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encourage the private sector to expand. We would, then, expect that the private sector, 
particularly in the most recent period, would be a dynamic element in the economy.
A government pursuing a policy of liberalisation could ease the limitations on 
capital investment and encourage the development of financial markets appropriate to 
attract the savings traditionally sunk in unproductive investments such as jewellery and 
land’ and to provide incentives to productive enterprise as opposed to trading and 
importing.
We would expect the following:
Emphasis on exports,
The encouragement of export trade,
The simplification of small investment,
The encouragement of traditional savings to be channelled away from non­
productive investment and into new enterprises.
Equity and the growth of the middle and upper classes. The objective of the 
improved equity and the alleviation of poverty are central objectives of the First Five 
Year Plan and figure strongly in the objectives of subsequent plans. While it might be 
early to expect a measurable improvement in the standard of living of the poor, the 
policies formulated and followed to make available more resources to the marginally 
landless and the landless should give some indication of the progress being made. Tax 
policy would provide both an incentive to productive employment generating segments of 
the economy and strong disincentives to unproductive investment. In this area the 
Government might be expected to set an example of modest consumption and self- 
reliance.
We would expect:
A record of governments active promotion of social equity,
The discouragement of the acquisition of great wealth.
Foreign aid. Given that reduced dependence on foreign aid is usually an 
objective of a government seeking to preserve its sovereignty, we would expect policies 
concerning the acceptance of foreign aid would involve a strict ordering of aid priorities.
*This is not to say that land is not productive, but rather that, since land is fully utilised in Bangladesh, increased investment is 
unlikely to make it any more productive, but will bid the price up. In fact there is considerable evidence that the acquisition of land 
by large landowners decreases it productivity since the evidence shows that small marginal landowners are considerably more 
productive than large ones, (de Vylder, pp. 116-117)
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We would also expect that, on the basis of an overall economic strategy, debt service 
implications would figure largely in aid acceptance. Aid, particularly aid on a loan basis, 
would be primarily spent on essential capital items, either to further the import 
substitution strategy and/or an export driven policy. Consumption items would be 
minimised because of the future debt implications without corresponding foreign ex­
change generation, and because of the danger of developing import dependent industries 
which could contribute to future balance of payments problems. In other words, 
particularly in the current foreign aid environment which is not positive, there would be a 
tendency to reduce the imports to those necessary or which contribute to increased 
foreign exchange earnings.
Reduced dependence on foreign aid does not necessarily mean less foreign 
aid, but rather pursuing a strategy where foreign aid can be foregone at only the price of 
reduced growth, resulting from the reduced investment available. Growth in the 
mobilisation of domestic resources that can replace the domestic component of the 
investment should indicate progress. The emphasis on the development of industries 
where there is comparative advantage should be strongly pursued.
We would, therefore, expect to find:
The selective use of foreign aid,
The active encouragement of domestic initiatives that do not depend on 
foreign aid.
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CHAPTER III
COMPARISONS AND RESULTS 
The Political Economy of an Aid Dependent Regime
The political economy of aid is best illustrated in the results of the 
development plans. There, the compromises between the objectives of the economic 
planners and the reality of the politicians’ desire to consolidate their power base and 
retain power are combined to form the reality of development.
At independence the Planning Commission was created by Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman to create the new socialist state that he envisioned. Members were to hold the 
same rank as ministers. The next level, chiefs of the sections, were to hold the same 
rank as the secretaries* of other ministries.1 The Commission was at the forefront of the 
new Government’s initiatives to develop and diversify the economy. Members were 
drawn from friends of Sheikh Mujib who were also among the elite of the academic 
community.2 It was a promising beginning.
The Prime Minister headed the first Planning Commission. Professor Nurul 
Islam, formerly of the Pakistan Planning Commission, was Deputy Chairman.** The 
other members were Professor Rehman Sobhan, Professor Mosharaff Hossain and 
Professor A. Rahman. All three men were well known at the time in Bangladesh. They 
were cool toward the World Bank and the Americans.
* Secretaries in the Bangladesh system would be comparable to under-secretaries in the British system or deputy ministers in the 
Canadian system.
**The Deputy Chairman was the executive bead of the Planning Commission with the political direction being provided initially 
by the Minister in charge of Planning and later by the Prime Minister.(Islam, 1977. p. 46.)
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The First Five Year Plan was socialist in tone,3 and only 12.5 per cent of 
investment was foreseen for the private sector.4 This was a reflection of the new 
Government’s political philosophy, although one can question how realistic this was for a 
government which counted among its prominent supporters the large land-holders.5 The 
First Five Year Plan called for very ambitious targets. Investment was to start at about 
12 per cent GDP and rise to 19 per cent by the end of the plan period. Savings were 
expected to start at 4.5 per cent and rise to 14.2 per cent by the end of the Plan period.6 
Foreign capital was to provide about 40 per cent of the development expenditure7 and the 
economy was expected to achieve sustained growth of 5.5 per cent of the GDP.8 Even at 
the planning level therefore, once past the initial rhetoric, it was essentially an attempt to 
achieve everything at once. It sought to stimulate agricultural growth by 4.6 per cent 
over the bench-mark and 8.4 per cent over actual 1972/73 production.9 It pursued a 
policy of import substitution, to provide internally for the economy those products that 
had hitherto been provided by the West Wing of Pakistan.10 This resulted in heavy 
investment in the industrial sector. The power and gas sectors were the second fastest 
growing in the economy."
Furthermore, as the First Five Year Plan was finalised it received critical 
comment from only a narrow range of critics. Open discussion was vetoed at the 
political level, as was debate in Parliament, although the Planning Commission was 
supportive of such discussion. There was no provision in the constitution for the 
approval of a five year plan. Even debate in Cabinet was limited to discussion of 
executive responsibility and the administrative mechanisms that the Plan required.12
The drafters of the First Five Year Plan proposed a strategy that was 
essentially a "lead sector" approach with agriculture as the dominant sector:
The Plan is designed to generate a rate and pattern of income growth which will not only 
meet a minimum consumption standard but also expand employment opportunities and ensure a 
socially desirable pattern of income distribution. With this end in view the basic strategy in the 
Plan is to concentrate on increasing output in those sectors of the economy which use large amounts 
of labour and use methods of production which are labour intensive.13
The justification was obvious. Agriculture accounted for some 58 per cent of the GDP at 
independence, and provided the largest source of employment in the country. The policy 
actually adopted by the new government at the political level, however, appears to have 
been essentially a "big push" or balanced growth strategy although such is not stated 
explicitly. The allocation of resources to the various sectors (see Table 3.1) supports
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such a conclusion. Investment was concentrated in the modern sector. Even the growth 
projections in the Plan itself saw construction, irrigation, drainage and housing as leading 
the way followed closely by the power and gas sector.14 The latter were neither 
employment generating, except in the short run, nor did they promote agricultural 
growth, except possibly through fertiliser production.
Although the First Five Year Plan (see Chapter II) was idealistic and founded 
on the principles of social democracy, it was biased against agriculture and rural 
development in its allocation of resources if not in its rhetoric15 (see Table 2.3). Despite 
the articulated emphasis on agriculture, the relative share of agriculture in the (proposed) 
Pakistan Fourth Plan had been much higher.16 Thus, the actual implementation all but 
ignored two of the most important sectors.17 The dichotomy between the objectives and 
the allocation of resources is attributable to a split between the theoreticians in the 
Planning Commission and the realities of the political process. Professor Islam recounts 
the relationship of the planners to their political masters during the early days following 
independence:
The Prime Minister often implicitly assumed that the Deputy Chairman and the Members 
were not only fully aware of the hopes, aspirations and objectives of the party and fully shared 
them, but also that understood the limitations of action inherent in a political process where 
differing and sometimes opposing interest groups had to be accommodated in order to preserve the 
unity of the party and its continuance in power. Not being involved in the political process and in 
the party's deliberations, the Planning Commission did not fully appreciate the political feasibility 
constraints on economic policy-making and therefore could scarcely be in a position to weigh the 
political costs and benefits before offering its recommendations.18
We see then, that practical political considerations overshadowed the stated social 
objectives of the Government. In reality the alleviation of poverty played a minimal role 
for the new Government. Poverty actually worsened during the mid-1970s, culminating 
in the famine of 1974.19
In contrast to the objectives of social equity espoused in the First Five Year 
Plan in Bangladesh is what the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
termed "the net". It is worth pausing here for a more complete description of what is 
meant by "the net":
As they became more organised, as a result of our work [BRAC’s] and their own efforts the 
landless people became more conscious of this disparity and was fsicl particularly aware that 
benefits intended for them; . . . were being intercepted by a net between them and the central 
government.20
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Another aspect of the First Five Year Plan was that the allocation of resources 
to the public sector was about 88 per cent of the total available,21 more than double the 
allocation for the public sector that had been proposed in the proposed Fourth Pakistan 
Plan, 33 per cent.22 This reflected the socialist objectives of the new government and of 
the Members of the Planning Commission. It ignored the practical problems of 
expanding the role of the public sector in a very short period.23 Here we see that, where 
political and economic considerations coincided, the political gestures forced a pace that 
was not practical with the resources available. Granted, the Government faced serious 
problems brought on by the loss of management personnel in the private sector, but a 
more gradual transition would have resulted in less disruption.
The industrial strategy proposed was based on the principle of import 
substitution, particularly in the fields of engineering, iron and steel fabrication, chemical, 
textiles and sugar processing, not areas where Bangladesh had a particular comparative 
advantage. Seventy per cent of the new investment was to be in new enterprises.24 Here 
in particular, the nature of the country’s resources indicated that the emphasis should be 
on labour intensive types of small business that could be integrated into both the 
agricultural sector and larger scale industry.25
This strategy was ignored in favour of those activities that catered to the small 
monied class and provided the most opportunity for the "appropriation" of resources 
either by unscrupulous businessmen, their agents and "facilitators", and by Government 
officials. In fact it perpetuated the approach so disparaged by the planners in Pakistan’s 
economic strategy.26
If we consider the objectives of the First Plan, what was accomplished was 
modest. Some reconstruction activity took place, but it took until 1978/79 for exports to 
achieve pre-War levels.27 For one thing, Bangladesh had to find new markets for its 
traditional exports of tea, hides, matches and paper to (formerly) West Pakistan.28
Considering the problems that were encountered during the period of the First 
Five Year Plan, the rise in the price of oil and the famine of 1974, there were some 
modest achievements. Growth was estimated at 4 per cent over the bench-mark against a 
target of 5.5 per cent resulting in real growth of about 6.1 per cent.29 Per capita income 
grew at 1.1 per cent over the bench-mark against a target of 2.5 per cent.30 Tax receipts 
increased from 4.29 per cent in 1973/74 to 7.93 per cent in 1977/78.31
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TABI.E 3.1
Sectoral Allocation First Five Year Plan
[Taka In Crore]
Sectors Public % Actual ** Privat© % Total % N o n - f I n .B
1. Agriculture and Water 1,041 26. 39s 31.7% 26 5. 1* 6, 059 24. 0% 129 22. 1%
2 - Industries and Minerals 7 38 18. 7 14.3 139 27 . 7 877 19. 7 18 3.1
3. Power and Energy 522 13.2 14.0 - - 522 11.7 — -
4. Physical Planning and Housing 315 8.0 6. 5 136 27 .0 451 10. 1 242 41.3
5. Transport 528 13.5 16. 5 66 13.2 594 13 - 4 - —
6. Communications 114 2.9 3.6 - — 114 2.5 - -
7 . Education and Manpower 316 8.0 5.1 - - 316 7 . 1 34 5.8
8. Health and 220 5.6 3.7 - 220 4 . 7 - —
9. Family Planning 70 1.8 2.2 - - 70 1-6 - -
10 .Government 26 0.7 - - - 26 0.6 - -
11 .Trade 62 1.6 - 108 21.3 170 3.8 lOl 173
12 .M i scellaneous Serv i ces - - - 28 5.7 28 0 . 6 61 10 . 4
3,952 100.0% 99. 8% 503 100.0% 4, 455 100.0% 585 100.0%
Source: Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan (Dhaka: Planning Commission, November 1973), tables
III.l D. 32.
^Calculated from #6049 table 5.4, p. 29.
Non-financial was an estimate of economic activity In the non-monetary traditional sector.
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Not much progress was made in providing the basic consumption items to the 
population. Industrial and agricultural growth stagnated and failed to regain their pre­
war levels.32 Per capita availability of food grains slipped from 360.72 pounds in 
1973/74 to 353.70 pounds in 1977/78, or -0.4 per cent per year. The availability of 
pulses increased at an average of 1.0 per cent from 5.7 pounds to 6.0 pounds per capita. 
By contrast, per capita availability of electrical power increased by 5.8 per cent per 
annum and cement by 25.0 per cent per annum. These were a reflection of the Hardcore 
Programme, a mid-term change toward more investment in the hard sectors, that took 
place in the latter years of the Plan.
Inflation was a serious problem due both to the mismanagement of the 
economy and to exogenous factors, such as the rise in the price of oil and commodities. 
The famine of 1974 also contributed to the situation. The general cost of living index 
rose at a rate of 50 per cent for the first two years,33 but moderated during the latter 
period. The result was a decline in real terms of both agricultural and industrial wages 
from pre-War levels. Although there was some modest recovery in latter years agri­
cultural wages were still at 63.8 (1969/70 = 100) in 1977/78.34
Per capita income slumped from US$95 in 197435 to US$76 in 197536 and then 
recovered to US$110 in 1976.37
The consolidation of the socialist framework proceeded quickly, but was 
hindered by a shortage of skilled management and work force.38 With the overthrow of 
President Mujib in 1975 the socialist framework collapsed although it wasn’t until the 
third period that large scale privatisation took place.
Dependence on foreign aid increased dramatically. The Government 
improved the rate of domestic resource mobilisation from 4 per cent to almost 8 per cent 
where it still hovered at the end of this study in 1986. The contribution of foreign aid to 
development outlay rose from the projected 40 per cent to some 78 per cent.39
The transformation of the agricultural sector did not take place and self- 
sufficiency was not achieved. By 1974/75 agriculture was still only 87 per cent of the 
1969/70 level. The period ended in a famine and the recovery period which succeeded 
it. The institutional base was neglected and institutional development remained an elusive 
goal.
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Population planning stagnated and it was not until the end of the third year of 
the Plan that the Government adopted a comprehensive population policy.40 Family 
planning among eligible families, static during the first years of the Plan, increased from 
9.6 per cent of eligible couples in 1975 to 14 per cent in 1979/80.41
Investment in the social sectors, particularly education, was well below 
planned levels while spending in the hard infrastructure sectors exceeded Plan projections 
(see Table 3.1).
Distribution of income deteriorated during the period for which there is data, 
1973/74 to 1977/78 and was worse than the preceding decade (see Tables 4.1 and 4.4).
Islam, reviewing the strategy of the Plan in his book Development Planning 
in Bangladesh, makes virtually no mention of the goals of equity or the reduction of 
poverty. The First Five Year Plan was strongly criticised by the World Bank which 
made much of the growing corruption42 among the leadership in their "green cover" 
report. "New men had access to political power for the first time with little conception of 
how to use it for purposes other than self-aggrandisement. "43 About corruption they said 
"The example is set at the political level where scarcely a foreign exchange transaction 
takes place, either on import or export, without some funds being deposited in the foreign 
bank account of a politician, businessman or some well connected individual.n44 Sobhan 
objects to this criticism. He states that in other countries where the World Bank operated 
such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Kenya there was also no lack of corruption or 
inefficiency. It had not, however, been a central theme to their country economic 
memoranda.45
Sobhan argues that the strategy of the World Bank was to formulate its views 
and then leak them to the other donors via the "green cover" report.46 The remaining 
objections of the World Bank were the limited role for the private sector, the restriction 
of the market by Government controls and the goals and assumptions stated in achieving 
self-reliance.47 We can conclude that the early period of independence was characterised 
by conflict between the World Bank and the Government, increasing evidence of the 
misuse of funds and the growing use of patronage.
By 1973/74 and 1974/75, the combination of declining aid revenues48 and the 
worsening external economic environment49 had combined to plunge the country further 
into economic difficulties. The tone of the Government changed. They agreed to a new
Chapter III
109
economic policy giving a much broader role to the private sector.50 They formed a 
regular donor consortium chaired by the World Bank51 in marked contrast to their 
insistence on organising it and chairing it themselves in 1973. There was, by 1975, 
agreement with the IMF on a structural adjustment programme. This included a drastic 
restructuring of import procedures, liberalisation of imports, tight curbs on credit, 
restraint on wages and salaries and a reduction of subsidies.52 There was a determined 
effort on the part of the leadership to attract more foreign aid. This even included a visit 
by Sheikh Mujib to the United Nations and to Washington. The declining influence of 
the Planning Commission,53 the original brain trust that had been established to guide the 
economic policy of the country, led to a loss of the original objective of social equity. 
The period ended with the assassination of Mujib and continuing instability. The 
inception of a modest American military programme indicated a significantly changed 
attitude toward the new Government.
The implication of the First Five Year Plan’s objective is that we might have 
expected to find greater effort to ensure that goods and services intended for the poor did 
actually reach them. In the second half of the 1970s the systems for the "appropriation" 
of resources were developed to an art.
The Two Year Plan: The Two Year Plan which followed the end of the First 
Five Year Plan was written as an interim measure. The upheaval of the time had not 
allowed concentration on economic planning, an indication of the Government’s other 
preoccupations. The Government’s main objective was staying in power. Furthermore, 
the philosophy had change dramatically from the socialist ideology that had characterised 
Sheikh Mujib’s government.
Investment in agriculture during the Two-Year Plan again concentrated on the 
infrastructure to develop water resources. This we shall see benefited mainly the larger 
farmers who already had the resources to invest in improved varieties of seed and 
fertiliser. Likewise, we will see in the section on agriculture that investments in capital 
intensive irrigation equipment, such as deep and shallow tube-wells, were unlikely to 
benefit the poor. The wealthier elements of the community generally gained control of 
the access to the resources that are required to increase productivity.54
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TABLE 3.2
Sectoral Allocation of the Two Year Plan
[Taka in Crore]
Sectors Public % Actual %A Private % Total %
1.Agriculture, Water and RD 898 27% 29. 4% 70 12% 968 25%
Agriculture 
Water Resources 
Rural Development
(425) 
(325) 
( 148)
(13.7)
(12.2)
(3.5)
2 . Industries
3 . Power, Natural Resources & STR
570
471
17
14
17 . 3 
16.9
246 41 816
471
22
12
Power
Natural Resources 
STR
(296) 
( 136) 
(39)
4 . Transport St Communications 580 18 19. 2 126 21 706 18
Transport 
Communi ca t ions
(450)
(130)
(16.0)
(3.2)
5.Physical Planning and Housing
6 . Education, Training & Public Admin.
250 
180 6
8 6.3
3.3
140 23 390
180
10
5
Education St Training 
Public Administration
169
11
7.Social Sectors 250 8 7.6 250 6
Health
Population & Family Planning 
Labour & Training 
Social Welfare
( 118) 
( 100) 
( 16) 
( 16)
(3.1)
(2.8)
(0.4)
(0.7)
8 . Development Boards & Other 62 2 0 . 6 18 3 80 2
3,261 100% 100.0% 600 100% 3,861 100%
S o u r c e : Bangla d e s h , Planning Com m i s s i o n , 17 H — HO f nhalffl : planning Commiss ion , 1978;
table 4.1, p. 44.
C a l c u l a t e d  from World Bank, B.anglasLejsh;. Recent Economic Developments and Medium Term Prospectfi , Repoi
No. 6049, table 5.4, p. 29-
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The Second Five Year Plan. The results of the Second Five Year Plan were 
equally disappointing. Having satisfied the need to acknowledge the problem of poverty 
it continued to suggest a sectoral allocation of public and private resources that bore little 
relation to the foregoing objectives which emphasised poverty in the rural areas 
attributable to malnutrition, illiteracy and over-population.
Growth was a respectable 3.8 per cent over the Second Plan period.55 There 
is, however, abundant evidence that the goals of improving the standard of living and 
providing access to the basic needs of the population were not achieved. Professor 
Hossain expressed it best in his summary of the Report on Rural Poverty:
Our analysis and findings leave little room for doubt that the process of impoverishment in 
the rural areas has been gathering momentum during the last few decades.36
Food grain self-sufficiency remained as elusive as during previous plan 
periods. Per capita availability of food grains increased at only 0.4 per cent per annum 
while pulses, a staple in the Bangladeshi diet, declined by an average of 2.6 per cent per 
annum to only 4.4 pounds. Food aid rose from 825,775 tons in 1980/81 to 1,315,971 in 
1984/85 an average increase of almost 10 per cent per annum.57 The total import of food 
and live animals went from 9.2 per cent of commodity imports in 1980/81 to 15.6 
per cent in 1984/85.58
The growth of the rural labour force increased an estimated 2.48 million 
between 1979/80 and 1084/85 and the crop sector alone was not able to absorb this 
increase.59 While the growth of the garment sector provided opportunities for urban 
workers, mainly women, the rural sector did not fare so well. The rapid rise in the use 
of mechanised milling for rice meant that some 2.0 million people lost their traditional 
source of employment.60
Figures for the exact period of the Third Five Year Plan are not available, 
however, literacy declined from 20.2 per cent in 1974 to 19.7 per cent in 1981.61 For the 
same period school attendance rate increased from 18.7 per cent to 22.5 per cent for 5 to 
9 year olds, but deteriorated from 33.8 per cent to 33.3 percent for 10 to 14 year olds, 
from 18.8 per cent to 17 per cent for 15 to 19 year olds, and from 7.5 per cent to 7.0 
per cent for 20 to 24 year olds.62
A major target of the Second Five Year Plan was to increase the contraceptive 
rate to 37.5 per cent, however, the estimated rate at the end of the Plan was only 25
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per cent.63 It was generally acknowledged that the population growth rate had dropped 
from about 2.9 per cent per annum to about 2.5 per cent.64
The Government did move forcefully on the decentralisation of some 
government activities to the upazila level. It provided resources for the construction of 
physical infrastructure and decided to carry out some major government programmes 
through the upazila structure. This provided welcome rural employment, but it still 
remained to be seen in 1986 whether the Government could attract sufficient skilled 
personnel to actually implement these programmes.65
The Target of the Second Plan had been to attain a tax/GDP ratio of 9.5 
per cent, however, the ratio at the end of the period was estimated to be only 8.3 
per cent,66 scarcely above the 8.0 per cent it had achieved at the end of the First Five 
Year Plan some seven years previous. The balance of payments situation remained stable 
despite a trade deficit that ranged from $1,822.3 million in 1980/81 to $1,531 million. 
Aid disbursements rose from $1,147.2 million in 1980/81 to $1,268.0 million in 
1983/84, reaching as much as $1,345.5 in 1982/83.
A few projects did make some progress in seeking to address the problems 
that the plans sought to overcome. The Grameen Bank, started as an experiment to make 
available credit to people without resources or collateral, has met with success.67 The 
Proshika Projects, Proshika Comilla and Proshika Kendra have done the same on a very 
limited basis. The Netherlands had some success in the settlement of landless peoples on 
Khas. or Government, lands. The economic analysis of the reclamation of land for the 
Sandwip Crossdam Project, a project designed to accrete land which would then be 
distributed among the landless, reached some startling conclusions. They arrived at a rate 
of return for the settlement of landless people that was estimated to be some 4 to 5 times 
the rate of return that would accrue if the land were sold to the wealthier farmers in the 
area.* The World Bank financed programme, Rural Development I, was designed to 
replicate the Comilla Model of cooperative development and is the main effort during the 
period to help the poorest people. It was generally regarded as a failure.68
This is one of the few analyses available that compares returns from traditional investment to those from investment in the 
alleviation of poverty.
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TABLE 3.3
Sectoral Allocation of the Second Five Year Plan 
(1979/80 prices)
[Taka in Crore]
Sectors Public % Actual % Private Total
1. Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 3,802 34.3% 29.7% 2,257 6,059
Agriculture (1,470) (13.3)
Water Resources (1,850) (16.7)
Rural Development (482) (4.3)
2. Industries and Minerals 1,390 12.5 9.3 1,769 3,159
3. Power and Energy 2,052 18.5 22.3 2,052
4. Transport and Communications 1,524 13.7 15.6 976 2,500
5. Physical Planning and Housing 574 5.2 5.2 1,098 1,672
6. Social Economic Sectors 1,758 15.8 10.5 1,758
7. Other & Upazilas - - 7.3
11,100 100.0% 99.9% 6,100 17,200
Source: Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan (Dhaka: Planning Commission, May,
1983), tables 3.2 and 3.3, p. 41-42.
^Calculated from World Bank, Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments and Medium Term 
Prospects. Report No. 6049, table 5.4, p. 29.
In Table 3.3 we see that once again most of the development budget was 
devoted to sectors where there is little if any benefit to the poorer elements of society. 
In Table 3.4 we can see the sectoral distribution of the actual disbursement of aid in the 
Annual Development Plan.
The growth of an increasingly aid-dependent economy during the mid­
seventies, was reflected by the continuing large proportion of Government revenue 
derived from aid.69 The growth in the imbalance of trade required increased financing 
from foreign aid. This, combined with population growth, soon led leaders to set aside 
the early objective of self-reliance as an immediate goal, in favour of pursuing more 
rapid growth in areas such as the industrial sector, the Hardcore Programme. It was felt 
that the poor would bear the brunt of the quest for self reliance.70 Essentially it was the 
pursuit of economic development through the "trickle down" approach.
From 1975 to 1980 the political leadership had changed dramatically from the 
socialist Mujib regime to a martial law regime under President Zia. The latter 
subsequently legitimised his government with suspect presidential elections on June 3, 
1978 and with equally questionable parliamentary elections on the 18 February 1979. 
Some participants were cynical enough to state publicly that they were held in order to 
satisfy the donors, specifically the United States.71
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TABLE 3.4
Sectoral Allocation of Annual Development Programmes
72/73
Revised
Budget
73/74 
Rev i sed 
Budget
74/75 
Rev i sed 
Budget
75/76 
Rev i sed 
Budget
76/77 
Rev i sed 
Budget
77/78
Revised
Budget
78/79
Revised
Budget
79/80
Revised
Budget
80/81 
Actual 
D i s b .
81/82
Actual
Disb.
82/83
Actual
Disb.
83/84
Actual
Disb.
84/85
Prelim
Actual
85/86
Budget
Agriculture 1,350.0
Crops n/a 576. 0 639. 0 1,150.0 1,529.0 1,540.0 2,344.0 2,938.0 2,823.0 3,145.0 4,154.0 4,764.0 2,870.0 2,188.0
Rural Development n/a 306. 0 285.0 480.0 420. 0 510. O 619. 0 7 48.0 981 . 0 100. 0 1,039.0 736. 0 120.0 1,097.0
Irrigation n/a 697 .0 860.0 1,360.0 1,199.0 1,430.0 1,725.0 2,972.0 4,089.0 3,689.0 3,189.0 3,893.0 3,930.0 4,095.0
Industry 294. 0 525. 0 650. 0 1,360.0 1,430.0 1,900.0 3,040.O 3,627.0 2,776.0 2,700.0 2,470.0 2,336.0 2,410.0 4,738.0
Power & Natural ResourCB^a 537.0 712.0 1,510.0 1,313.0 1,680.0 2,525.0 3,989.0 3,759.0 5,114.0 5,788.0 6,971.0 8,800.0 7,927.0
Transport 1,157.0 965. 0 812. 0 1,250.0 1,962.0 1,760.0 2,135.0 4,040-0 4,659.0 3,703.0 3,947.0 2,448.0 2,690.0 2 , 7 4 7 .O
Communications n/a 131.0 186. 0 345. 0 307 .0 510. 0 431.0 802.0 669. 0 789.0 990. 0 629.0 780.0 561 . 0
Physical Planning & H s g 3 0 7 .0 233.0 340 . 0 660. 0 630. 0 810.0 966.0 1,448.0 1,559.0 1,465.0 1,300.0 1,636.0 1,140.0 969. 0
Social Sector 87 0.0
Education n/a 307.0 288.0 450.0 473.0 580.0 641. 0 649-0 97 0. 0 861. 0 1,052.0 1,370.0 1,380.0 1,651.0
Health n/a 207 .0 218.0 330.0 320.0 430-0 476-0 700 . 0 612-0 692.0 7 39-0 708. 0 930. 0 757.0
Family Planning n/a 50. 0 77.0 250.0 216. 0 310. 0 467 . O 593.0 466.0 400.0 712.0 857.0 1,020.0 1,287.0
Social Welfare n/a 21. 0 20.0 40.0 29. 0 50.0 65.0 216.0 191. 0 205.0 121.0 142.0 160. 0 150. 0
Manpower n / a . 3.0 13.0 30.0 20.0 40.0 69. 0 97 . 0 91 . 0 69. 0 246. 0 242. 0 130.0 115.0
Upazila Construction 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 73.0 3,196.0 3,960.0 4,250.0
Cyclone Reconstruction n/a 80.0 150.0 285. 0 80.0 140.0 162.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0. 0
Other n/a 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.0 1,057.0 132.0 1,410.0 5,724.0
Total 3,,978.0 4,638.0 5,250.0 9,500.0 9,928.0 11,690.0 15,665.0 22,869.0 23,645.0 23,011.0 26,877.0 30,060.0 31,730.0 39,347.0
Source: World Bank, Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments and Medlun Term P r o s pects. Report No. 6049, table 5.4, p. 29.
TABLE 3.5
Percentage Sectoral Allocation of Annual Development Programmes 
(As a percentage)
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 A v g .
Agriculture, Water & RD 
Crops
26.3%
n/a 12 . 4% 12.2% 12. 1% 15.4% 13.2% 15.0% 12.8% 11.9% 13.2% 15. 5% 15.8% 9.0% 5.7% 12. 1%
Rural Development n/a 6.6 5.4 5. 1 4. 2 4 . 4 4 . 0 3.3 4. 1 4.2 3.9 2.4 0 . 4 2.9 3.3
Irrigation n/a 15. 0 16-4 14.3 12. 1 12.2 11.0 13.0 17 . 3 15.4 11.9 13.0 12.4 10.7 13.0
Industry 5.7 11.3 12.4 14.3 14. 4 16. 3 19.4 15.9 11 . 7 11.3 9.2 7.8 7.6 12.4 11.8
Power & Natural Resources 22.5 11.6 13.6 15.9 13.2 14.4 16. 1 17 . 4 15.9 21 .4 21.5 23.2 27 . 7 20.7 19.9
Transport 22.5 20.8 15. 5 13.2 19.8 15. 1 13.6 17.7 19. 7 15.5 14. 7 8.1 8.5 7.2 13.0
Communications n/a 2.8 3.5 3.6 3.1 4 . 4 2.8 3.5 2.8 3.3 3.7 2.1 2.5 1 . 5 2 . 8
Physical Planning & Housing 6.0 5.0 6.5 6.9 6.3 6.9 6.2 6.3 6.6 6. 1 4.8 5.4 3.6 2.5 5.2
Social Sector 
Education
16.9
n/a 6.6 5.5 4 . 7 4.8 5.0 4. 1 2.8 4. 1 3 . 6 3.9 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.2
Health n/a 4.5 4-2 3 . 5 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.9 2.0 2.8
Family Planning n/a 1 . 1 1.5 2 . 6 2.2 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.6
Social Welfare n/a 0.5 0 . 4 0 . 4 0.3 0 . 4 0 . 4 0.9 0 . 8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
Manpower n/a O . 1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0 . 9 0.8 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 5
Upazila Construction 0. 0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.6 12.5 11.1 4.5
Cyclone Reconstruction 0.0 1.7 2.9 3.0 0.8 1 . 2 1-0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.9 0.4 4.4 15. 0 3.3
Total 99.9%A 100.0% 100.3% 99. 9% 100.0% 100.2% 100.0% 99.9% 99.9% 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 99. 9% 100.1% 100.0%
Source-. Calculated from World Bank, B angladesh: Recent Economic Developments and Medium Term P r o s p e c t s . Vol. II, Statistical Appendix, Report 
NO. 6049, table 5.4, p. 29.
T ’otals not egual to 100% are due to rounding errors.
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Corruption became even more evident in Zia’s time than it had been during 
the Mujib regime, but the donor reaction to it had changed. The Government was by this 
time making a distinct effort to cultivate the western members of the donor community, 
and corruption was no longer a major issue or an impediment to development assistance 
as it had been during Mujib’s rather more confrontational regime.
Zia himself was an ambiguous figure concerning corruption. Even his 
detractors concede that he was honest with his personal finances.72 They maintained,
however, that he tolerated corruption to an unprecedented level in his regime. 
Conjecture has it that he encouraged it so that those around him would be vulnerable.73 
His actions appear to support this. Elections were rigged.74 Mascarenhas argues that he 
even became President illegally, and in contravention of the Constitution, by backdating 
documents, thus changing his status to conform to the letter of the law.75
An exchange in the Parliament reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review
in July of 1980 gives some idea of how deeply corruption had compromised the
Government:
Reports of massive corruption involving some ministers prompted a startling scene in 
parliament. State Minister Atedden Khan in charge of the Manpower Ministry was singled out at 
the BNP parliamentary meeting on June 30 by MPs for alleged corruption over recruitment of 2700 
cleaners for coveted jobs in Saudi Arabia. The kickbacks were said to amount to more than US$ 
3.2 million.
London-trained barrister Abdul Hasnat, who is chief whip of the ruling party and Mayor of 
the Dacca Municipal Corporation, was accused of sharing the money with Khan . . .
An exasperated Khan then exploded "Why only me? Don’t you see the Commerce Ministry? 
Corruption is going on in that ministry on a monstrous scale. Licenses and permits worth crores 
[tens of millions] of taka are being issued for money. . . .76
This was corruption at the highest levels of the Government, but it was also 
evident at lower levels. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, carried out 
research on drought affected areas in 1979.77 In it they documented the power structure 
in 10 villages. BRAC researchers described how, if Government relief efforts had been 
successful, the presence of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee would have 
been superfluous.78 They showed how, by establishing ties between locally prominent 
people and local government officers, this coalition was able to divert resources meant 
for the poor and control resources, such as timber, in the rural areas.79
If anything, then, in this second period we see an increase in corruption rather 
than a decrease. Unlike the problems Sheikh Mujib had faced in 1974 in securing aid, 
the donors appeared willing to keep on giving. The conclusion is inescapable as Sobhan
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has intimated.80 The prime motivating factor behind the World Bank's concern at 
corruption in their criticism of the First Five Year Plan was less the potential damage to 
the economy than pique at being left out of the formulation of the Plan.81 Corruption 
ceased to be an issue once the country’s economic policies were formulated in an 
atmosphere of cooperation. The tone of the World Bank’s review of the Second Five 
Year Plan in 1981 gives some indication:
There is now a growing recognition among policy makers in Bangladesh that a more comprehensive 
program of reform [of Government incentives for the private sector] needs to be undertaken. The 
initial studies necessary for a long term program of reform to the incentive system and the institu­
tional structure for implementing policy reforms are currently the subject of discussion between IDA 
and the Government.82
The 1981 to 1986 period coincides with the last year of Zia’s regime, the 
interim Sattar Government and President Ershad’s regime. Much of Ershad’s efforts 
were spent attempting to return the country to nominally legitimate government, and 
assuring his own position assured as President, in much the same manner as President 
Zia.
He continued to pursue much the same economic policy that Zia had. Many 
of the state enterprises had been returned to private ownership and relations with the 
donors, particularly the Americans, remained cordial. In 1984 the World Bank report on 
the economy was very positive on the state of the economy and the attitude of the 
Government. Such statements as "There has been impressive progress towards this goal 
in recent years, [maintenance of food self-sufficiency at adequate levels of caloric intake] 
but the momentum will have to be sustained",83 and "the Government took a series of 
courageous decisions to stabilise the economy in FY83" seemed to bode well for the 
economic future of the country.84
There were, however, some who, based on their personal experience in the 
rural areas, disagreed with this view. The Like-Minded Group (Dhaka) commissioned an 
alternate report on the state of rural poverty. It is worth recalling the origins of the 
"Report on Rural Poverty in Bangladesh" here:
The "Report on Rural Poverty in Bangladesh" originates from just one such meeting [of the 
Dhaka Like-Minded Group] following the presentation of the draft CEM to the Local Consultations 
Group by the World Bank in February 1984. There was a sense of frustration in the group that 
while the tone of the report was more positive than in previous years it suggested the same remedies 
that had been suggested during far more critical times, remedies that supported the Bank’s leverage 
with the Government, and furthermore that it concentrated almost wholly on the issue of economic 
growth, virtually ignoring the issue of the problems facing marginal farmers and the growing 
landless population. . . .  It was this sense of frustration that prompted the suggestion from the
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group that they sponsor an alternate report on the plight of the poor and landless. This was later 
modified to the suggestion that, . . . [the] Like-Minded Group sponsor a supplementary report [to 
the World Bank’s] that might be presented to the Aid Donor Meeting in Paris in April 1985.85
There were several conclusions to the Report, but this statement in Hossain’s 
summary of the "Report on Rural Poverty" sets out the core of the problem:
Thus it is essential to understand the nature and role of the state in analysing the impact of 
government programmes and development assistance on rural poverty. Its [the Government’s] 
function has become increasingly to mediate in the distribution of resources among the competing 
interest groups. In this process a vicious circle has developed in which the government has become 
involved, willingly or not, in a patronage system, aided by external assistance, which merely 
strengthens the self-preserving ruling coalition who are content to contain the discontent of the 
majority.86
The conclusions of the "Report on Rural Poverty in Bangladesh" were not 
unlike the conclusions of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee studies. There 
was significant "appropriation" of resources by various interest groups. Nutritional levels 
were declining. The government was using aid as a form of patronage.
Conditions in the rural areas were getting worse rather than better despite the 
thousands of millions of dollars that had poured into the country since independence. 
Corruption during this period is more difficult to document. Many of those suspect are 
still in power. While accusations still come from the outside there was little visible 
dissent in the country itself until 1987, a period outside the scope of this study. Even 
this appears to have been effectively quelled. Neither were the donors very interested in 
pursuing the allegations that did surface. Aid funds continue to flow.*
The Government took strong exception to the "Report on Rural Poverty" and 
to the statement quoted above in particular. They attempted to restrict the distribution of 
the report particularly within Government.** They resisted a seminar requested by the 
Like-Minded Group, but finally organised one in March 1986. The leaders of the 
working groups, all drawn from the bureaucracy, prepared the conclusions of the 
meetings before they were held. Although some did later rewrite the conclusions to 
reflect the views expressed by the participants, most of them presented the findings 
against the protests of the participants in the final plenary session. The proceedings of
*Donors at the 1989 Aid Donor Meeting in Paris actually pledged more than the World Bank had estimated was needed.
**The writer, who was at the time coordinating the demarche of the Like-Minded Group with the Government and the World 
Bank, was asked by the Economic Advisor to the President, and de facto Minister of Finance, not to distribute the Report widely and 
particularly not to send it to any Government officers. This resulted in the bizarre situation where the Director General for Europe 
and the Americas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the man at least nominally responsible for relations between Bangladesh and the 
bilateral donors was prohibited by his own Government from seeing a controversial document that could potentially have an impact 
on both relations and future aid flows.
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the seminar, although tape recorded, have, to date, never been released by the 
Government. The World Bank appeared split over the issue. The Resident Mission and 
country desk cautiously supported the initiative while the senior management, particularly 
the regional vice-president, was opposed and resisted it consistently.*
The foregoing illustrates several things. There was increasing sophistication 
of the recipient in dealing with donors who attempted to bring a poverty oriented focus to 
their development efforts. There was a lack of aggressiveness on the part of the donors 
in trying to bring about some change in the way aid was used. There was resistance by 
the World Bank to any multilateral initiative that might conflict with its appreciation of 
the economic situation in the country.
It is too soon to be able to provide much hard empirical evidence on this most 
recent period concerning the levels of corruption within the economy. There is little, if 
any, evidence to lead us to different conclusions than have been reached for either of the 
two previous periods we are concerned with. The issue of corruption was still in the 
forefront. On August 30, 1986 the London Observer ran a feature alleging that the Pre­
sident himself, and his family were involved in numerous enterprises that earned both 
foreign exchange and illegal profits for them.87 There appears to have been little official 
concern over these allegations in the face of increasing evidence of corruption among 
senior members of the regime. Economic performance has been good, but equity appears 
to have suffered in the process.
Thus in reviewing the general efforts and results of the Government during 
the various periods, we find, as our model predicted:
A concentration on short term policies that neglect the longer term problems,
The deterioration of the lofty objectives that characterised the leadership of the 
county when it first gained its independence,
Continuing poor administration,
That most of the objectives set out in the plans have only been partially achieved or 
not achieved at all.
*Tbe experience is based on the writer’s participation in the process from March 1984 until August 1986.
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The Food Distribution System in Bangladesh has had a profound effect on the 
economy and on the economic policies of the country. It owes its origins to the 
devastating Great Bengal Famine of 1943“ in which between 1.5 million89 and 3 to 4 
million people90 lost their lives. Its primary purpose, however, has changed from a 
safeguard to a method of dispensing patronage on a broad scale. Originally established to 
ensure sufficient food is always available and to intervene when prices fluctuated to 
much, it has become, under the management of the Ministry of Food, the recipient and 
distributor of food aid.
The System is made up of several different channels designed to serve various 
parts of the population. They are: Statutory Rationing, Priority Categories, Modified 
Rationing, Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), Food for Work (FFW), 
Marketing Operations and Open Market Sales (OMS).
The three largest components of the System are Statutory Rationing, Priority 
Categories and the Modified Ration System. Together they account for utilisation of 58.1 
per cent of the food which was distributed through the System between 1973/74 and 
1984/85.
The Statutory Rationing System is confined to residents of the six major urban 
centres of Bangladesh: Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Narayaganj, Rajshahi and Rangamati. 
It accounts for 20.1 per cent of the food distributed. Originally all residents of these 
cities were entitled to ration cards, but no non-government employees have been added to 
the system since 1974. By 1979 it was estimated that only 63 per cent of the urban 
areas, about 3.7 million people, were covered by the Statutory Rationing System.91REF
The Priority Categories are comprised of government employees, employees 
of para-statal organisations, members of the military and police, employees of flour mills 
and educational institutions, inmates of orphanages, hospitals and jails and finally 
employees of private sector firms employing fifty or more persons. Approximately 5.7 
million persons were covered by Priority Categories in 197992 accounting for 34 per cent 
of the food distributed.
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TABLE 3.6
The Public Food Grain Distribution System 
('000 long tons)
73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 Total Average
Opening Stocks 297 214 749 823 376 591 209 779 1,229 625 611 800
Domestic Procurement 71 128 415 314 550 355 348 1,017 298 192 270 349 4,307
Total Imports 1,670 2,292 1,477 780 1,678 1,146 2, 739 1,059 1,236 1,844 2,058 2,588 20,567
Food Aid 1, 305 1,625 1 ,233 854 1 , 304 1, 107 1,830 826 1, 125 1,093 1,364 1,316 14,982
Total Availability 2,038 2,634 2,641 1 ,917 2,604 2,092 3,296 2,855 2,763 2,661 2,939 3,737
Statutory Rationing 502 471 359 377 451 417 492 343 307 307 293 266 4,585 20. 1%
Priority Categories 396 554 584 551 7 53 7 54 907 601 656 647 641 711 7,051 34.0
Modified Rationing 777 578 496 288 353 312 385 179 483 368 399 465 5,083 22.3
Relief and VGF 52 161 110 33 30 45 57 50 70 84 120 340 1,152 5. 1
Food for Work - - 116 166 255 216 440 349 365 411 441 571 3,330 14.6
Marketing Operations - - 11 58 6 9 10 . . 104 70 51 8 327 1.4
Open Market Sales - - - - - 43 111 50 48 107 201 560 2.5
Total Distribution 1,728 1,762 1 ,67 7 1,473 1,847 1,796 2, 402 1,522 2,036 1,935 2,052 2,562 22,088 100.0%
Losses 96 148 149 68 166 87 115 104 82 96 87 167 1,365
Repayments - - - - - - - - 20 ~ - - 20
Closing Stock 214 729 823 376 591 209 779 1,229 625 611 800 1,008
Vol. TV: Statistical Appendix,
»m Bangladesh, External
Source-. Figures for 1973/74 to 1983/84, World Bank,
Report No. 5409, April 12, 1985), table 10.2, p. 135. 1984/85 figures. World Bank,
Vol. II: Statistical Appendix, Report No. 6049, March 17,1986), table 7.10, p. 52. figures for donor supplied food aid art
^This may be a discrepancy or food aid on the high seas may have been included in the Government's figures in order to show a high stock level 
at the end of the fiscal year, sometimes an important psychological factor in showing speculators that the government is in control of the situation 
in order to minimise speculation.
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The Modified Rationing System was established to ensure that food did reach 
the poorest elements of the rural population. In theory it is targeted at the lowest income 
groups in small urban and rural areas. Recipients under the system, however, receive 
only half the ration that the other two categories receive.93 Modified Rationing is also 
treated as a residual after the requirements of Statutory Rationing and the Priority 
Categories have been met.94 It accounts for 22.3 per cent of the food distributed.
The Relief Programme covers both relief in times of food shortage, such as 
the famine of 1974, the food shortage of 1979. The Vulnerable Group Feeding 
Programme was established in 1975 to provide supplementary source of nutrition for 
what were considered the most disadvantaged groups in the society. These were women 
in the poorest rural areas and pre-school children under three years of age.95 Choice of 
the beneficiaries of the programme is delegated to the Union Councils who choose the 
recipients. There is considerable evidence that many beneficiaries are chosen for political 
reasons rather than objectively under the criteria dictated by the programme.96 Table 3.5 
shows that the Relief Programme comprised only a small proportion of the total food in 
the ration system. In 1974, a year of famine, only 9.9 per cent of total food aid, 9.1 
per cent of all food distributed, went into relief. This figure demonstrates more 
graphically than anything else the importance that the Government places on the non- 
relief components of the Food Distribution System. They subsidise particular groups that 
are already relatively privileged, rather than the poorer elements of the society. We shall 
see there is considerable reason for believing that even in the single year, when the Relief 
Programme accounted for more than six per cent of the food that was handled by the 
system, only a fraction of it reached those for whom it was intended.
The Food for Work Programme, which also includes the canal building 
projects initiated under President Zia, was used to employ the poorest elements of the 
community during the winter season. During this season the ground is dry and it is 
possible to construct earthen embankments to control flooding and drainage for the wet 
season. These were built under the supervision of the Ministry of Relief and 
Rehabilitation.* Food for Work has utilised 14.6 per cent of the food that has been dis­
tributed by the Food Distribution System. The Food for Work Programme is one method
^During some periods Relief and Rehabilitation has been an independent ministry itself while at other times it has been a 
division of the Ministry of Food.
Chapter III
123
by which some of the food aid can be converted into infrastructure. Such construction, 
to be truly effective however, requires a corresponding investment in appurtenant 
structures such as sluices, bridges and culverts. It also requires that drainage be provided 
to protect them, entailing additional financial investment. This requirement for additional 
cash resources is a disincentive to expanding such programmes since there is a constraint 
on domestic resources. It would require that additional funds be raised from taxes or 
diverted from alternative uses to pay for the additional expenses, neither a welcome pro­
spect. The Food for Work Programme consumes an increasing proportion of the food, 
but there are limitations to its use.
The Open Market Sales Programme was established to encourage the
Government gradually to reduce the subsidy to privileged groups that it provides.
Table 3.3 shows the programme has met with only limited success. In 1984/85, the year 
the highest level of Open Market Sales was reached, it only accounted for 7.8 per cent of 
all food grains distributed. No other previous year exceeded 6 per cent.
Open Market Sales Programme was also designed to put food on the market 
when prices rose past a specified trigger price. This was to increase supply and to 
prevent drastic price increases such occurred in 1973 and 1974. It was, however, not 
used in 1984 when floods destroyed part of the food grain crop.97
Supporters of food aid in the donor countries would probably be very
surprised to discover that, of all the food aid given to Bangladesh since independence, 
only 5 per cent of the total volume that has been distributed by the Food Distribution 
System has been allocated to the Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding Programmes. 
Fourteen point six per cent has been allocated to Food for Work. Another 22.3 per cent 
has gone into the modified ration system.
The Food Distribution System has evolved from a safety system designed to 
protect vulnerable groups in difficult times, to a means for keeping the middle classes 
satisfied at minimal cost to the Government. In 1976, for example, 90 per cent of the 
food supplied by donors was channelled into the Food Distribution System and distributed 
to ration card holders. These were mainly urban dwellers, including the civil service, 
army and police. The cost to them was about two thirds the prevailing market price. 
About one third of the ration card holders are rural dwellers. They, however, have the 
last call on the available food and receive half the ration of an urban dweller. Ten
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per cent was distributed in the form of Food for Work or through the Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Programme.98 The result was that when prices rose in 1974 in anticipation of 
food shortages brought on by flooding, the privileged groups could purchase rice at one 
fifth the market price. The Government chose not to divert food from the ration system 
to areas where there had been crop losses pleading that the problem was one of supply. 
The World Bank chose not to argue the point, although knowledgeable observers at the 
time maintained that adequate stocks were available.99 It is estimated that between 30,000 
and 100,000 people, mainly landless rural poor, died as a result.100
Thus, during the first period, as relief goods were entering the country they 
were being diverted by members of the new regime. Lifschultz recounts the case of 
Gulam Mustafa who was President of the Dacca City Awami League and Chairman of 
the Bangladesh Red Cross. He "established a multi-million dollar black market operation 
in relief goods which became the principal source of party financing". Lifschultz quotes 
the Director of UNROB as observing that only one in seven tins of baby food and one in 
thirteen blankets received ever reached the recipients for whom they were intended.101
From a Government’s purely pragmatic point of view, the Food Distribution 
System is, in the imperfect world of Bangladesh, a useful resource. First, food can be 
used to supplement the salaries of both those employed by the Government, the 
bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the police. Second, the advantage of having an 
assured supply of food in the shops throughout most of the year promotes political 
stability. Third, the sale of food, even at a subsidised price, provides additional revenue 
that can be used for other purposes. Fourth, this revenue obviates the need to increase 
the domestic resource mobilisation effort. Finally even the pressure from the World 
Bank and other donors does not pose a problem. They are prepared, not only to tolerate 
this use of food aid, but to encourage it.
Much of the benefit to the middle class consumer is in the convenience of 
having access to an assured source of supply, rather than simply the price advantage over 
the open market system. The price differential between the ration price and the open 
market system has narrowed in recent years and is no longer a critical factor. The 
increases in price imposed at the behest of those donors intent on reducing subsidies work 
in favour of the Government in a perverse way. The Government can derive more
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revenue when the price is increased, but can put the blame for increased prices on donor 
pressure.
The ration system thus serves several purposes. It is a source of fungible 
revenue for the Government. It is a bonus for particular groups in society. For some 
donors who are particularly anxious to be able to disburse, it is quick, when compared to 
other forms of aid. It addresses the donors’ own domestic problems as well as fulfilling 
obligations to overseas development assistance.
The reduction of the ration system would provide a market incentive for 
increased production. Some aspects of it could be preserved to ensure that food 
programmes targeted at the poorest classes were maintained so that they were assured of 
sufficient food until wage rates rose. An increase in the Food for Work Programme, 
besides requiring additional funds to finance the construction of ancillary structures, is 
only seasonal. Both alternatives have limitations. Given a bureaucracy that is essentially 
based on the generalist approach to the administration of Government,102 and which is 
subject to frequent transfers of personnel,103 there is little incentive to change and much 
support for the status quo. Furthermore, the donors are quite content with the situation. 
For example, the President of CIDA visited Bangladesh in April of 1975 and reported in 
part to the Secretary of State for External Affairs:
It is indeed a sad fact that part [sic]* of our food aid does not reach those for whom it is meant. We 
know that the existing ration system does not guarantee the sharing of foodstuffs between rural and 
urban areas, or between those who need the most and who need the least. . . It still has a large bias 
towards serving the urban areas, which by Bangladesh standards are basically middle class.104
It was, however, more than five years before the programme took significant 
steps to target a percentage of Canada’s food aid to the poorest classes.” It can be 
assumed that the proportion of Canadian food aid that was going into the Relief and Food 
for Work elements of the ration system was in roughly the same proportion as the 
allocation of all food in the system. We can see from Table 3.6 that it averaged less than 
15 per cent between 1975 and 1980. It was in fact less than half this when Mr. Gerin- 
Lajoie made his report to Secretary of State for External Affairs.
*The report appears to imply that most food does reach the poor and that only a part is diverted. In fact the reverse is true. In 
1975 when this report was written there was no Food for Work Programme and what food was targeted at the poor through Modified 
Rationing and Relief amounted to about 28 per cent of the total available. We have seen from the findings in the World Bank review 
of the Food Distribution System the amount that actually reached the poor was very meager indeed.
**On the basis of the writer’s personal experience litde had been done by 1982 to ensure that increasing amounts of Canadian 
food aid were targeted at the poorer groups in society. In 1982 less than 15 percent was earmarked for FFW and VGF programmes.
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It is fair then to conclude that the attitude of indifference that donors have 
shown towards the use of food aid has helped to contribute to the lack of impetus that the 
Government has shown in trying to devise a means of reducing the impact of free, or 
almost free, food aid on the incentive to produce more. It has then been perfectly natural 
and indeed logical for the Government to continue with a system which, with the limited 
resources that they have access to, suits their short term needs.
During the latter half of the 1970s the World Bank carried out a complete 
review of the policies in the food sector and the allocation of food in 1979. A part of 
their findings follows:
The public food distribution system is not primarily designed to reach the poor. . . . That the rural 
poor are not the target of the present distribution system is clear from the fact that the average rural 
resident received perhaps 28 pounds of food-grains per year through the various forms of public 
distribution, including Food for Work, [emphasis added] compared with averages of about 212 
pounds per year for each resident of a statutory rationing area, and 321 pounds for each adult 
statutory rationing card-holder. If complaints of villages about failure to receive Modified Ration 
Grain allotted to their Union Parishads are true, the actual per capita benefit to the rural poor is 
even less. It is likely that the present rationing system is also increasingly failing to reach the urban 
poor.105
Ehrhardt concludes, that this underlines the continuing preoccupation of the 
Government with maintaining stability in the urban areas, and within the police and 
military using food aid as a form of remuneration.106 It also eases the Government’s 
requirement for increased domestic resource mobilisation and defers the need for 
increases in civil servants’ emoluments.
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, in their research on the 
power structure of the rural areas in 1979, examined the use to which food provided for 
the Food for Work programme was put, since it is an important resource in the village. 
In twenty projects examined, only 23.9 per cent of the food had actually been 
distributed.107 The remainder had disappeared.108 Out of the twenty projects three had 
been sanctioned twice under different names. The value of the food, in this case some 
taka 139,200 (US$ 9144 at 15.2228109, the prevailing rate of exchange) had gone to the 
chairman and the members of the Upazila Parishad (sub-district council).110 This 
represents a large resource in a poor country such as Bangladesh where the per capita 
income is about $US 120 per annum.
A report commissioned by USAID concluded that less than 70 per cent of the 
wheat withdrawn for Food for Work found its way to the labourers.111 In an
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accompanying case study the report found falsification of records and reports of 
bribery.112 It was also calculated that if the actual figures in the records had been used as 
the basis of payment, the number of days worked was only 54 per cent of the number for 
which they were reimbursed.113 Furthermore, "even with honest measurements by CARE 
[the monitoring agency] engineers the level of misappropriation can be well over 30% 
due to inaccuracies in the pre- and post-work measurement and underpayment of 
laborers".
The Modified Rationing, we recall, was designed to be made available to the 
poorest elements of the society.114 A spot check of one district committee member, who 
had been allocated 176 maunds (6.5 long tons) of wheat and 332 maunds (12.2 long tons) 
of rice, showed that only 50 maunds (1.8 long tons) of each had been distributed, mostly 
to his family and friends. The balance had been sold on the black market.115
The pattern of misuse of food is not unusual. These examples demonstrate 
that the "appropriation" of resources even at the lower levels of the society is a 
continuing problem. The attitude of the Government is aptly expressed in the following 
from the 1979/80 Memorandum for the Bangladesh Aid Group:
Public distribution now serves about 20 per cent of the total population. About 4 million people are 
continuously served under statutory rationing, while another 15 million get the benefit of modified 
rationing. It handles an average of 2 million tons of foodgrains mobilised from import and local 
procurement. Although the system has faced severe criticism in recent years, it played an essential 
role in procurement and distribution of foodgrains and other items in support of government 
stabilization programme. It maintained a steady supply of food grains for the fixed income groups 
[emphasis added] in the urban areas as well as for the subsistence farmers and landless workers in 
the rural areas.116
We recall, however, the estimates by the World Bank in their review quoted 
above, the allocation, on a per capita basis, to the rural areas was of the order of one 
tenth that to the urban areas. We see that the Government has concentrated on aid to 
those who have fixed incomes, rather than those living at subsistence level in the rural 
areas. The Food distribution system has favoured the relatively well off at the expense of 
the poor.
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TABLE 3.7
Selected Market and Food Distribution System Retail Food Prices 
(1973 to 1984)
(in taka per maund)
Rtn PriceA 
Rice
Mkt. Price® 
Rice
Subsidy as a 
Percentage
Rtn PriceA 
Wheat
Mkt Price0 
Wheat
Subsidy as a 
Percentage
July 1, 1973 38.82 84.73 54.2% 28.00
May 27, 1974 58.00 129.74 55.3 48.00 95.67 49.8%
Dec. 20, 1975 68.00 105.83 35.7 53.20 55.63 4.4
Feb. 7, 1976 87.00 112.84 22.9 60.00 73.56 18.4
Dec. 31, 1977 97.00 98.05 1.1 77.00 80.21 4.0
May 19, 1979 117.00 183.22 36.1 87.00 93.07 6.5
May 3, 1980 137.00 190.35 28.0 107.00 113.00 5.3
Nov. 13,1980 136.00 159.51 14.7 106.00 112.02 5.5
Apr. 11, 1981 151.20 190.33 20.6 112.00 105.77 5.9
Dec 12, 1981 171.00 205.00 16.6 120.00 126.00 4.8
July 3, 1982 191.00 224.10 14.8 130.00 157.00 17.2
Jan 3, 1983 209.00 238.00 12.2 139.00 176.00 21.0
Dec. 31, 1984 262.00 167.00
Dec. 1, 1985c 275.00 181.00
June 15, 1986c 289.00 192.00
Source: AWorld Bank, Bangladesh: Economic and Social Development Prospects. Report No. 5409, Vol. IV: Statistical 
Appendix, April 12, 1985, table 10.17, p. 150. ®Ibid., table 9.7, p. 119. clbid.. table 9.8, p. 120.
cWorld Bank, Bangladesh: Promoting Higher Growth and Human Development 2 vols, March 10, 1987, Report No. 6616-BD, 
Vol. II: Statistical Appendix table 6.9, p. 40.
The system has not changed markedly under President Ershad in this latter 
period, the first half of the 1980s, except that the ration price has risen until it has at 
times equalled the market price.* One final note is that there is evidence that Bangladesh 
actually exports wheat despite the fact that this is in violation of both the spirit and letter 
of their agreements with major donors such as Canada and the United States.*’
*At a farewell dinner for the departing Canadian High Commissioner in August 1985 it was suggested by a senior Government 
official that, in the light of the withdrawal of tax measures proposed in the budget a month earlier which were threatening to hold up 
access to an upper credit tranche from the IMF, he propose the abolition of the ration system to the President on his farewell call. 
The rationale was that at the time the ration price was slightly above the market price. It was, therefore, the ideal time to remove it 
without people’s incomes being threatened. The move would, in all likelihood, have satisfied both the World Bank and the IMF Both 
had long recommended that the price be raised or, better still, that the whole system, with the exception of Food for Work and 
Vulnerable Group Feeding, be abolished. At the time agreement for a forthcoming World Bank Import Credit was contingent upon 
agreement with the IMF. This, in turn, depended upon certain tax measures being implemented, but these had been cancelled by the 
President, They consisted of a proposal to tax interest earned on bank accounts. Interestingly, opposition came not from the 
business sector, but from civil servants, presumably because some of them would have been hard put to explain their large bank 
balances.
The suggestion was made and the President was not amused. He made it clear that the ration system was a domestic issue 
beyond the purview of the High Commissioner. What is interesting about this incident is that the President could afford to ignore the 
suggestion of the third largest bilateral donor, and second largest bilateral food donor, not because he knew that it was not an official 
condition that Canada was considering attaching to its commitment of food aid, but because he was well aware that the provision of 
food aid from the food surplus countries is almost as much a need of the donor as it is of the recipient. Canada’s protestations that it 
does not have food surpluses, but rather the bureaucratic euphemism for surplus, "carryover", do not carry much weight with those 
who understand the system.
**The writer stumbled on this allegation in conversation with a Canadian businessman, who wishes to remain anonymous, who 
has had dealings both in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. During a trip to Sri Lanka he was in attendance when shipping papers, including 
certificates of origin, were produced for some wheat being imported. The papers showed that the wheat was of American origin and 
had been shipped from Bangladesh. The mistake was noticed immediately and the papers returned and replaced with the "correct" 
set. The revelation of such a diversion of food could presumably jeopardise the food aid programme if it were to be made public.
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If we have dwelt upon the Food Distribution System at some length it is 
because it is the largest transfer of homogeneous resources that takes place between the 
donors and a single ministry. The composition of the aid most clearly indicates how 
donor interests dominate in the form of aid supplied and how the recipient government 
adapts to use the resources available. Its potential impact on the largest sector, agricul­
ture, is also substantial as we shall see.
In conclusion we see that as in the "dependence paradigm" the Government 
has "appropriated" most of this resource to meet its own short term political ends. A 
portion has also been "appropriated" from that destined for the neediest by unscrupulous 
traders. Only a small proportion actually reaches the poor for whom it was ostensibly 
intended. It has not been phased down to a system designed to provide a strategic reserve 
for times of emergency which could also direct resources toward the most impoverished 
in the society as Faaland and Parkinson suggested it should. It has become rather a broad 
form of patronage provided to the privileged. Thus a large portion of the aid provided 
never reaches those for whom it intended. But this situation appears to suit both the 
donor and the recipient.
We find, then, in the Food Distribution System evidence of the following:
Widespread misuse of food, given ostensibly to help the poorest, both by the 
Government to meet patronage obligations and by individuals in positions of trust 
within the system.
The use of food as a source of revenue for Government to meet budgetary needs; 
Loose administrative controls to prevent the misuse of the resource.
We find in addition no sign or intent that the Government is likely to disassemble the 
system.
Agriculture
There are three principal issues in the agriculture sector. The first is that 
food aid has depressed the price leading to a disincentive to increased production. The 
second is that institutional development has been neglected and hence has lagged behind 
the technology available. It has not played a proper role in assuring the delivery of 
improved technology to the smaller farmers. The third is that the introduction of
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inappropriate capital intensive technology has allowed the relatively wealthy in the rural 
areas increasingly to dominate the sector.
The large food aid programme comprises one fifth of committed aid and more 
than 25 per cent of aid disbursed. It has been a prime contributor in discouraging 
farmers to produce more.
Urban Bangladesh, towns of over 5000 people, is estimated to contain only 7 to 8 million 
people. It is therefore apparent that rationed food literally blankets the economy and enables many, 
generally the middle class, to eat more than 15.5 ounces per day. This food, sold at less than 
prevailing market prices, sharply curtails the size of the grain market for domestic cultivators, 
thereby preventing their incomes from growing as rapidly as they might in the absence of such a
117system.
Food aid, however continues to be one of the primary remedies recommended 
by the World Bank. This is not because it is feeding the destitute but, because it provides 
the Government with revenue which it would otherwise have to raise taxes or budgetary 
deficits. Stefan de Vylder identifies two major aspects to the effects of food aid on 
agricultural production, the "price effect" and "policy effect".
The effects of huge injections of foreign grain on food prices are bound to be negative, . . . 
the concomitant loss in domestic food production is extremely difficult to assess in quantitative 
terms, since no reliable estimates exist of the supply and demand elasticities of foodgrain in Bangla­
desh; all that can be said with certainty is that farmers do respond positively to price incentives and 
that the disincentive effects of low food prices are stronger in the long run than in the short run.118
The "policy effect" is explained by McHenry and Bird:
A potentially more damaging aspect of Bangladesh’s dependence on revenues generated 
through the ration system is the nearly pervasive relief mentality. Bangladeshi officials are 
convinced that the international donors will not allow them to starve. Since it is much easier to 
order a shipment of food through the embassy in Washington than to spend the time and money on 
a domestic procurement program, a definite complacency has settled on the bureaucracy. The 
technocrats . . .  are resigned to continue reliance on American, Canadian, and Australian surplus 
food grains. One symptom of the relief mentality is a reluctance to invest too much of the country’s 
limited resources away from the glamorous industrial sector into low profile agricultural projects.119
de Vylder substantiates:
Food aid has, in short enabled the government to neglect agriculture (and land reform), a policy 
which has ‘forced’ the government to rely more and more heavily on imported food. Impossible to 
quantify, the losses in domestic production due to these rather subtle mechanisms are likely to be 
very serious in the long run, when powerful vested interests fighting for the maintenance of the 
system have consolidated themselves. The more dependent a country is on imports of cheap food 
grain, the more costly it becomes for the government to achieve self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. 
Today it would be a budgetary disaster for the Government of Bangladesh if domestic production 
increased so much that foreign donors refused to supply food aid, [emphasis added] leaving the 
government to assume the full costs of sustaining the ration system.120
This lack of investment has resulted in turn in weak rural institutions.121 The institutional 
base has also been neglected. Extension services were weak and the planning capability
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of the Ministry of Agriculture is still undeveloped.* The provision of large amounts of 
food aid has hampered development. The concentration on imported related and capital 
intensive technology has resulted in inefficient and inequitable growth. Combined with 
this, the lack of concentration on the development of a strong institutional base have all 
conspired to make the country increasingly dependent on imported food to meet its 
domestic needs. Reliance on foreign aid has increased.
The Ministry of Agriculture itself has very limited planning capability and 
poor communications with the research institutions.122 The Bangladesh Agricultural 
Development Corporation (BADC) has suffered from frequent changes in leadership and 
conflicting policy direction from donors and Government. The Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board (BRDB) has a reputation for inefficiency stemming from lack of 
access to resources and frequent changes in leadership.123
These problems in turn have led to the introduction of technology without 
appropriate safeguards and without an appreciation for the potential misuse of that 
technology. Investment in the agriculture has been largely concentrated on the provision 
of infrastructure such as deep and shallow tube-wells, low-lift pumps and water control 
structures. It has accounted for 46.8 per cent of investment in the agriculture sector 
under the Annual Development Plan.124 Less than half of this has gone into rural 
development and about the same into crops or other sub-sectors (see Table 3.5).
The problem has three aspects. First, is a lack of commitment on the part of 
donors and the Government to ensure that a significant proportion of the aid provided by 
the donors go to the poorest. Second, is that without a strong rural institutional base 
designed to ensure that aid gets to where it was designed to, aid is "appropriated" by the 
upper class. Third, is that the depressed price of food has discouraged improved 
production.
Betsy Hartmann and James K. Boyce describe the situation in the village of 
Katni which formed part of the World Bank’s North-West Tube-Well Project:
*Based on the writer’s experience with the Ministry of Agriculture this is a fair assessment. Planning was almost non-existent 
although individuals within the system had thought, and written about the problems. Little of this was translated into concrete 
proposals. Part of the reason was the counter management attitude of the Planning Commission which instead of formulating the 
broad guidelines for growth and then prioritising the activities that should be made to take place, tended to become involved in the 
minutiae of project management. In the agriculture sector this was worse than in other areas and tended to revolve about various 
personalities.
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On paper, the tubewell will be used by a farmers’ cooperative formed especially for the 
purpose. . . .  In reality, the tubewell in our village was the personal property of one man: Nafis, 
the biggest landlord in the area. The irrigation group, of which Nafis was supposedly the manager, 
was no more than a few signatures he had collected on a scrap of paper. . .
The tubewell was by far Nafis’s greatest patronage plum. Although each tubewell cost the 
donors and the government about U.S.$12,000, Nafis paid less than $300 for his, mostly in bribes 
to local officials. The tubewell sits in the middle of a 30-acre tract of Nafis’s best land. Since it 
will irrigate enough water to irrigate twice that area, Nafis says the smaller farmers who till adjacent 
plots will be able to use his water-at a price. But the hourly rate he intends to charge is so high that 
few of his neighbours are interested. As a result his tubewell will not be used to capacity.
At first we were surprised that the beneficiary of the World Bank’s aid should be the richest 
man in our village, but on closer inspection we learned that this was not so strange. A foreign 
expert working on the project told us, "I no longer ask who is getting the well. I know what the 
answer will be, and I don’t want to hear it. One hundred percent of these wells are going to the big 
boys. Each thana (county) is allotted a certain number of tubewells. First priority goes to those 
with political clout: the judges, the magistrates, the members of parliament, the union chairman. If 
there are any left over, the local authorities auction them off. The rich landlords compete, and 
whoever offers the biggest bribe gets the tubewell. Around here the going price is 3000 taka (less 
than $200)."
"You see," he explained, "On paper, it’s a different story. On paper, all the peasants know 
these tubewells are available. If they want to have one they form themselves into a democratic 
cooperative, draw up a proposal and submit it to the union council, which judges the application on 
its merits. The union council then passes the proposal to the Thana Irrigation Team, which again 
judges the case on its merits. If the proposal is accepted, the foreign consultants verify that the site 
is technically sound. So on paper it all sounds quite nice. . . When the high-level officials fly in 
from Washington for a three-day visit to Dacca, they look at these papers. They don’t know what 
is happening out there in the field, and no one is going to tell them."
An evaluation sponsored by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), which 
helped finance the tubewell project, confirms the experience of our village was typical. . . . after 
examining 270 tubewells."125
It is clear from this example that the aid funding, in this case from the World 
Bank, was improving the economic position of Nafis, one of the more privileged 
members of the community. In all fairness to the World Bank the project was planned 
before McNamara’s efforts to place more emphasis on the social sectors and to focus on 
target populations. Nevertheless, it was a project that helped contribute to a more 
inequitable share of the resources.
Jansen, in Competition for Scarce Resources, describes much same process of 
increasing impoverishment through the misuse of resources provided with foreign aid. 
He describes the mechanisation used in the Bhaimara area, slightly to the north-west of 
Dhaka, where he was studying the community. He recounts how a particular individual 
was able to acquire a mechanised cultivator and to obtain Government loans to finance a 
deep tube-well in the name of a cooperative controlled by himself.126 This technically 
fulfilled the requirement for the formation of a cooperative while allowing him to 
dominate it by being elected both President and Secretary. The tubewell was located on
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his land and was under the care of his resident caretaker. Since he had paid bribes to 
have the tubewell allocated to his village and had incurred expenses in so doing he felt 
entitled to charge a price for the water equal to twenty-five percent of the crop harvested. 
Not all peasants in the command area were prepared to participate and even some who 
might have been willing, but with whom he had a hostile relationship, were excluded. 
Despite problems in the first two years these were partially overcome and by 1982, when 
Jansen revisited the area, he found that it irrigated some 30 acres against a theoretical 
command area of 50 acres.127
This example, similar to that given by Hartmann and Boyce above, confirms 
de Vylder’s contention that the concentration on infrastructure, even in the agriculture 
sector, has tended to dominate investment. Table 3.8 illustrates:
TABLE 3.8
Government Funding of Irrigation Schemes, 1973-77
Type of Irrigation
Allocation
in
FFYP
% of Land 
Made 
Irrigable
State Subsidy 
as a % of 
Total Costs
Large-scale projects 53% 5% 100
Deep tube-wells 31 21 67
Low lift pumps 14 24 44
Shallow tube-wells 2 2 34
Hand pumpsA Nil 3 29
Traditional methods (dhones, 
swing baskets, etc.) Nil 45 Nil
Sources: Based on Agriculture Mission 1977, EBRD and S. Biggs, C. Edwards and J. Griffith, 
"Irrigation in Bangladesh", 1978 quoted in de Vylder, Agriculture in Chains, p. 79.
*1116 hand pump scheme was initiated after the writing of the Five Year Plan.
Thus, even within the irrigation sub-sector, the amount of investment in 
irrigation schemes and the amount of state subsidy have been almost directly proportional 
to the capital intensity. These types of investment have affected only a small proportion 
of the irrigable land. Jansen explains the capital bias:
Normally there is a great demand for deep tube-wells in an area. The people in Government at 
central and local levels are well aware of this situation, and exploit it to their advantage.lt is not 
unusual that a large amount of bribes will have to be paid to them by the rich people who start the 
co-operative. . . . One important consequence of this way of acquiring a deep tube-well is that the 
linkages between urban and rural elites are strengthened, and the resources produced in the rural 
areas are transferred, in the form of bribes, to Government officials in the urban areas. The rich 
farmers who have had the expenses for the bribes inform the members of the co-operative of this, 
and demand compensation for providing the water to the others. A normal way to collect payment 
from the members is to demand 150 to 300 taka for irrigating one bigha of land or to ask for a 
certain percentage of the crop; 25% is common. In this way, the rich farmer(s) can more than 
recover their expenses, and the water from the deep tube-wells has become a major source of in­
come. . . .
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A patron-client type of relationship can often develop between the controllers and the users 
of the water, where the users not only pay an economic compensation for the use of the water, but 
also have to show loyalty in other fields, for instance, to give political support in village and Union 
affairs. The more support shown, the more certain the client can be to receive other favours, 
including water supply, access to fertilizers and pesticides; goods which for poor people can be 
obtained only on the black market at high prices. . .
The organizational implications of the use of the [hand] pump are very different. There is no 
need to form and maintain a cooperative group around a manual hand pump. If credit is provided, 
even the poorest landowner could become the owner of a hand pump. The pump offers a good 
return. Under normal price conditions, farmers using one hand pump to its capacity can regain their 
initial investment in one boro crop season. Rich farmers feel threatened when the poor farmers get 
hand pumps. The increased production which results from the additional winter crop is used to 
make the [small] farmers more self-sufficient and independent of the rich farmers. The rich farmers 
understand that as soon as the farmers become self-sufficient and do not have to take up loans to 
survive, they will lose the chance for buying up land from the poor peasant fanner. In several parts 
of Bangladesh where the hand pumps have been introduced, rich farmers have threatened poor 
farmers and refused them more loans if they start to use the hand pumps for irrigation. While deep 
tube-wells often function as a means for strengthening the patron-client relationship type of social 
organization in rural areas, the hand pumps can function as a means to break up this pattern.128
Deep tube-wells are an imported item, either financed under projects, import 
credits or, less often, from free foreign exchange. Being in the agriculture sector they 
are an attractive investment for donors that often conform to their tying regulations. 
Hand pumps are a factor for social change but may disturb the status quo. Weiss and 
Jequire express a view fairly typical of foreign donors and planners:
Conventional gravity irrigation . . . does not work well in the humid tropics fsici of Latin America 
or in Bangladesh. . . where landholdings are small. In the Punjab (India and Pakistan) the green 
revolution in a way perplexed planners because almost spontaneously tens of thousands of shallow 
wells were installed by private farmers in the space of a few years. These were mostly electric 
driven, low capacity centrifuge pumps, which in physical terms are far less efficient than large- 
capacitv deep well turbine pumps, vet the former are clearly superior in economic and human terms 
[emphasis added].129
What the World Bank might have learned from local farmers in the Punjab, where 
agricultural growth has been both impressive and equitable,130 they did not apply in 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh the World Bank devoted a large part of its agricultural invest­
ment to capital intensive deep tube-wells of the type used by Nafis in our earlier example. 
Capital intensive tubewells may have been more efficient in theoretical terms, but they 
were unsuited to the socio-economic situation prevalent in Bangladesh. The result is that 
they tend to subjugate the poor even further.
Even the World Bank concedes that the results were less than perfect:
However, 1978/79, irrigation equipment was typically being utilized at only 60% of its capacity.1/ 
Deep tubewells were generally sited on the lands of the prominent farmers who had taken the 
initiative to form irrigation groups. The deep tubewells came to be regarded as the personal 
property of the farmers whose land they were sited and water use systems were not developed to 
cover the entire area, so that the needs of a large number of small farmers were denied.
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1/Bangladesh: Current Economic Position and Short Term Outlook; IBRD March 21, 1979. Also 
see an Evaluation of Deep Tubewell Project in North West, BIDS, March 1980.
A survey of the Northwest Deep Tubewell Project from 1978/79 to 1982/83 
carried out for the Swedish International Development Authority in which the capital and 
import biases that characterise foreign aid are clearly evident. There were found to be 
companies capable of producing the pumps for both shallow and deep tube-wells,131 albeit 
not in sufficient quantities with existing capacity. There were, however, an excessive 
number of different engines being imported for the shallow tube-wells without a 
corresponding quantity of spares and without there being adequate maintenance facilities 
available. Furthermore, this was a deliberate policy on the part of some importers to 
maintain the demand for new pumps.132
The conclusions were summed up by Johan Holmberg in the foreword 
referring to the report:
Its overall findings however, are far from surprising to anyone involved in rural development issues 
on the whole and support the findings of the early SID A evaluation. Development resources are 
being captured and monopolised by the rural rich, often making life even more miserable for the 
poor. Effects on employment are modest, even the impact on growth is far from convincing.133
Thus, the situation does not appear to have changed much in the middle 1980s 
with respect to the major donors. Some of the smaller donors such as UNICEF are not 
driven to the same extent by the need to disburse. They may also have adequate staff in 
the field.134 As a result they have gained a growing appreciation of the non-capital 
intensive approach and have introduced handpumps to the area.135 The Government has a 
preoccupation with large prestigious infrastructure projects such as the Brahmaputra 
Barrage. The feasibility study it requested for a huge barrage project from Prime 
Minister Trudeau when he visited Bangladesh in November 1983 is typical. Its estimated 
cost was more than a third of the country’s GNP. Furthermore, the first benefits would 
not have been derived until well into the next century. Yet it would have required that 
virtually all investment be put into this one project. It preoccupied the Ministry of 
Irrigation for more than a year, diverting their attention from such mundane but 
productive things as hand pumps.*
The World Bank, despite its own assessment of the problems associated with 
deep tube-wells, signed another deep tubewell project on July 26, 1982 for some SDR
*This is based on the writer’s experience as Head of Aid during the period referred to when he carried out most negotiations 
with the Government.
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60.5 million.136 The Asian Development Bank, which has almost no project supervisory 
staff, signed a deep tube well project on April 20, 1983 for US$56.5 million.137 
Regardless of whether the lessons are taught and recorded, they still have not been 
learned.
The selection of technology is frequently a function of the financing 
available.138 We have seen in the examples above the effects of technology being 
introduced without the appropriate institutional structure to ensure its optimal use. The 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank operate without the tying constraint that 
binds the bilateral donors. Hence they ought to be leaders in the selection of optimal 
technology. Regrettably they do not appear to have learned by their own mistakes.
In the agriculture sector we see the following:
A limited market due to the dominance of urban markets by food aid,
A lack of institutional development,
A capital intensive approach,
The large scale "appropriation" of the capital intensive resources that are provided,
Some effort, but little success at improving rural institutions to ensure that the best 
possible use is made of the resources available,
No real sustained effort at really fulfilling the agricultural potential of the country.
Economic Growth
Economic growth averaged 5 per cent from 1973 to 1975.139 Agriculture grew 
at 4.6 per cent.140 This was overshadowed by spectacular growth in the industrial sector 
of 27.3 per cent in large-scale industries, only 7 per cent of which was in the area of 
small scale and cottage industries. This reflects the capital bias that was prevalent in the 
economy from even before independence.141 The trade sector grew some 14.7 per cent142 
again reflecting the propensity to engage in trade. This again reflects the donor 
preference for capital intensive technology and an import oriented approach. During the 
period over half of the loan agreements signed by the Asian Development Bank were 
concerned with the industrial sector.143 The World Bank invested rather less in the 
industrial sector, but concentrated on investment in the irrigation sector. It also provided 
commodity loans of US$225 million, out of a total of US$585 million on programme aid
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and US$36 million on industrial investment.144 This no doubt contributed to the growth 
of the trade sector.
Table 3.5 shows that the trend has clearly been for the government to favour 
energy and industry at the expense of agriculture in terms of the proportion of investment 
allocated to various sectors. Most investments are concentrated in capital projects that 
are dependent on imports: irrigation equipment, 13.4 per cent; industry, 12.6 per cent; 
power and natural resources, 17.9 per cent; and transport* and communications, 17.6 
per cent, totaling 61.2 per cent per cent of all investment. This is magnified when one 
takes into consideration the relative share of GDP accounted for by agriculture, some 
48.6 per cent of GDP in 1974/75, while energy accounts for only some 0.15 per cent.145 
This bias is due to the donor propensity for high technology, large scale, import oriented 
projects, but an added benefit for the recipient, is that there are relatively more 
opportunities to "appropriate" aid from large infrastructural project, such as those in the 
energy, transportation and industrial sectors. These are not necessarily derived from 
corruption, but may also come from commissions paid to agents, visits overseas and 
training associated with such technology. There is also greater opportunity to bank 
foreign exchange overseas by under- or over-invoicing or simply by charging generous 
profit margins.
Agriculture on the other hand is a difficult sector in which to programme. 
The inputs are technical knowledge, modem inputs such as fertiliser and high yielding 
varieties, and credit. The last presents some opportunities for misuse. They are not, 
however, on the same scale as those available through industrial credit schemes simply 
because most farmers or sharecroppers operate on a very small scale.
The average growth rate during the latter half of the 1970s continued at a 
respectable 4.7 per cent between 1974/75 and 1979/80.146 Large scale industry slowed to 
a slightly above average 6.2 per cent,147 still more than double agriculture’s modest 3.0 
percent. Small scale industry, however, grew at 21.2 percent. Construction grew at
6.5 per cent. Transport grew at 5.5 per cent and banking and insurance at 20.0 
percent.148 During this period growth was healthy, but again largely confined to the
*Of all the sectors transport has potentially the largest local cost component in construction of local roads. Most transport 
investment has been concentrated on the railways and the modern part of the inland water transport sector, both of which are capita] 
intensive and largely dependent on imports.
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modem sector. Tendler contends that the propensity to opt for larger projects or larger 
foreign exchange components of large multi-donor projects is related to a bureaucratic 
phenomenon that favours large projects over small. This is because, in the view of 
bureaucrats, the efficiency of implementation is measured in the "input of staff work, 
measured in time, to transfer a given amount. Since the larger project requires less effort 
per unit of value than the smaller one* there is a tendency to opt for the larger project."149
Average growth dropped to 3.8 per cent for the 1980 to 1985 period.150 This 
was in part a reflection of the world economic slump of the period. Agriculture 
continued to lag at 2.7 per cent,151 about the same rate as population growth. Industry 
grew at 5.4 per cent and the service sector grew at 4.7 per cent.152
Thus, we see that without a real effort in agriculture by the Government, the 
modem sector has continued to gain ground and dominate the growth pattern of the 
country. It has been largely financed from outside the domestic economy and not from 
agriculture, potentially the lead sector. Employment problems have continued to grow, 
particularly as there are few employment prospects in traditional agriculture resulting in 
increased urban migration. The investment in agriculture has not reached the poor. It is 
not surprising then that, with the capital bias and growth in the modem sector 
dominating, the welfare of the traditional sector should suffer.
There is one anomaly that stands out. The average production of wheat rose 
from 109 thousand tons during the first five year period to an average of 1166 for the last 
five year period, an increase of tenfold over the decade. Yet, interestingly, the 
investment in wheat has been modest by comparison with the other areas. Thus, we find 
as predicted:
Growth has been acceptable, but concentrated in the modem sector,
The traditional sectors have been largely ignored.
*The writer’s own experience in Bangladesh bears this out. Fundamentally good projects were often discouraged because they 
were too small to have any effect on the flow of resources being transferred regardless of their intrinsic value as development 
projects. Specialist technical teams were regularly instructed either to discourage small projects or to package them in such a way that 
they could be approved as a part of a bigger project. The reason for this was that it was beyond the capacity of either the limited field 
staff of the desk staff in Ottawa to prepare the appropriate documentation for approval. While CIDA did move in the direction of 
delegation more financial authority to Country Programme Directors the additional resources were not made available.
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TABLE 3.9 
Gross Domestic Product 
(in constant 1972/73 prices in millions of taka)
72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85
Agriculture 26,100 28,827 28,537 31,865 30,903 34,019 33,872 34,050 34,910 35,230 36,850 37,440 37,940
Crops
Forestry
Livestock
Fisheries
19,761 
1 ,240 
2,230 
2,869
22,352 
1,330 
2 ,267 
2, 878
22,212 
1, 134 
2,230 
2,888
25,477 
1 , 183
2,236
2,879
24,461 
1, 183 
2,380 
2,87 9
26,450 
1 , 490 
3, 166 
2,913
26,941 
1,520 
3, 308 
2, 103
26,950 
1,550 
3,447 
2, 103
27,630 
1,700 
3,480 
2,100
27,440 
1,880 
3,690 
2,220
28,790 
1 ,920 
3,770 
2,370
29,120 
2, 100 
3,840 
2,390
29,340
2,290
3,900
2,410
Industry 4,555 5,212 7,410 7. 755 B, 338 9,014 9,510 9,880 10,700 11,020 11,090 12,010 12,900
Mining and Manufacturing 
-Large and Medium Scale 
-Small Scale 
Construction
Electricity, Gas and Water
2,896 
(1,871) 
(1,025) 
1,529 
130
3,404
(2,226)
(1,178)
1,713
95
5,482
(3,032)
(2,450)
1,833
86
5,878 
(3,2 59) 
(2,619) 
1 , 742 
135
6, 118 
(3,382) 
(2,736) 
2,057 
163
6,642 
(3,743) 
(2,899) 
2, 188 
184
6,939 
(3,968) 
(2,971) 
2,387 
184
7 , 081 
(3,976) 
(3,105) 
2,604 
195
7 ,600 
(4,390) 
(3,210) 
2,850 
250
7 , 720 
(4,430) 
(3,300) 
3,000 
300
7 ,600 
(4,210) 
(3,390) 
3,040 
450
7 ,880 
(4,390) 
(3,490) 
3,650 
490
8, 170 
(4,580) 
(3,590) 
4, 180 
550
Services 14,457 16,530 16,344 19,066 20,228 20,949 23,384 25,102 26,040 25,980 26,890 28,550 30,160
Transport and Communications 
Trade
Banking and Insurance 
Housing
Other Services 
Public Administration
3,366 
3,829 
559 
2,454 
3, 300 
949
3,528 
5, 142 
469 
2,417 
3,678 
1,296
3,617 
5,814 
450 
2,383 
2,841 
1 ,239
3,792 
7 ,653 
465 
2,529 
3,281 
1 , 346
4,095 
7 ,907 
475 
2,585 
3,57 7 
1 , 589
4,258 
8, 008 
506 
2,740 
3,7 56 
1 ,681
4,612
9,373
545
3,082
3,994
1,778
4,995 
10,048 
619 
3,220 
4,226 
1,954
4,850 
6,870 
1,390 
5, 300 
4,910 
2,730
4,850
6,270
1,290
5,420
5,230
2,910
5,230
6,430
1,220
5,550
5,570
2,900
5,340
6,800
1,290
5,680
5,940
3,500
5,460
7,080
1,360
5,810
6,410
4,040
GDP at Market Prices 45,122 50,569 52,282 58,686 59,469 63,982 66,766 69,032 71,640 72,230 74,840 78,000 81,000
Net Indirect Taxes 1,061 1,496 747 3,314 3,232 3,396 3,756 4,245 4,130 3,770 4,020 4,200 4,390
GDP at Factor Cost 44,051 49,073 51,535 55,374 56,237 60,586 63,010 64,787 67,510 68,460 70,820 73,800 76,610
S tatistical A p p e n d i x . February 23, 1981, table 1980/81 to 1984/85 W o V u ^ ^ B a n ° Ba n g badesh°^ R e g e n t ^ r o n m l ^ ^ v e l o p m e n t s ^ n d  H e d h m  Term
Notes: Data for 1972/73 through 1979/80 are not directly comparable with those for subsequent years as wages and salaries paid from the Annual 
Development Programme were not included in estimates of sectoral value added prior to 1980/81. Our estimate is that this may under estimate values by 
about 1.7 per c e n t .
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Most of both the domestic investment and the investment provided through 
foreign aid that has taken place in Bangladesh since independence has been for the 
procurement of imported goods rather than their manufacture. There are several reasons 
for this.
The end of the War of Liberation saw the flight of the entrepreneurial class 
which had been predominantly West Pakistani.153 Bangladesh had already suffered from 
the loss of much of the Hindu entrepreneurial class during the partition of 1947. This 
loss, repeated in less than a generation, set the economy back again. The newly emergent 
country had few resources remaining to draw upon in the way of educated, experienced 
businessmen. It was thus left to the Government to find a means to keep the abandoned 
industries operating while there was an acute lack of the skilled personnel necessary 
required to manage the industrial sector efficiently.
With the already extremely limited manufacturing capability of the country in 
a shambles, there were quick profits to be made as indentors (importers) struggled to 
arrange the importation of foreign financed commodities and goods. There was a far 
higher return to be made on capital invested in the importation of goods154 than there was 
from investing in production, processing or manufacturing facilities where returns were 
much less certain and much slower. Furthermore, there was more likelihood of 
competing with established and more efficient foreign suppliers.155* In fact, 
representatives of manufacturers supplying under commodity programmes needed to make 
only very small investment by comparison with the size of the transaction being made and 
the profits earned.
During the pre-war period the entrepreneurial class of West Pakistan had 
controlled 47 per cent of all fixed assets in private hands and 72 per cent of the private 
industrial assets.156 The result at independence was that business houses with their
* There are exceptions to this and in recent years both the pharmaceutical industry which is protected from competition from 
imports by law and the garment industry where Bangladesh has, for the moment, good comparative advantage have grown and to 
some extent prospered. It should be noted, however, that in the case of the former there was considerable opposition from at least 
one donor, the USA, who threatened to cut its foreign aid programme if exceptions were not made to accommodate US 
manufacturers and that the ban i6 still widely transgressed by donors in the health sector. In the case of the garment industry, which 
is labour intensive rather than capital intensive, Bangladesh was fortunate to benefit from the fact that some traditional suppliers were 
on the point of exceeding their quotas while Bangladesh had not yet been subject to a quota imposed under the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement and that the rise in communal violence in neighbouring Sri Lanka left an additional gap in production to be filled.
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headquarters in West Pakistan controlled 41 per cent of the fixed assets in the country. 
The remainder of the investment was in private, non-Bengali hands.157 The loss of 
Bengalis in the senior echelons who had been killed during the War was serious.158 Just 
as serious was the loss of personnel such as skilled workmen and shop floor 
management.159 At the executive level there were fewer non-Bengalis in executive posi­
tions.160 In the newly nationalised industries which had been abandoned, there were 
simply not sufficient qualified personnel to manage the enterprises.161 Sobhan and Ahmed 
argue that the result of this in most companies was to turn over effective responsibility to 
"a fluctuating coalition of union leaders, managers and nominated outsiders who then sold 
off inventories of finished goods to pay wages or for their own profit".162 Maniruzzaman 
on the other hand maintains that the administrators appointed by the Government were 
from the ranks of the Awami League supporters. They promptly sold off much of the 
machinery and raw materials across the border in India.163 Regardless of who profited, 
productivity plummeted. The result during this first period is that the productivity of the 
industrial sector dropped and the country became more dependent on imports.
In reviewing the history of industrial growth over the first decade the 
Planning Commission concluded, in The Substantial New Plan for the 1980s. that the 
capacity utilisation of the industrial sector remained unsatisfactory due to several factors. 
There was limited availability of raw materials, labour unrest and a lack of a sustained 
supply of imported raw materials.164 In the public sector particularly they faulted inept 
management, poor maintenance and lack of accountability as contributing causes.165
In the jute processing industry, which dominated the industrial sector166 the 
Government had, before independence, encouraged the growth of the industrial sector at 
the expense of the rural sector by paying a generous export bonus, for which the export 
of raw jute was not eligible.167 This was done to encourage the development of 
processing in the country. The result of this, however, was a net transfer of resources 
from the rural areas to the urban areas. The price of jute was depressed,168 another 
example of the urban bias that predominated. A factor that Abdullah identifies, is that 
several industries actually had negative social returns,169 It has also be suggested that this 
led to an over-expansion of the jute-processing industry since the jute market was 
contracting under pressure from synthetic competitors. The combined share of both India
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and Bangladesh grew from 8 per cent of the world market in 1955/56 to some 50 
per cent in 1969/70 while the quantity of exports stagnated at the same level.170
Sobhan asserts that 64 per cent of investment in Bangladesh is financed by 
foreign aid.171 Furthermore, the propensity of the trading classes is to opt for imported 
rather than domestically manufactured goods because of the relatively higher commissions 
to be made in importation.172 His calculation, using very conservative assumptions on the 
size of commission, works out at some US$136 million between 1972 and 1980 on 
disbursed aid of some US$5,500 million in disbursed aid. Since these calculations were 
made another US$ 6,500 million have been disbursed up to June 30, 1985173 which could, 
using Sobhan’s assumptions, have resulted in a total of some US$300 million from 1972 
to 1985. The result has been the growth of a "black" economy dealing in luxury 
consumer goods which is quite incongruous in the world’s second poorest country.174 
These calculations do not include the commissions made on the import of goods with 
legitimate foreign exchange or bought from remittances from foreign workers through the 
Wage Earner Scheme (WES).
Another common problem in Bangladesh is that of under-utilised productive 
capacity. While some sectors of the industrial sector are comparatively well utilised, 
there are areas where it is not.175 The installed capacity available, were it to be fully 
utilised, could contribute far more to employment generation and economic growth of the 
country than it currently does. Not all under-utilisation can be laid to the fault of the 
donors and foreign aid. There is, however, little doubt that they share the blame in 
encouraging importation even where some production could be carried out locally. Their 
propensity to do this has been well documented by Tendler.176
The under-utilisation of existing productive capacity in Bangladesh is apparent 
to the observer. Ole David Koht Norbye in the Bangladesh Country Study177 gives 
numerous examples. The Bangladesh Machine Tool Factory by itself accounts for 5 
per cent of the fixed assets of all industries in Bangladesh, but its output is negligible. 
The Diesel Engine Plant produces an engine which buyers find unsuitable. The 
manufacture of inefficient irrigation pumps is yet another example. The General Electric 
Manufacturing Plant in Chittagong produces transformers that are of Soviet design and 
are wasteful of costly materials.178
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The last example is particularly relevant given the great investment in 
electrical energy production and distribution. Donors have provided imported 
transformers rather than assistance to the plant for the manufacture of the required 
equipment. Granted, the latter would be a more time consuming and complicated 
process, but the result would be better utilisation of existing capacity. The longer run 
implications of such approaches to providing aid are that Bangladesh’s existing capital 
investment remains under-utilised with an opportunity cost attached. Little improvement 
has been brought about in the managerial capacity of the sector, and little employment 
has been created. The donors are not alone in their omission of this factor. The longer 
time horizon involved is unlikely to appeal to the Ministry of Energy whose immediate 
concerns do not include the improvement in productivity in the industrial sector. Final­
ly, the influential traders who stand to benefit from the commissions paid for the 
importation of foreign goods undoubtedly have had an influence on the Government 
decision-makers.179
Tendler,180 in her study of aid in Latin America, explains the general tendency 
of USAID and other donors to favour larger projects over smaller ones and to favour 
large foreign exchange components of large multi-donor projects when participating in 
them.181 One of the reasons for this is the tying of aid funds to the procurement of 
equipment in the donor’s country. Donor countries persist in tying, despite considerable 
evidence that it adds both to the cost and complexity of projects, and does not bring 
tangible economic benefits to the donor country. Most donors have tying requirements.
In considering the logic of this attitude we must understand that bureaucrats 
engaged in the administration of foreign aid are not rewarded on the basis of the success 
of a project whose end they will probably never see. As Sobhan suggests, however, they 
are sometimes rewarded for allocating the benefits of the project.182 There is no measure 
of the profitability resulting from these benefits as there would be in the private sector. 
Rather, recognition is on the basis of the amount of money spent. Even where ex-post 
facto project evaluations are carried out these tend to be narrow in scope. Payer argues 
that the implementation and evaluation stages of a typical World Bank Project are 
concerned with seeing whether the project met its goals, goals that were set by the 
appraisal team at the time of project identification and approval. They are not concerned 
with whether those goals were relevant to the problem.183 The aid bureaucrat is thus
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judged on his performance for the work he has completed, i.e., spending money. The 
result of this in Bangladesh is that most large donors have avoided small projects that do 
not disburse funds on a regular basis. Small projects are usually the type of project that 
are most likely to benefit the small farmer or the landless rural dweller.
Another aspect of the business sector has been the effect of donors in 
preserving markets for the subsidiaries of their domestic industries. This is done even in 
the face of evidence that the importation of some products may be wasteful, or even be 
detrimental to the improvement of the general development of the country. The health 
sector serves as an example. In their evaluation of the Norwegian commodities 
programme the evaluators describe how the donors took a very strong stand when the 
Bangladesh Government tried to restrict importation of drugs in an effort to develop the 
domestic production of a limited line of basic drugs more appropriate to Bangladesh’s 
basic health needs:
Before 1982, drug laws in Bangladesh provided very little control of the pharmaceutical 
supply system. By early 1982, there were 4340 registered products of which 2600 were local and 
1740 were foreign brands. A large number of these products were non-essential, engaging more 
than 50 per cent of local production. Promotional activities of private manufacturers had created a 
demand for many non-essential drugs that had very little or no relevance to real health needs. 
Consumers were persuaded to undertake self-medication with non-essential drugs. . . .
. . .  It was this situation which provided the background for the World Health organization to 
address the drug policies and practices pursued in third world countries. WHO’s Action Programme 
on Essential Drugs was part of WHO’s wider aim and programme "Health for All by the Year 
2000" .
While some of the guidelines [in Bangladesh] are based upon sound pharmaceutical and 
therapeutic premises, some are purely of economic nature. For example, foreign companies are not 
allowed to manufacture simple products such as antacids . . . and oral vitamin preparations.
The drug market there [in Bangladesh] is worth only US$ 80 million and any multinational could 
withdraw from Bangladesh with little effects on its international sales figures. What does concern 
the multinationals is the fear that WHO recommendations might be adopted by a large number of 
Third World countries and even followed by the industrialized countries. . . .  the multinationals are 
concerned about the example Bangladesh could set to many Third World countries. The strong and 
fierce opposition to the Drug Policy must be understood in this perspective. Prior to the adoption 
of the new drug policy, biased information and propaganda put out in Bangladesh by the 
multinational companies suggested that the companies would leave Bangladesh if the policy were to 
be implemented. The ambassadors from several large Western countries contacted the President and 
expressed their concern about the new policy. The West German Ambassador argued the Policy 
deterred foreign companies from investing.184
In the Norwegian drug programme it was the local agent of a Norwegian 
pharmaceutical company already doing business there who drew up the list of the 
country’s drug requirements from Norway.185 Many of them, however, were on the list 
of prohibited imports186 because they were already being manufactured there. The
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importation of Norwegian drugs led to the closing of one manufacturing plant making the 
raw materials in June 1985. The imported medicines cost the Ministry of Health some 14 
per cent more than the domestic product.187
Much the same kind of issue was met in the area of the importation of hand 
sprayers for the application of insecticide on the jute crop. The case was not as clear cut 
as that of the pharmaceuticals because demand may have exceeded supply.188 
Nevertheless, it was claimed that unsold stocks of the domestically produced product 
were available locally at the same time as there was effort on the part of a local 
company, BEXIMCO (one of the larger trading houses in Dhaka) to import the banned 
items under the Norwegian commodity programme.189
We see, therefore, there has been a propensity for traders to engage in trade 
of imports rather than the sale of local manufactured goods because of higher returns.190 
It follows therefore, that private investment capital will also gravitate to trading rather 
than manufacturing. The returns are higher and there are opportunities to divert at least 
part of the profits to safer havens abroad. Conventional theory predicted there would be 
an effort to export. There have been two such successes: the frogs’ legs and shrimp, and 
the garment trade. Both have done well and were the result of entrepreneurs grasping 
market opportunities. Both, however, are limited when compared to the range for 
commissions that Sobhan cites, some US$136 million from 1972 to 1980.191 By 
comparison these commissions would equal total shrimp and frogs’ legs exports for two 
years (1982/83 and 1983/84 equaled US$72 million and US$76 million respectively).192 
Alternately they equal more than one year of garment exports (US$116 million in 
1983/84).193 In 1984/85 aid totalled some US$1,267 million.194 
In sum, have seen that:
Exports of new products have grown, but by comparison with aid they are 
still small;
Industries tend to be capital intensive and there is a general neglect of a 
labour intensive approach;
It is difficult to ascertain whether there has been large scale export of capital.
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Corruption was pervasive during Mujib’s time even extending to the members 
of his own family.195 The Awami League, despite its socialist philosophy, represented the 
landowning classes. They were relatively poor perhaps by the standards of wealthier 
countries, but close to the top of the social structure in Bangladesh. The description of 
Mujib’s use of patronage and nepotism is well documented by Franda. He describes the 
growth of popular feeling against such misuse of power.196 With the overwhelming 
majority that Mujib commanded in Parliament* there was little that the opposition could 
do. His power was obtained through election rigging, intimidation and violence.197 He 
set the stage and provided the example for the society and the two dominant leaders who 
were to follow, Presidents Zia and Ershad. Each of the latter was to take power 
ostensibly to combat corruption only to fall prey to it. Zia did through his tolerance of 
corruption to achieve political ends. Ershad, it is alleged,198 has tolerated dishonest 
practices to benefit members of his family.
Thus, dating from the early days of the country’s independence, there has 
been real growth in the small but increasingly influential upper classes. This growth of 
the upper classes is at least partially attributable directly to or indirectly to the growth of 
foreign aid.
The burgeoning urban elite of Bangladesh owes its position almost entirely to aid; the creation of 
luxurious residential and shopping areas in Dhaka is the one tangible effect of all the aid money that 
has been poured into Bangladesh since its independence from Pakistan.199
Hay ter is exaggerating somewhat in the above quote. There are no luxurious 
shopping areas, outside of a few small shops in the two international class hotels. There 
is no question, however, that the aid community is the raison d’etre for the majority of 
the construction in the suburbs of Banani and Gulshan Model Town, and more recently in 
neighbouring Baridhara. Nor is this the only tangible effect of all the aid money spent in 
the country. Dhaka is a city in which it is obvious, even to the casual observer, that 
attention is paid to maintenance and beautification. This was so particularly at the time 
of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in 1984, and the visits of Queen Elizabeth 
II, President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in November
*307 of 315 according to Franda, p. 54, or 305 according to O’Donnell, p. 194.
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1983. The same cannot be said of smaller centres in the rural areas where such visitors 
rarely venture except on carefully orchestrated visits. The ability of the Government to 
allocate monies to such activities is possible because the donors provide some 40 per cent 
of the country’s total budgetary requirements through the sale of food aid and 
commodities.
Farouk estimates that about 250,000 families form the upper class in 
Bangladesh. They are closely knit and live in relative comfort amongst the poverty that 
predominates. They also form an influential class with the bureaucratic and the political 
elite.200 They have used their credit, land and their official positions to acquire wealth. 
He describes them:
The upper class included men whose corrupt careers brought success stories. Many had little 
reputation of honesty. There were officers screened out for corruption, yet living in society as 
respected and well-to-do citizens. Educationists were convicted and sentenced for mismanagement. 
Politicians had frequently become rich by abuse of their power. Many of the criminals in the city 
appeared to be the children of the newly rich families1.201
l .C.f.."The Police Commissioner of Dacca remarked that it is easy to arrest the old criminals 
but not so with the new criminals. Majority of the latter come from the educated and well-to-do 
class". The Ittefaq. Dacca, (Post-Editorial), July, 7, 1980. "Children of the upper class families 
are becoming wayward, teasing girls and doing other crimes in the city, because their families had 
become rich quickly by unfair means." Daily Sangbad. Dacca (Post-Editorial), October 23, 1980.
The import business (indenting) which developed to fill the gap left by 
departing Pakistani entrepreneurs at the end of the War of Liberation has provided one 
such outlet for growth and easy profits. Since a large portion of imports are financed by 
donors, the upper class has a vested interest in the promotion of aid. Its growing 
influence has been focused on decision-makers in government so that there are strong 
forces opposed to the government’s making any serious attempt at achieving a measure of 
self reliance.
Another area has been the provision of easy credit through the domestic 
financial institutions. For example between December 16, 1971 and June 1982, a period 
of almost eleven years, some 9,859 million taka (approximately $500 million) has been 
invested in 1257 projects in the private sector. Sobhan and Mahmood estimate that this 
could well have benefited only about 1000 families202 or an average of approximately 
US$500 thousand per family. In a country where the average income is about US$120 
per annum this represents a definite bias towards the wealthier segments of society.
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Koht Norbye suggests that the average income of the 50,000 wealthiest 
households in the country could be as high as one million taka a year. This would 
account for approximately 12.5 per cent of the national income.203 Certainly the statistical 
division of the population into quintiles or deciles in Table 4.1 understates the nature of 
the problem of the accumulation of wealth. Even Koht Norbye’s estimate of 50,000 
households is too generous. Sobhan and Mahmood are probably much closer with their 
estimate of 1000 families. Below this there is a segment comprising the rural elite and 
the urban middle class. It is doubtful, however, if even they would make up all of the 
top decile of the population where per capita income is still very low by world standards 
(see Table 4.3).
There are several possible answers to the question of why aid favours the 
wealthy. Donor agencies do not have the resources to ensure that development assistance 
is well administered. There is not, in most donor countries, a well informed 
constituency, or even a well informed legislature. The United States is the exception in 
this respect in that the Congress is concerned with the delivery and use of foreign aid. 
Thus, there is little pressure on most donor governments* to increase the effectiveness of 
the foreign aid relationship. In fact, for some donors to do so would undermine the 
patron-client relationship between the donor and the beneficiaries. These as we have seen 
are often the most privileged in the recipient country.
Dating from the early days of the country’s independence there has been real 
growth in the small, but increasingly influential, middle class and upper class. The 
growth of this group is at least partially attributable, directly or indirectly, to the growth 
of foreign aid.
Much aid, such as food aid, and, to a lesser extent, commodity aid, may have 
been appropriate at the time of the reconstruction immediately following the War of 
Liberation when "quick fix" solutions were called for. This aid has become the panacea 
for all Bangladesh’s ills because of the vested interests of the upper classes in 
perpetuating it for personal gain.
The existing policy framework from the time of independence has tended to 
neglect agriculture for the rewards of growth in the industrial sector. Most aid flows
*In most donor countries the administration of the aid programme is largely the responsibility of the executive branch of 
government.
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have reinforced this strategy204 rather than changing it. The policy framework is reflected 
in the allocation of resources in the various Annual Development Plans in Table 3.4 and 
3.5.
Thus, we see that "appropriation" of aid by the upper classes has reinforced a 
mix of aid that might have been beneficial in the immediate post-war period, but has 
instead become counterproductive to the goal of equitable development as needs changed. 
This has led to inequitable development reversing the trend that existed prior to the War 
of Liberation when conditions were improving for the poorest and remaining relatively 
static for the upper classes (see Table 4.4).
We see therefore that the middle and upper classes have improved their 
positions vis-a-vis the poorest and have grown significantly.
Foreign Aid
Foreign aid was welcomed almost from the beginning although there was 
selectivity and an overriding concern that the donors not distort the objectives of the new 
state. It was soon overcome. Dr. Anisur Rahman, who had been a member of the first 
Planning Commission expressed the following views on the desirability of Bangladesh 
following its own destiny:
On the morrow of the liberation, the government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh had 
announced its intention not to accept aid from any country which had been hostile to its liberation 
struggle, no matter what this policy would cost the nation. This was a very exciting decision. If 
followed this would have meant no US aid for Bangladesh, and thus the biggest single source of 
foreign aid would have been cut off . . . the nation would have been forced to adopt a more austere 
reconstruction and development policy . . . such a highly respected and courageous policy, if 
faithfully followed, would have raised the prestige of Bangladesh as a nation . . . Besides, a 
government which could sustain such a challenging attitude to foreign aid, would have adopted 
equally bold distribution policies at home, so that the suffering from whatever post-liberation 
shortages there would have existed, would have been widely shared and hence much better 
tolerated.205
The result was that humanitarian assistance was available from a wide variety 
of donors very shortly after the end of hostilities. The independence of Bangladesh did 
not cause the divisiveness between donor countries that, for example, the attempt of 
Biafra to break away from Nigeria had only a few years before. In the period following 
the formation of the new government feelers were extended to a broad range of potential 
donors. Even the United States, which had been opposed to the breakup of Pakistan,
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extended humanitarian aid shortly after independence. Only China delayed assistance 
until Pakistan had recognised Bangladesh.
At the end of the War of Liberation the total damage to the infrastructure was 
estimated to be taka 9,600.0 million, or approximately 21.19 per cent of the 1972/73 
Gd p  206 jn immediate months following Bangladesh was pledged $171.5 million in 
food aid alone and had disbursed $129.7 million.207 Bangladesh became a focal point for 
the aid community, including the UN System, the bilateral donors from both the market 
and non-market economies and the larger non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 
the first seven months after independence fourteen countries committed aid to Bangladesh 
and nine of them actually disbursed aid. During the following year the number either 
committing or disbursing aid had grown to twenty-one bilateral donors, thirteen of them 
from the DAC countries, six from the eastern bloc non-market economies and two from 
the non-aligned movement plus an additional seven international agencies.208 
Nevertheless different donor nations regarded the new government from quite different 
perspectives.
The most prominent among the multilateral agencies during the early days of 
Bangladesh was UNROD. It was constituted as the successor to UNEPRO which had 
been established during the summer of 1971 to deal with the refugee problem that was 
building in India following the outbreak of hostilities.209 UNROD,210 and its successor 
organisation UNROB, were specifically designed to address the problem of reconstruction 
in Bangladesh and to coordinate the contributions of both the other United Nations 
organisations and the of other donors.
Following the establishment of the new government, foreign exchange became 
available from foreign donors as emergency relief was mobilised. Between December 
16, 1971, Victory Day, and the end of the first fiscal year, June 30, 1985 the following 
commitments and disbursements were made.
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TABLE 3.10 
Aid Disbursements 
(Millions US Dollars)
Committed 
Food Aid
Disbursed 
Food Aid
Committed 
Program Aid
Disbursed 
Program Aid
Committed 
Project Aid
Disbursed 
Project Aid
Total Aid 
Committed
Total Aid 
Disbursed
1971/72 171.5 129.6 292.7 137.7 146.6 3.4 610.8 270.7
1972/73 258.8 182.6 302.1 288.9 317.5 80.0 878.4 551.5
1973/74 155.2 228.7 176.0 108.1 223.9 124.4 555.1 461.2
1974/75 461.1 382.3 415.1 375.7 390.5 143.0 1,266.7 901.0
1975/76 240.8 313.5 360.9 361.6 357.2 125.5 958.9 800.6
1976/77 143.1 121.6 304.1 254.6 279.7 158.6 726.9 534.8
1977/78 138.8 177.8 426.1 380.5 582.9 275.6 1,147.8 833.9
1978/79 300.7 179.1 604.4 482.6 855.1 368.4 1,760.2 1,030.1
1979/80 270.0 374.7 285.3 378.5 597.9 469.9 1,153.2 1,223.1
1980/81 202.9 194.1 354.9 392.5 1001.5 559.9 1,559.3 1,146.5
1981/82 220.6 230.5 513.0 419.9 1189.3 589.3 1,922.9 1,239.7
1982/83 248.4 255.5 474.4 452.0 799.8 469.9 1,522.6 1,177.4
1983/84 285.2 276.4 528.2 439.2 881.7 552.8 1,695.1 1,268.4
1984/85 380.2 244.5 253.1 431.6 1339.6 590.9 1,972.9 1,267.0
Total 3,477.3 3,290.9 5,290.3 4,903.4 8,963.2 4,511.6 17,730.8 12,705.9
Source: Bangladesh, Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (As of June 30. 19851. Dhaka: External Resources Division; 
Ministry of Finance, December 1, 1985, tables 4, 5, and 6, pp. 18-91.
Table 3.10 shows that the amounts committed in each category by the donor 
community during the first year were of the same order of magnitude. The amounts 
disbursed, however, as a ratio of commitments, varied widely; from 75.6 per cent of 
food aid to 47.0 per cent of program aid to 2.8 per cent of project aid. This skewing 
toward more liquid forms of resource transfer was to be expected in the first year of 
independence due to the relatively longer time that it takes to mount projects than to 
deliver food or commodities. The pattern of slow disbursing project aid still holds to the 
present, if in a somewhat less exaggerated manner than exhibited in the first year. In fact 
during the first two and a half years after independence Bangladesh received more foreign 
aid than it had during the previous 23 years.211
As we discussed in Chapter II, there was during this initial period a particular 
reluctance on the part of the Planning Commission to seek too close a relationship with 
the World Bank, the largest and most influential of the donors. Furthermore, there were 
abundant offers of assistance from other donors, some of whom, it was believed, shared 
the views and aspirations of the new leaders much more closely than others as they 
gained an awareness of the plight of the mass of the population.212
The importance of the effort to pursue a line of action different from the 
traditional approach taken by the World Bank and the major donors should not be
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underestimated. It showed a desire on the part of the developing country to move to the 
role of determining its own destiny. It is difficult, in considering the ultimate objectives 
of development, why this move towards a more independent stance was opposed by the 
World Bank since it indicated the kind of leadership that so many developing countries 
need.
The 1973 Bangladesh Aid Donor Meeting was, in fact, used as a model by 
Egypt in the organisation of the January 1981 donor meeting held at Aswan to 
demonstrate their independence from the World Bank. It was seen to give the recipient 
country an opportunity to guide the discussions rather than abdicating this responsibility 
in favour of the World Bank.213 The Bangladesh meeting did not go as smoothly as 
planned. Many of the bilateral donors went expressly against the wishes of the host 
country which had requested that there be no pledging. They made pledges which were 
conditional on the satisfactory resolution of the debt issue, the very point Bangladesh had 
sought to avoid.214
This relative independence from the influence of the donors soon deteriorated. 
By 1974 the rise in the price of oil and other commodities had led to a deteriorating 
economic situation. It was exacerbated by the combination of floods and reduced 
purchasing power,215 global inflation and increased commodity prices.216
During this period Bangladesh was invaded by one of the largest 
contingencies of relief workers ever to descend on a country.217 This was bound to cause 
friction between the bureaucrats of the country and the newcomers as charges of 
corruption and misuse came from the relief teams,218 many of them young in a society 
that respects maturity. On the other hand senior officials were irritated by the workers 
self-importance219 and their insistence on interfering with what the government officials 
believed were domestic matters.220
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TABLE 3.11 
Sectoral Disbursement of Project Aid 
(0 0 0 ,0 0 0  us$)
72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 Ave
Agriculture, Water & Rural 
Crops
Development
0.7 2.3 6.3 3.5 10 . 7 34 . 1 24 . 4 30 . 0 42 . 0 47 . 4 56.8 105.0 76.2 439.4
Rural Development 0.0 0 . 6 6.1 0.6 3.8 9. 1 5.0 12. 5 12. 7 11.1 18. 5 15.2 18.8 114.0
Irrigation 14.1 20. 1 14.9 10.2 10.0 15.0 21 . 0 28. 7 51.2 49.9 50.2 49. 1 54. 4 388.8
Industry 2.5 17 .0 31 .6 30.0 48. 0 59. 0 100.0 76. 5 70.0 93.4 52.8 32.4 54-5 667.7
Power 7 .2 15.0 20 . 6 25.0 17 .2 40.0 47 . 8 83.3 70 . 1 63. 1 65.2 143.6 147 . 3 745.4
Natural Resources 0.0 2.8 3.5 1.9 1 . 1 8.0 2.0 24.9 30. 7 86.8 60. 7 41 .6 59.6 343.6
Science & Research 0.0 0.0 0. 1 0.3 0.5 0. 5 1. 4 0.3 0.7 8.4 9.0 2.3 0.1 23.6
Transport 51.2 47.2 9.7 13.0 31 . 4 50. 3 72- 0 130. 0 139.8 102.4 63.5 27.4 51.0 788.9
Commun ications 0.2 2.2 4 . 4 1.8 5.9 11.0 5.0 10. 3 9.6 22.2 9.4 7 . 4 8.2 97 .6
Physical Planning & Housing 3.6 3 . 4 0 . 0 5.6 3.0 3.0 8.0 8.0 27.2 11.0 10.5 11.8 4.7 97 .6
Social Sector
Education 0.2 2.8 0.0 6.4 5.7 9. 4 10. 0 12.5 12. 1 10.0 10.8 19. 5 23.0 122.4
Health 0.0 4.4 7.9 8. 4 2.5 12.3 4 . 8 12.5 16. 0 10.5 8.2 10.0 12.4 109. 9
Family Planning 0.2 5.2 5.6 4.6 7 . 1 6.5 18.5 15. 7 22 . 5 23.4 18. 8 23 . 3 11.2 162.6
Social Welfare 0.0 0. 1 8.5 2.2 0.2 1 . 5 2.5 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 18. 1
Manpower 0 . 0 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0 . 3 0.3 2.8 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 9.9
Public Administration 0 . 0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.7 1. 0 3.6 0.0 0 . 4 0.1 7.0
Planning Commission 0 . 0 0.0 7.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 1 . 7 2.1 0.3 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8
Cyclone Reconstruction 0 . 0 0.8 9.2 6.2 2.4 2.5 3.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25. 0
Private (NGOs) 0.1 0 . 5 2.6 5.6 8.2 12. 0 20 . 0 20. 0 50. 1 44. 0 34.0 63.2 69.3 329.6
Total 80. 0 124.4 143. 0 125.5 158.5 275. 1 368. 4 469. 9 559.9 588.9 468. 8 552.8 590.94,503.9
Source: Bangladesh, External Resources Division, Ministry of Finance, Flow of External Resources Into Bangladesh fAs of June 30. 1 0 8 5 1 . table 16,
pp. 162-163.
TABLE 3.12 
Sectoral Disbursement of Project Aid 
(As a percentage)
72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 Ave
Agriculture, Water & Rural 
Crops
Developmen t
0.9% 1.8% 4.4% 2.8% 6.8% 12.4% 6.6% 6.4% 7 .5% 8.0% 12. 1% 19.0% 12.9% 9.8%
Rural Development 0 . 0 0.5 4.3 0.5 2 . 4 3.3 1 . 4 2.7 2.3 1. 9 3.9 2.7 3.2 2.5
Irrigation 17 .6 16.2 10. 4 8. 1 6.3 5.5 5.7 6. 1 9.1 8.5 10. 7 8.9 9.2 8.6
Industry 3. 1 13.7 22. 1 23.9 30.3 21 . 4 27 . 1 16. 3 12.5 15.9 11.3 5.9 9.2 14.8
Power 9.0 12. I 14 . 4 19. 9 10.9 14.5 13.0 17 . 7 12.5 10.7 13-9 26.0 24.9 16.5
Natural Resources 0.0 2.3 2 . 4 1 . 5 0.7 2.9 6.0 5.3 5.5 14.7 12.9 7.5 10. 1 7 .6
Science & Research 0.0 0.0 0 . 1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.4 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.5
Transport 64. 0 37 .9 6.8 10.4 19.8 18. 3 19. 5 27.7 25.0 17 . 4 13.5 5.0 8.6 17 .5
Communications 0.3 1 .8 3.1 1.4 3 . 7 4 . 0 1 . 4 2.2 1.7 3.8 2-0 1.3 1 . 4 2.2
Physical Planning & Housing1 4.5 2.7 0 . 0 4 . 5 1 . 9 1 . 1 2.2 1.7 4.9 1.9 2-2 2.1 0.8 2.2
Social Sector
Education 0.3 2.3 0 . 0 5.1 3.6 3 . 4 2 . 7 2.7 2.2 1.7 2.3 3.5 3.9 2.7
Health 0. 0 3.5 5.5 6.7 1.6 4.5 1.3 2.7 2.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 2 . 4
Family Planning 0.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 4.5 2 . 4 5.0 3.3 4-0 4.0 4.0 4-2 1.9 3 . 6
Social welfare 0 . 0 0 . 1 5.9 1.8 0. 1 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0 . 4
Manpower 0.0 0 . 0 2.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 . 5 0.3 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0.2
Public Administration 0.0 0 . O 0. 1 0.1 0.2 0. 1 O. 1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
Planning Commission 0.0 0 . 0 5.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0 . 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Cyclone Reconstruction 0.0 0.6 6.4 4 . 9 1 . 5 0.9 1.0 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Private 0.1 0.4 1.8 4.5 5.2 4.4 5. 4 4.3 8.9 7.5 7 . 3 11. 4 11.7 7 . 3
Total 100.1% 100.1% 99. 9% 100.1% 100.1% 100.1% 100.1% 100.2% 100.1% 100.1% 99. 7% 99. 9% 99.9% 99.9%A
Source: Calculated from Bangladesh, External Resources Division, Ministry of Finance, Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (As of June 
30, 1985), table 16, pp. 162-163.
^Deviations from 100% are due to rounding errors.
155
Finally, there was large scale smuggling of relief goods and jute, practically 
the country’s only foreign exchange earner at the time, to India. There, although the 
official exchange rate of the taka to the rupee was at par, the unofficial rate was at two to 
one. Thus, essential commodities were being smuggled out of the country to be 
exchanged for cheap consumer goods221 which in turn went to satisfy domestic demand. 
We conclude that this excess of money from the proceeds of smuggling and the 
"appropriation" of aid, in the economy contributed to the inflationary pressures that the 
country was facing.
Finally the termination of UNROB operations on December 31, 1973 meant 
that the flow of resources that had staved off famine and an economic crisis for two years 
was gone.222
Aid declined towards the end of the first period only to return in larger 
quantities in response to the 1974 famine. It had become an essential part of the 
economic landscape of the country. It was a major source of food, an important source 
of capital investment, financing for a large proportion of imports and a source of 
Government revenue.
In Tables 3.11 and 3.12 we see how project aid was allocated among the 
various sectors by the donors. The donors’ preferences are reflected in their allocation of 
resources devoted to project aid. First, we see that in the agriculture sector irrigation has 
received about half of the allocation, with rural development getting only a small part. It 
was to be expected during the reconstruction period that transportation would receive pro­
portionately more than other sectors because of the damage suffered, however, the 
continuing investment in transport demonstrates continued capital bias. Industry had been 
damaged during the War of Liberation, therefore, it is not surprising that there was heavy 
investment initially. The continuing support, well after relief and reconstruction efforts 
were over, once again showed the preoccupation of donors with capital projects. A total 
allocation to the whole social sector averaging less than 10 per cent was indicative of the 
almost complete lack of commitment to this area. This is so even in a country where 
such things as employment creation, health and population are fundamental to 
achievement an acceptable standard of living. It is harder to programme in these areas, 
but a figure of less than 10 per cent puts the whole donor investment in the social sector 
only slightly above the total private donations from abroad, activities of the NGOs listed
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under "private" in Tables 3.11 and 3.12, a comparatively small amount. The allocation 
to the industrial sector indicates much the same bias. In sum, as Tendler contends, the 
donors prefer urban, capital intensive projects to those in the agriculture or the social 
sectors.223 This results in a bias toward those things which tend to benefit mainly the 
upper classes.
An indication of the Government’s attitude toward foreign aid by the Ministry 
of Finance concerned with maximising the flow of resources, is illustrated by a quote 
from a speech by then Finance Minister A.M.A. Muhith at a training Course organised in 
Dhaka on February 9, 1983:
Finally, effective use of aid must consider of beneficiaries of aided activities. Who derives 
the benefit from transfer of resources? Does the rich become richers? fsicl Are the poorest and the 
weakest invested with higher productivity as well as better return from their efforts? Whether the 
distribution system provides aid to reach the poor and the deprived. Whether agricultural 
development programme is helpful to small farmer or tenants. Whether a road project only benefits 
a limited number of users of motor vehicles. Whether immediate production out of an investment is 
sufficient to contain the inflationary effects of development outlay. These are very intricate and 
difficult considerations. Sometimes these considerations tend to be incompatible with the objective 
of rapid disbursement of aid [emphasis added].224
Muhith is essentially saying that project priorities are secondary and 
sometimes interfere with the rapid disbursement of aid, a strong indication of White’s 
contention that aid becomes "a habit of mind".
In several specific areas foreign aid has been counterproductive to the long 
term objective of self-reliance. There has been a lack of attention to the productive 
potential of the poorest elements of the society who form an important impediment to the 
development of domestic markets. There is a lack of investment in agriculture, the 
largest sector. There is little incentive for either the government or the private sector to 
engage in productive effort. Finally, investments made in expanding the productive 
capacity of certain sectors have remained under-utilised in the face of competition from 
imports financed by foreign aid.
Thus, we see the following:
Aid has concentrated on those areas where it is easiest to spend funds;
It has ignored those areas where it is most difficult to programme effectively;
Donors have tolerated poor administrative performance and, more serious yet,
strong evidence of corruption;
Aid has been selective, not in the quality of project, rather in the ease of
disbursement;
Chapter III
157
It has in some cases become a disincentive to development.
Conclusions. Why did donors whose stated objectives were to alleviate 
poverty ignore mounting evidence that most aid benefited not the poorest elements of 
society? Why did they concentrate on those who were comparatively speaking among the 
better off in society? Why did they concentrate the greater part of their resources on 
areas where the benefits accrued to the better of elements of the society?
In many specific areas foreign aid has been counterproductive to the long 
term objective of self-reliance. There has been a lack of attention to the productive 
potential of the poorest elements of the society who form an important impediment to the 
development of domestic markets. There has been a lack of investment in agriculture, 
the most important sector. There has been little incentive for either the government or 
the private sector to engage in productive effort. The relative abundance of free foreign 
exchange and taka has been a disincentive to increasing the rate of domestic resource 
mobilisation. Finally, investments made in expanding the productive capacity of certain 
sectors have remained under-utilised in the face of competition from imports financed by 
foreign aid.
This study will show the important determinants in Chapter V, through an 
analysis of donor administrative and organisational policies, constraints and performance. 
We will show that pressure to disburse, lack of analytical capacity with consequent over- 
reliance on the World Bank’s short-term outlook reduce the effectiveness of aid. Lack of 
coordination among the donors and putting priority to their own short-term objectives at 
the expense of the recipient’s long-term objectives of the recipient by the major donors, 
have contributed to an increasing dependence on foreign aid. This in turn has led to 
diminished efforts aimed at achieving a greater measure of self reliance and an 
increasingly inequitable distribution of the country’s wealth. This action by donors has in 
addition reinforced the particular parts of society in the recipient country that benefit 
from aid, creating an influential group with a vested interest in maintaining the demand 
for increasing aid.
To interventionist donors the alleviation of poverty is a minor objective, 
notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary. The main thrust of the prevailing strategies is 
one that will encourage growth even at the expense of equity. For most donor countries 
the articulated objectives of supporting international development are to provide the
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inhabitants of the less developed countries with a better standard of living and promote 
increased economic self-sufficiency. For some, this also implies that developing nations 
will be able to take their position in the international trading system. Other donors still 
may have strategic objectives which further their foreign policy goals. Common sense 
tells us that no nation, developing or developed, has as its objective an increasing reliance 
on the generosity of the wealthy nations. Yet donor policy in Bangladesh since in­
dependence has contributed to increasing dependence and the undermining of 
Bangladesh’s legitimate aspirations of self reliance.
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CHAPTER IV 
POVERTY AND DEPENDENCE
The Dimensions of Poverty
R. H. Khandker describes what poverty is like in Bangladesh:
About one-third of the total population is unable to eat two [emphasis added] full meals a day 
on many days of the year. A full meal does not constitute anything like a balanced diet; for the 
poor it means a bowl of rice with a little fish and vegetable or pulses to provide the taste to empty 
the bowl. About one pound of rice, 3-4 ounces of fish cooked with an equal quantity of vegetable 
(as curry), supplemented by some dal (lentil or some other pulses cooked as soup) constitute a 
square meal in Bangladesh. A family that can get such a meal every day from its income is not con­
sidered poor, although such a meal is insufficient in calories or other nutrients.1
He continues with other dimensions of poverty:
. . .  all children up to 6 years are deficient in calorie and protein intake (60 percent are 
wasted and stunted, 50 percent only stunted and 6 percent only wasted). About 70 percent of the 
entire population is anemic, and 82 percent children below 5 years do not have the minimum accept­
able level of hemoglobin in blood fsicl. . . annual per capita cloth consumption is estimated to be 6 
yards . . .  6 yards of cloth gives no more than two pieces of loin cloth and a shirt to an adult male 
or just one saree to an adult female. . . .  A typical house for the rural poor constitutes a hut with 
thatched roof and bamboo fencing. There are also mud houses in some parts. Having corrugated 
iron sheets as roofing would mean a somewhat higher class housing, . . .
Poverty is therefore both serious for the individual and is widespread throughout the 
country.
The Trends in Poverty
Poverty is essentially a rural phenomenon in Bangladesh where the majority 
of the population live. Less is known about the urban poor. The landless and 
functionally landless are the poorest of the poor.3
Bangladesh was not always the poor country portrayed on these pages. 
Farouk4 compares the wages of a clerk in 1792 with one in 1980 in terms of the quantity 
of rice he could purchase, a method of determining wage rates that is still in effect in 
Bangladesh.5 He found that purchasing power had declined to about one sixth its value at
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that time. Even during the period since independence poverty has increased dramatically. 
A.R. Khan estimates that the percentage of "extremely poor" has increased from 5.2 
per cent in 1963/64 to 41 per cent in 1975. The agricultural wage rate had declined 
steadily, except for a brief period between 1961 and 1964.6 The growth in population is 
no doubt one of the principal factors that has contributed to this state, but there are other 
causes. The lack of employment opportunities and lack of access to resources have also 
contributed to the deteriorating standard of living there. These factors, according to 
some writers, contribute to polarisation of the society, particularly in the rural areas7 and 
this in turn results in increasing disparity in income.
There are several measures which can be used to indicate the amount of 
relative poverty. The principal problem is the collection of reliable data for the 
measurement. Bangladesh is no better than most developing countries, and worse than 
many in this respect. Much of the work quoted in this chapter is derived, therefore, from 
a combination of empirical evidence combined with the subjective observations of 
researchers involved in trying to assess the extent of the process of impoverishment in 
Bangladesh.
Income Distribution. Changes in the distribution of income over time are one 
of the ways of measuring the process of impoverishment of some parts of society in 
relation to others. Data in this area is scarce. Despite Hollis Chenery’s assertion that the 
World Bank has one of the best collections of information on poverty and the distribution 
of income, comparative data for only one low-income country, Bangladesh, is published 
in successive issues of World Development Report.
World Development Report: 1984 and World Development Report: 1986. 
give income distribution statistics for Bangladesh for the years 1973/74 and 1976/77. 
This period also coincides with the 1974 famine and so may not present a typical picture. 
There are, however, other indicators which support the picture of a shift in income 
distribution.
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TABLE 4.1 
Distribution of Income, 1973/74 and 1976/77
Lowest Second Third Fourth Ninth Highest
20 Per cent 20 Per cent 20 Per cent 20 Per cent 10 Per cent 10 Per cent
1973/74 6.9 11.3 16.1 23.5 14.8 27.4
1976/77 6.2 10.9 15.0 21.0 14.9 32.0
Sources: Derived from World Development Report 1984. table 28, p. 272 and World 
Development Report 1986 table 23, p. 226.
Table 4.1 shows a pronounced shift in the distribution of income. From 
1973/74 to 1976/77 the share of the least advantaged eighty per cent of the population 
diminished while the share of the highest quintile and, most significantly, the highest 
decile rose.
Table 4.2 shows the deterioration since 1963/64 in the share of the lowest 40 
per cent and the corresponding gains at the upper end of the scale.
TABLE 4.2 
Distribution of Income, 1963/64 and 1976/77
Bottom Middle Upper Middle Top
40 Per cent 40 Per cent 15 Per cent 5 Per cent
1963/64 20.1 38.0 24.1 16.8
1976/77 18.3 39.0 25.4 17.3
Source: S.R. Osmani and A. Rahman, "A study on income Distribution in 
Bangladesh", (Dhaka: BIDS, 1981) quoted in Rural Poverty in Bangladesh: A Report to 
the Like-Minded Group, North-South Institute, April, 1985, (Mimeographed), p. 82.
Osmani and Rahman’s calculations agree with those of the World Bank and 
show the same trend towards increasing poverty in the poorer classes of the society and 
the accumulation of wealth by the upper classes.
If we analyse this in terms of the distribution in real GDP over the same 
period we find that the increase in the highest 10 per cent is much more significant than 
is initially apparent. In Table 4.3 we analyse the effect of this shift in the distribution 
using constant GNP in 1972 taka.
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TABLE 4.3
Distribution of Growth in GNP and Per Capita GNP 
(Millions of taka at 1972/73 prices)
Lowest 
20 Per cent
Second 
20 Per cent
Third 
20 Per cent
Fourth 
20 Per cent
Ninth 
10 Per cent
Highest 
10 Per cent
1973/74 GNP 3,497.4 5,727.6 8,160.5 11,911.3 7,501.6 13,888.0
1976/77 GNP 3,699.9 6,504.7 8,951.4 12,532.0 8,891.8 19,096.4
GNP p.c. 73/74 227.0 371.8 529.7 773.1 973.8 1,802.9
GNP p.c. 76/77 223.7 393.1 541.1 757.6 1,075.0 2,308.8
Change in GNP p. c. -3.3 +21 .4 +  11.4 -15.1 +  101.2 +505.8
% Total Increase -1.5% +5.8% +2.2% +2.0% +  10.4% +28.1%
% Increase p.a. -0.5% + 1.9% +0.7% -0.7% +3.5% +9.4%
Sources: The real 1973/74 GNP was 50,686.3 million taka and for 1976/77 59,676.3 million taka. World Bank, 
Bangladesh: Economic and Social Development Prospects Report No. 5409, 4 vols, n.p.: World Bank, 1985.Population was 77.031 
million for 1973/74 and 82.713 million for 1976/77, Population figures from BBS 1979 table 2.6, pp. 50-51.
Table 4.3 shows that the poorest elements of society i.e., the lowest twenty 
per cent actually suffered a decline in their real incomes during the 1973 to 1977 period. 
Put another way they averaged an annual decline in income of 0.5 per cent. At the other 
end of the scale, the wealthiest 10 per cent benefited from an average annual increase in 
income of 9.4 per cent. This period was one during which aid receipts increased 
dramatically in order to help the poorest elements in the country. Despite this the poorest 
elements actually lost in real terms while the better off elements, particularly the top 10 
per cent gained significantly. The implication of this is that population increase and 
income distribution shift conspired to outstrip the growth rate of the economy for the 
majority of the population, and this despite an increase in the total amount of aid Bangla­
desh received. This in itself does not establish a causal relationship, but it does raise 
questions as to how this new influx of resources was used.
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TABLE 4.4  
Distribution of Income Prior to Independence
Lowest 
5 Per cent
Lowest 
20 Per cent
Highest 
20 Per cent
Highest 
5 Per cent
1963/64 1.2 7.7 45.7 20.4
1967/68 1.8 8.7 44.1 20.4
1968/69 2.0 9.3 40.5 20.4
Source: Mubuiddin Khan Alamgir, Development Strategy for Bangladesh with 
forward by Gustav F. Papanek (Dacca: Centre for Social Studies, June 1980), table I- 
22,p. 45.
Data from the 1960s indicates that, during the time that Bangladesh formed 
part of Pakistan, the distribution of income for the poorest elements of the society was 
improving slowly. The share of the top 5 per cent stayed constant at a little over 20 
per cent. The share of the lowest 5 per cent grew from 1.2 per cent in 1963/64 to 2 
per cent in 1968/69. The share of the lowest 20 per cent grew from 7.7 per cent to 9.3 
per cent during the same period. While the two measures are not directly comparable 
with the studies in the post-independence period, the trends appear clearly to have been 
reversed. This was a time when one of the chief complaints, and a contributor to the 
civil war, was that East Pakistan was not receiving its fair share of aid resources. We 
conclude from this that, despite the perceived exploitation of the East Wing of Pakistan 
and the concentration of aid on the West Wing cited by Sobhan, there was measurable 
improvement in the distribution of income when compared with the worsening which 
occured during the 1970s.
Poverty Level. In determining an acceptable poverty level for a particular 
country or group the FAO/WHO methodology is to estimate the appropriate requirement 
of nutrition based on body weight and activity. They then estimate the cost of this diet 
and add in the costs of additional basic requirements, such as clothing and housing.8 This 
figure is then compared with actual income. The results of applying this method to 
Bangladesh, Table 4.5, show an increasing proportion of the population below the 
poverty line. Significantly the movement between 1963/64, population 58.94 million and 
1973/74, population 77.03 million, is small in percentage terms, some 0.5 per cent 
growth per annum in those below the line, but still a significant 13.2 million people. In 
the three years after 1973/74 the proportion has increased by 8.5 per cent or about an 
additional 11 million.9
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In another comparable study carried out by local researchers, Hossain and 
Ahmed, the methodology was altered to better take into account the dietary habits of 
Bangladeshis. The projected expenditure on non-food items was reduced from the 
average of 25 per cent used in the 1976/77 Household Survey to 15 per cent. The 
percentage of people living below the poverty line is then calculated. The results are 
shown below in Table 4.5:
TABLE 4.5
The Percentage of Rural Population Below the Poverty Line
FAO Estimates Ahmed and Hossain
1963-64 75.0% 52.0%
1973-74 74.5 55.7
1976-77 83.0 61.1
Source: Ahmad and Hossain, 1984, p. 15. quoted in North-South Institute, 
"Report on Rural Poverty", table 2, p. 69.
The estimates made by Ahmad and Hossain are lower than those using the 
FAO/WHO criteria due to their more conservative assumptions.10 Nevertheless, they still 
show that more than half the population receives less than the acceptable level of 
nutrition. They also confirm the FAO trend to worsening nutritional levels. This 
underlines the very serious nature of the mass poverty that exists in rural Bangladesh. 
When more than half the population is living below the poverty line the problem has 
ceased to be one of welfare. It has become a fundamental structural problem in the 
economy.
The pattern that Table 4.5 presents is an interesting one. This measure of 
poverty is heavily weighted by the measurement of a basket of foodstuffs. It may 
therefore be useful to examine the relationship between agricultural production and 
poverty. Annual growth in the agricultural sector during the 1960s was 3.34 per cent 
while population increased at an annual rate of some 3.0 per cent. This was much 
improved over the previous decade. Agricultural growth stagnated in (then) East Pakistan 
during the 1950s, averaging only 0.25 per cent per year while population grew at an 
annual rate of 1.9 percent. During the period from 1970/71 to 1983/84 agricultural 
growth averaged 2.2 per cent per annum, while population growth reached 2.6 per cent 
per annum.11 It is interesting, therefore, to see that with only a modest decline in the rate 
of growth of agricultural production between the 1960s and the 1970s there is a sharp 
increase in the number of the population living below the poverty line. The conclusion is
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inescapable that even those living above the poverty line are still on the very margin of 
poverty.
The War of Liberation was undoubtedly a contributing factor to the increase 
in poverty. It is curious, however, that the fall in quality of life occurred well after the 
war was over. Even if we consider that the dates for this data straddle the 1974 famine, 
the comparison with the effect of the War of Liberation shows a far steeper decline 
during the latter period. We will examine some of the causes of this phenomenon. In a 
country where agriculture is the dominant sector both for the generation of income and 
the provision of employment it will be useful to look there for the flow of resources. We 
have seen in Chapter III that the urban market has been provided with cheap food largely 
through the Food Distribution System. The System is supplied by the food aid provided 
by the foreign donors.12 In contrast with this, relatively higher prices prevail13 in the rural 
market. This in turn means that the sale of food from surplus producers stays mainly 
within the rural areas resulting in minimal inflow of money from the urban areas. As 
Jansen points out, an urban market that demanded food would provide stronger demand 
and incentives for increased production.14
There are occasions where there is demand from an external market. Such 
was the case of the procurement of rice by the Government such as during 1977 and 
1978. During this period the Government procured rice at prices above the prevailing 
market price.15 What resulted, however, was collusion between government officers and 
traders or rich peasants. This made it difficult for the poorer farmers to sell their 
produce to the procurement officers without going through the traders or larger farmers. 
The small farmers therefore derived little or no advantage from the higher price that 
prevailed during that period.16 Conversely the rural elite "appropriated" the increase in 
price which was then shared with the government procurement officers. The reason for 
Government officers being susceptible to such practices is that they are very poorly paid. 
Salaries of 500 to 1000 taka per month were paid in 1980, which were scarcely enough to 
survive on, particularly when posted to rural areas while continuing to maintain families 
in urban areas.17 The result was that the temptation to split profits from such windfalls
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was irresistible.* The Government officers’ portion of the resource, therefore, flowed 
back to the urban areas.18
An additional factor is that the inputs for improved agricultural practices 
originate largely from the urban areas. Fertiliser, irrigation equipment and high yielding 
variety seed, i.e., initially HYV seed must be imported, although, once seed 
multiplication units have been established, the dependence on the urban sector diminishes 
somewhat. Once again the flow of resources is toward the urban areas.
The irony of the situation is that the small and marginal farmers have a much 
higher cropping intensity than the larger peasant farmers. This is because of the need to 
produce more on their very small pieces of land.19 Larger land owners can still achieve 
relatively high levels of productivity since they have better access to credit and hence to 
modern inputs, such as fertiliser, HYV seed and irrigation equipment. This improved 
access results from their ownership of cash or collateral that the small farmer lacks.20 
They are, however, not as productive, lacking as they do the incentive to maximise 
productivity. Many are absentee landlords and little of their profit is reinvested in land 
improvement. Instead it is invested in money lending and other more remunerative 
activities.21 Government officers argue that the large farmers are a better risk because of 
their ownership of collateral, which in traditional terms they are. The fact remains that 
they are not as productive as the small farmers.22
The situation is summed up in the "Report on Rural Poverty". "What is 
important to emphasize. . . is that individual resources are generally parlayed for 
additional ones and those without selected resources lose both control of a single produc­
tive factor and access to additional ones."23
Landlessness. Land is one of the few tangible assets in which people can 
invest savings, given the absence of developed capital markets. Even for the urban 
dwellers it is an important hedge against the economic and political instability that pre­
vails in Bangladesh. Because of the bonds that exist between the urban middle class, 
civil servants, the military, professionals and small businessmen and their villages there 
may be a greater propensity to invest in land than there was in times previous.24 Even 
currency does not necessarily provide security as many learned to their detriment in 1975
*From the writer’s experience in Bangladesh, many government officers posted to rural areas leave their families behind in 
Dhaka where access to health and education facilities is better thus incurring the added burden of the cost of running two households.
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when the 100 taka banknote was demonetized as part of the Government’s attempt to 
catch speculators.
The importance of land in the rural economy is illustrated in the following
example:
Land, for instance, is not only a technical resource contributing to agricultural subsistence, it is also 
the basis for negotiating access to additional resources such as irrigation facilities and rural credit. 
Today, as in the past, land and other resources increase the status of selected rural families. Control 
of land also situates families in complex social and political networks where influence and power, 
access to education, government and military service, the observance of purdah, i.e., the seclusion 
of women, and the marriageability of sons and daughters to equally or better endowed families, is 
negotiated. The processes by which family mobility is achieved or lost is dependent upon a variety 
of factors of which the acquisition, maintenance, or loss of land remains important if not of sole 
significance.25
Increasing landlessness has in recent years been exacerbated by the flow of 
migrant labour to the Middle-East and their remittances. These have become one of the 
most important sources of foreign exchange for the Government. Migrant workers re­
turning from the Middle-East with savings return to their villages and invest in land.
The Wage Earner Scheme introduced by the government allows returning 
migrant workers to sell their foreign exchange for a premium to importers, as part of the 
Government’s liberalisation policy. It essentially subsidises the purchase of land by the 
amount of the premium which varies from 8 to as high as 20 per cent. In some areas the 
cost of land has increased many fold in recent years.
Table 4.6 shows the shift in landholdings from 1968 to 1978. It is fair to 
assume that this trend has continued, probably at an accelerated rate from 1980 onwards 
when remittances rose at dramatically.
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TABLE 4.6  
Distribution of Land Ownership
1968 1978
Top 10 Per cent of Population 34% 49%
Bottom 10 Per cent 1 2
Sources for 1978: World Bank, Bangladesh: Economic and 
Social Development Prospects. Report No. 5409, Vol. I (n.p.: The 
World Bank, April 2, 1985). p. viii and for 1968: World Bank,
Bangladesh: Current Economic Situation and Development Policy Issues.
Report No. 1469-BD (n.p.:The World Bank, May 19, 1977). p. 1.
The process of increasing landlessness as described above has increased rural 
poverty by making the large landholders more powerful and the marginally landless and 
landless weaker and more vulnerable to exploitation.
TABLE 4.7 
Land Distribution 
(Late 1970s)
Holding (acres) % Population % Land Held
Large Landowners 5 .0+ 6% 45%
Mid-sized Landowners 2.5-5.0 17 33
Small Landowners 0.5-2.0 33 20
Marginal & Landless 0.0-0.5 50 3
Source: Harry Blair, "Participation, Public Policy, Political Economy and Development in Bangladesh, 1958-85", World 
Development. Vol. 13, No. 12, 1985, p. 1240 citing F.T. Janniez and J.T. Peach, The Agrarian Structure of Bangladesh: An 
Impediment to Development. (Boulder Colo: Westview Press, 1980).
In a detailed study of two villages Rahman concludes:
The concentration of land in the hands of a few has increased in both villages.
Simultaneously, we observed a fast increase in the ranks of the landless:
(i) Households owning less than half an acre of land (including landless ones) comprised about 
14% of total households in Village 1 and 12% in Village 2 in 1951. They increased to 41 %
in both villages in 1981. . . . [emphasis added]
(ii) Rich households owning more than 7.50 acres of land controlled most of the land owned and
operated. In Village 1, these households comprised 16% of total households in 1951 and 
owned 47% of total owned. While the proportion of households shrank to 7.5% in 1981, 
they still owned 40% of total land. In village 2 we observed a similar concentration.
(iii) Gini-co-efficients calculated from our data also indicated growing concentration in both
villages.
(iv) Middle groups of peasantry were observed to be under tremendous economic pressure and 
some of them have fallen down the social ladder.26
The process of consolidation, ’’whereby vested or dominant interests increase 
their direct or indirect control of resources including the monopolization of social 
linkages and networks",27 leads to polarisation, the "differentiation in resource endow­
ments which locate families and individuals in relation to one another, becomes
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institutionalised and provides the context through which additional resources are 
distributed and controlled."28 The result of this process is that the resources in the rural 
areas are increasingly inequitably distributed amongst the population. This results in the 
increasing impoverishment of those at the lower end of the scale. In turn it leads to in­
creasingly inequitable distribution, decreasing nutritional standards and a deteriorating 
quality of life.
Nutrition. The trend in nutritional intake has been monitored closely in 
Bangladesh. It has deteriorated significantly since 1951, although the intake of a few 
nutrients improved between 1962/63 and 1975/76. In only one nutrient, iron, has the 
trend been consistently upwards.
TABLE 4.8 
Per Capita Nutrient Intake 
(1962/63, 1975/76 and 1981/82 Surveys)
Nutrients 1962/63 1975/76 1981/82
Calorie (kcal.) 2301.0 2094.0 1943.0
Protein (gm) 57.9 58.5 48.4
Fat (gm) 15.8 12.2 9.8
Carbohydrate (gm) 482.0 439.0 412.0
Calcium (mg) 273.0 305.0 260.0
Iron (mg) 10.3 22.2 23.4
Vitamin A (I.U. 1870.0 730.0 763.0
Thiamine (mg) 1.5 1.65 1.38
Riboflavin (mg) 0.5 0.87 0.68
Niacin (mg) 23.2 22.21 13.15
Vitamin C (mg) 14.4 9.5 13.26
No. of families 1052.0 674.0 597.0
Source: Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, University of Dhaka, Nutrition Survey of 
Rural bangladesh. 1981/82. 1983 in K.Ahmad and N. Hassan, "On Nutritional Surveillance in 
Bangladesh", The Bangladesh Development Studies, table n, p. 84.
Nutritional intake has been found to vary both with income and with the degree 
of landlessness. Table 4.8 shows caloric intake in rural areas when calorie intake was 
used as the dependent variable and prices and wages as the independent variable. 
Seventy seven per cent of the variation in caloric intake was found to be related to wages 
and prices.
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TABLE 4.9
Calorie Consumption in Rural Areas by Income, 1981/82
Monthly Income 
Per Capita
Calorie Intake per 
Person per Day
Percentage of Calorie 
Requirement Fulfilled
Less than SO 1493 65.77
5 0 - 7 4 1769 77.8
7 5 - 9 9 1824 80.2
100 - 149 1974 86.8
More than 149 2084 91.7
Source: Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, University of Dhaka, Nutrition Survey of 
Rural Bangladesh. 1981/82. 1983 in K.Ahmad and N. Hassan, "On Nutritional Surveillance in 
Bangladesh”, The Bangladesh Development Studies, [p.81-93] Vol. 10, No. 3, (September 1982), table 
VI, p. 87.
The degree of landlessness also has an impact on nutritional intake. In 
considering the increasing trend toward landlessness it has been observed that nutritional 
intake tends to vary directly with the size of landholding, with the exception of the 
completely landless who have a slightly better nutritional intake than the marginally 
landless.
TABLE 4.10
Average Daily Food Consumption by Landholding Group
Food Intake Nutrient Intake per Person
Size of Land (gms/person) (calories/person) (gms/person)
Holding (acres) 1975/76 1981/82 1975/76 1981/82 1975/76 1981/82
3.0 + 843 873 2375 2222 67.6 55.2
1 .0 0 -2 .9 9 785 763 2193 1986 62.5 47.7
0.50 - 0.99 745 699 2035 1777 57.7 44.8
0.01 - 0.49 683 673 1924 1672 52.6 44.3
0.0 694 712 1925 1775 52.9 44.4
Source: Nutritional Survey, 1981/82 pp. 64 and 70, and Q. K. Ahmed and M. Hossain, Rural Poverty Alleviation 
in Bangladesh: Experiences and Policies. In Depth Studies Series No. 10 (Rome: FAO, February 1984), in North-South Institute, 
"Rural Poverty in Bangladesh" table 5, p. 73.
This apparent anomaly probably indicates the presence of alternative employment. With 
the trend we have seen above, however, the conclusion follows that, barring some 
intervention to the contrary, the increasing landlessness will continue to lead to increasing 
malnutrition. Even the case of the landless having a marginally better nutritional intake 
than the marginally landless may not be sustainable in the face of decreasing employment 
opportunities.
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Dependence is more than a set of indicators, be they static or dynamic, i.e., 
demonstrating the trends. It is the result of a complex set of interrelationships which are 
mutually supportive and which in turn lead to greater dependence.
Sobhan has identified a number of measures of dependence, but he starts from 
the premise that there is no real surplus available for generating a level of investment 
within the prevailing social system.29 While it is true that investable surplus is scarce, we 
argue that it is less the fundamental structure of the system and scarcity of resources, than 
the abuse of the system by those in power that has led to increasing poverty. This, 
combined with the attitude that "the world owed Bangladesh a living",30 an attitude which 
White describes as "aid as a habit of mind", has led to this state of affairs. To date, with 
the exception of a few activities, the failure to invest in productive enterprise has been 
largely because the available investment has sought the highest return and this is either 
importing31 or import based industries.32 The Government has been prepared to tolerate 
this, and even encourage it by the restriction of investment and the overly bureaucratic 
handling of investment projects.33 An important factor here, raised by Chadha, is that 
"There is no such thing as Time-Cost Trade-off between the objective (Project completion 
on time) and means (Formalities/procedures)".34 In any environment free investment 
capital will seek the area providing the best return, and in Bangladesh, particularly the 
overly bureaucratic structure of the Government, that is in importation. Aid agencies 
unfortunately share this lack of appreciation for the time-cost trade-off in approving and 
implementing projects, however, so it is rarely a consideration. The two bureaucracies 
are mutually supporting.
Sobhan’s measures as follows are static in their consideration of dependence 
and he does not consider the trends of the various indicators, nor the implications of 
increasing dependence at a time when the limits of the donors generosity are clearly close 
to being reached. Nor, if we accept the argument that such aid as food aid and 
programme aid actually worsen the balance of trade by making easily available monies 
for the importation of non-essential goods, does he speculate on the eventual results. The 
continued importation of food aid first created a demand for wheat, a non-traditional 
consumption item, which led to a change in tastes. The market then responded because
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the right factors existed for the production of wheat.* Wheat production increased 
dramatically during the 1970s, but did not result in a corresponding decrease in wheat 
imports because it simply kept up with growing demand. Demand has continued to grow 
while the limitations of Bangladesh’s wheat growing potential are becoming more 
apparent. Continued food aid Jias  ^ created a demand^for food which has exceeded 
domestic capacity. This makes it even more dependent on aid to meet its balance of 
payments shortfall in the absence of a new source of foreign exchange to pay for this 
food import.
Let us look briefly at another imported commodity, aluminium, which has 
long been provided by the Canadian commodity programme. In addition to its use in 
various industries, it is readily observable, even the casual visitor to the countryside, that 
aluminium is a major constituent in the manufacture of pots and dinnerware. This 
supplements the traditional earthen pottery that is manufactured to meet local demand 
with local raw materials. What has happened is that the abundant supply of aluminium is 
cost competitive and, therefore, because of its superior qualities: durability, lightness and 
the ability to be recycled, it effectively displaces earthenware which is a major labour 
intensive rural industry, thus putting people out of work. Once again tastes have changed 
in favour of an import which brings with it no corresponding export potential to pay for ^  {
future imports. The alternative i.e., the importation of aluminium for industrial purposes 
with scarce foreign exchange might result in a high enough price to make it 
uncompetitive with earthenware until such time as the availability of foreign exchange 
from new export industries brought the price down. Earthenware would continue as an 
important rural industry until natural market forces forced an adjustment.
This brief example assumes that the availability of other imports with 
concessional financing does not make available enough excess foreign exchange to 
depress the price of aluminium. What these examples do show is that the large scale 
availability of imports has the potential to disturb market demand and change the 
structure of the economy. The situation that results is not unlike that in the argument put 
forth by dependency theorists concerning the structure of peripheral economies being 
determined by the demands of central economies. The free importation of food and
In many countries, such as Sudan and Sri Lanka where wheat has been given as a response to food needs no such capacity
exists.
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commodities results in an economic structure that is dependent on continued aid and may 
even delay the need to develop export industries.
The first indicator of dependence that we have discussed has been the balance 
of trade which has increased from a shortfall in export earnings of 7.1 per cent of GDP 
from 1973 to 1975, to 11.1 per cent from 1976 to 1980 and then to 15.1 per cent from 
1981 to 1984.35 Of this the proportion of food and commodity aid are as shown in Table 
4.11 to have increased from the first to the second period with both diminishing 
somewhat in the third period as project aid has grown to a larger proportion of aid.
TABLE 4.11 
Balance of Trade and Foreign Aid 
(As a percentage of GDP)
Balance 
of Trade
Food
Aid
Programme
Aid
Project
Aid
Total
Aid
1973 to 1975 7.1% 2.7% 2.7% 1.2% 6.6%
1976 to 1980 11.1 2.7 4.3 3.2 10.2
1981 to 1984 15.1 2.1 2.8 5.2 10.2
Source: Calculated from Bangladesh: Economic and Social Development Prospects Report 
No. 5409, Vol. IV table 2.4, p. 15 and table 3.3, p. 21.
The shortfall in the balance of trade has been met from two sources, foreign 
aid, and in the last period, from the increase in foreign remittances from migrant 
workers, primarily in the Gulf States, and emigrants. The remittances have actually 
exceeded Bangladesh’s largest export, jute manufactures; in most years since 1980, 
however, they have had some negative effects. While many migrants are unskilled 
workers, the lure of higher earnings also draws significant numbers of skilled workers 
thus depleting the country’s narrow skilled human resource base. The mid-1980s decline 
in oil revenues has resulted in a decline in the demand for labour illustrates the fickle 
nature of this source of foreign exchange. As a temporary supplement to the foreign 
exchange earnings are a welcome, but are unlikely to provide sufficient foreign exchange 
to meet the needs of the country at present rates of consumption.
There are several other areas of dependence that we can look at. The Food 
Distribution System, chiefly as we have seen in Chapter III, a perquisite for the already 
relatively privileged in this very poor society, has put the Government in a position 
where it is dependent upon foreign donors to provide what amounts to a subsidy to the 
civil service. This, in turn, has become a primary source of financing for the Annual 
Development Plan. The reduction of the subsidy element in the Food Distribution
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System, without a corresponding reduction in the System itself has increased the 
dependence of the Government on the increased revenues derived from sales through the 
System by providing more revenue. At the same time the reduction in subsidy has not 
reduced the reliance of the recipients on an assured source of supply, even if the price of 
food grain is possibly at times close to, or even at times briefly more than, the market 
price. The scale of the Food Distribution System, nurtured on foreign aid, is such that it 
is not replicable using local resources, even if the resources existed, to procure more 
locally. The result of a sudden, or even a gradual, decrease in food aid, conceivable in 
the light of competing demands for food from Africa, would cause instability and 
possibly even result in a change in Government. The refusal of the Government during 
the period of the study to take steps to prevent this has been faith in their strategic card 
with the principal food aid donor, the United States. Food aid and programme aid have 
become the cost of keeping a pro-western, open market economy operating. Even the 
United States, with its tremendous leverage with food aid, has been unable to convince 
the Government to dismantle the Food Distribution System36 because the Government 
knows that the United States is unlikely to use the ultimate threat of withdrawing food aid 
over such an issue, although they might very well over a more serious political issue.
In yet another way the Government have left themselves vulnerable, and 
dependent on foreign aid. We saw in Chapter III that substantial amount of the 
Government’s current expenditure is now included in the ADP in order that it can qualify 
for funding derived from the sale of food aid and commodity aid.37
This represents a significant proportion of the budget that does not go to 
investment, but rather is concerned with meeting recurrent expenses. Thus, much of the 
indirect tax revenue to finance the recurrent budget, which is not eligible to receive the 
proceeds from the sale of aid goods, would also be lost if the flow of aid were to slow 
significantly or dry up.38 What this means is that in the absence of adequate mechanisms 
to raise taxes, and we have seen that agriculture, the major sector, is largely untaxed, the 
Government is doubly vulnerable. It could, in the event of a significant reduction in aid, 
find itself in a position where, not only could it not invest in any new undertakings, but it 
would find itself unable to meet the recurrent costs now within the Annual Development 
Plan, including salary costs for regular Government salaries that have been transferred 
from the recurrent budget.
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TABLE 4.12
Transfers from the Development Budget to the Recurrent Budget
[Taka in Crore]
83/84 84/85 84/85a 85/86
Total ADP (Taka) 3585.0 3896.0 3508.0 3826.0
Project Aid (Taka) 1652.0 1847.0 1565.0 2000.0
Taka Portion 1932.0 2049.0 1944.0 1826.0
CDST 188.0 190.0 158.0 180.0
CDST as % of Taka Portion 9.7% 9.3% 8.1% 9.8%
Revenue Surplus 501.0 766.0 547.0 638.0
Sources: ADP, Bangladesh, Annual Development Plan 1984/85 (Dhaka: Ministry of Finance,
1984) and Annual Development Plan: 1985/1986 (Dhaka: Ministry of Finance, 1985). Budget 
Surplus, World Bank, Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments and Medium Term Prospects (n.p.:
World Bank, March 17, 1986), table 5.1, p. 26.
ARevised.
The Government also charges customs duty and sales tax (CDST) on aid financed 
imports of goods. Donors, on principle do not pay duties on goods financed on concessional 
terms. This charge of customs duty and sales tax paid for out of the Annual Development 
Plan allows the Government to transfer monies from the development budget to the recurrent 
budget, thus circumventing the donors usual condition that counterpart funds generated from 
aid must not be used to meet recurrent expenses. The recurrent budget usually shows a slight 
surplus which contributes to the ADP. This transfer of customs duty and sales tax means that 
this slight surplus is reduced even further. The Government, therefore, barely even covers 
recurrent costs from domestic resource mobilisation, a further indication of its dependence on 
foreign aid.
Essentially in the sense that we defined dependence in Chapter I this Government has 
no freedom of action from the donors’ wishes. It continues to exist only because its image of 
poverty for some donors, and strategic position for others, make it a worthy recipient. While 
the image is vulnerable to the exposure of the kinds of excess that all governments have 
indulged in, corruption, the strategic interest may, for the moment, hold more promise, but 
since the major donor with strategic objectives, the United States, has many world interests, 
this too is precarious. Its neighbour India has intervened in Bangladesh once before to 
preserve strategic interests and has recently done so in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. It is not 
inconceivable that in the face of a breakdown of internal order, it would do so again.
Bangladesh is thus vulnerable to political changes within the donor countries, to 
changes in other parts of the world which compete with it for aid. In terms of our definition
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of dependence in Chapter I, Bangladesh "is unable to make certain domestic choices, . . . 
unless some sort of permissive or enabling action is taken by the dominant power, . . . "
In the agriculture sector the Government has failed to develop adequate institutions39 
to select and deliver the necessary inputs and technology, not only to the larger agricultural 
enterprises, but to the far more productive small and marginal farmer.40 This has resulted in 
increasing inequity and impoverishment of the poorest where a strengthening of such institu­
tions could instead have resulted in increasing productivity. The trend to increasing 
landlessness and larger farms results in turn in decreasing productivity and less efficient use 
of the resources available for, as we recall, small farms are generally more productive than 
large ones.
The Food Distribution System, as we have seen, has had an adverse effect on the 
agricultural market in the urban areas. With the majority of urban dwellers purchasing their 
food from the Food Distribution System, Agriculture is deprived of a primary market. This 
lack of growth has meant that the potential taxable surplus in the agriculture sector has not 
developed because there is only limited incentive to increase production or productivity. In 
turn this serves to justify food aid to sell through the Food Distribution System. It is easier to 
take the revenue from free food than to increase agricultural production and then tax it. The 
interrelationship between agriculture and food distribution has become a mutually reinforcing 
relationship which stifles productivity and production.
The attitude, prevalent amongst the political leaders and the bureaucracy, that aid 
will continue to be given and will support an increasingly inequitable distribution of income is 
naive over the longer term. Bangladesh may be able to barter its strategic position to those 
donors for whom that is the prime motivation, but that will narrow the field leaving it 
dependent, and hence much more subject to influence, from those donors who have an 
interest in influencing the political and/or economic system, i.e., the United States and the 
World Bank, neither an assured source of revenue given American aid policy and the 
difficulty encountered in recent years in replenishing IDA funds.
Whether Bangladesh is worth a net transfer of almost $US 2,000 million per annum 
without any signs of improvement, and probably many signs of deterioration, is open to 
question and can in the end only be answered by those countries which are willing to pay it. 
The political instability, already inherent in the present system, will not be improved by a 
reduction in the breadth of donor participation, which in turn will render it more dependent
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on narrower interests. A reduction in aid, in the absence of even the ability to keep the 
machinery of government moving at all, raises scenarios of the Iranian sort. Donors whose 
objectives are humanitarian will eventually be drawn to more promising areas in an aid 
environment of increasing demand for decreasing aid resources.
The preoccupation with capital intensive technology does nothing to utilise the 
county’s most prolific resource, manpower, and makes very inefficient use of the scarce 
funding available for investment. High technology need not be excluded, as both Singapore 
and Hong Kong have proven, but the adoption of capital intensive technology in a labour 
surplus economy is likely to lead to greater unemployment and under-employment. 
Consequently the result will be increasingly inequitable incomes and decreased political 
stability. The rapid growth of the garment industry has shown that there are opportunities for 
countries like Bangladesh, but also that there are limitations to the growth in any one 
particular area.
In the educational sector, the continued neglect of primary education has limited the 
opportunities for industrial growth except that which requires unskilled labour. The lack of 
opportunities in turn have encouraged emigration both on a temporary basis, to the Middle 
East, and on a more permanent basis to Western Europe and North America. The "brain 
drain" in turn leaves fewer skilled people in the labour market.
The growth of an upper class that is increasingly distant from the poorer classes, and 
less inclined to close the gap between them is indicative of the increasing polarisation taking 
place in the country. Where this will lead is beyond the scope of this study, but examples 
exist which enable the student of political economy to make credible predictions.
In conclusion, the aid that has been provided to Bangladesh, most of it in a form that 
is easily diverted to serve other ends, has undermined the basic institutions that make a 
country viable and give it the potential to achieve self-sufficiency. The inevitable result will 
be abuses so blatant that they can no longer be ignored by the donors, such as have happened 
in Haiti or Panama.* Alternately there may be such widespread dissatisfaction that some
* Indeed, with the pressure on drug smuggling in Burma and Thailand the port of Chittagong has already increased in 
importance as an outlet from the 'Golden Triangle”. It is inconceivable that there will be no connivance on the part of already corrupt 
authorities to aid and abet this, particularly given the potential profits.
Alternately widespread rioting during the 1987 elections indicates that there is some disaffection even in the largely illiterate 
countryside.
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populist uprising is possible. In Chapter V we look at the donors’ position and how the 
situation is perpetuated by the structure of the donor agencies.
What we see, therefore, is a Government which initially benefitted from a "resource 
windfall" of foreign aid which met short term objectives. The upper classes benefited from 
the "appropriation" of this aid as did the Government to meet immediate needs. Politically, 
aid was a very useful resource with which to bestow patronage. These demands on the 
Government have become institutionalised over time, until it is now in a position where it 
cannot function without the aid resources it receives. It is vulnerable and unable to resist 
pressures from the major donors and only the caution of the donors to date, and factors which 
we shall see in Chapter V, have prevented a complete breakdown. Donors who are in the 
best position to influence Government policy, the World Bank and USAID have done so often 
against the wishes of the Government. The World Bank has succeeded by virtue of the 
resources and information at its command and its willingness and ability to bring pressure to 
bear on the Government through conditions attached to its loans. USAID has done so both 
because of the resources it commands and because as a decentralised operation it is in a very 
good position to be very familiar with Government policy and to influence it, a major 
American objective.
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CHAPTER V
THE DONORS: AID IS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN
The Rationale for Development Assistance to Bangladesh
Considerations: political, economic and humanitarian. There are several 
factors that influence donors to give foreign aid. While aid is economic in nature, it 
frequently overlaps into the realm of politics. In fact, despite the economic nature of aid, 
it is often overshadowed by political considerations.
Holsti identifies four main external political objectives for donors of foreign 
aid: to create political stability, to change the recipients domestic or foreign policies, as a 
reward for entering into an alliance, and to assist the recipient in achieving foreign policy 
goals.1
This list, while it covers the basic political objectives, is incomplete in that it 
ignores economic and humanitarian objectives. We will also want to consider these other 
possible donor objectives in providing aid to Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s strategic 
importance is limited and, of most interest to a few countries in the immediate region or 
those outside the region with particular interests in the region. These interests must be 
considered to arrive at a complete picture of the factors which govern the quantity and 
type of aid being provided.
The economic objectives of foreign aid are an important factor, even in a 
country as poor as Bangladesh. They can be more general in scope than the promotion of 
trade. There may be a general desire to see stronger economies in the world for the 
improvement of the world trading system. Alternately, there may be a belief that 
economic development leads to a more equitable distribution of income or to the 
liberalisation of government control. Finally, it may only be to ensure that the poor 
countries are able to keep on paying their bills to the developed countries.
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The developing countries form an increasingly important market for the 
manufactured goods of the industrialised world. For example, in 1984 the developing 
economies accounted for some 24 per cent of the industrial market economy countries’ 
merchandise exports.2 With strong competition among countries to establish themselves 
in these growing markets, many governments, concerned with increasing their countries’ 
share of international trade, believe development assistance to be one of the best ways to 
promote market development. The following extract from the Government of Canada’s 
foreign policy review under the Progressive Conservative Government:
. . . Prospects for the growth of Canadian trade and other economic relations with developing 
countries will depend in a large measure on how the international trade and financial system 
accommodates those countries’ development needs. Their capacity to export to developed countries 
is an important determinant of their capacity to import our products, to absorb investment 
productively, and to meet their financial obligations to us. . . .3
Another facet of this trade objective, as it relates for example, to tied aid, 
goes beyond the simple provision of goods at attractive rates of financing, to support for 
technical assistance and training. It is a commonly held belief, in departments concerned 
with trade promotion, that exposure to new methods and products predisposes Third 
World nationals in positions of responsibility to favour those products with which they 
are most familiar when they are able to influence procurement.4
Humanitarian objectives may be dictated by the nature of a country’s foreign 
policy. Alternately it may be the result of pressure by an active and aggressive domestic 
interest group or by the nature of a particular situation which is well publicised. 
Examples of this might be the Sahelian famine of the early 1970s or the Ethiopian famine 
of the early 1980s.
In examining development assistance the various objectives of the donors can 
be considered under three major categories: political, economic and humanitarian. The 
primary and secondary motives governing the provision of aid are shown in Table 5.1:
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TABLE 5.1
Donor Motivation for Giving Aid
Political Economic H um anitarian
Internal Stability Balance of Payments Poverty Alleviation
Reward Economic Growth Promotion of Equity
Strategic Interests Trade and Export Promotion Disaster Relief
Liberalisation of a Regime
Influence
Most donors are influenced to varying degrees by all of the above, however 
there is a tendency for some interests to predominate. In the following sections we will 
discuss briefly how the motivations of the major donors are influenced by these factors. 
There is some overlap among the various classifications. For example, the promotion of 
economic growth can be for political objectives; balance of payments support may be to 
preserve stability in a country or to preserve trade links threatened by balance of 
payments problems. These motives will vary from donor to donor depending on how 
they perceive development assistance. They will also vary, even with a single donor, 
among various recipients of its aid depending upon the relationship with the recipient 
country.
In this study we are interested in determining the motives of the various 
donors to Bangladesh, which donors predominate, and whether and how they influence 
the quality and quantity of foreign aid. Finally, we will see how they have influenced the 
development of the country. We are also concerned with how foreign aid affects the 
standard of living of the poorest, and whether the country’s dependence on foreign aid 
has increased or decreased.
Political: internal stability. Several countries have given aid to Bangladesh to 
promote political stability. India is the most obvious. The Indian intervention in the 
civil war in December 1971 was partially motivated by a belief that the conflict could 
deteriorate into anarchy with possible consequences for the surrounding Indian states. 
Relations with India since independence have usually been cordial on the surface, if not 
always close. India continues to suffer the same problems of instability in the states 
surrounding Bangladesh such as Assam and Tripura. This unrest is exacerbated by the 
presence of Bangladeshi refugees who have not returned to Bangladesh and whose 
residence dates from the War of Liberation. Others have migrated in search of greater
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economic opportunity. The number of emigrants is in dispute and no accurate estimate 
exists.
There are also areas of continuing friction such as the dispute over the waters 
of the Ganges River. These are being diverted to Calcutta at the Farakka Barrage.5 
Other areas of difficulty are the border dispute over the Muhurir Char, an island formed 
in the Bay of Bengal,6 and the boundary with Indian state of Tripura.7 For the most part, 
however, they are not sources of overt hostility. A stable and productive Bangladesh is 
in India’s best interests. A repeat of the violence that erupted in 1971 forcing almost 
nine million refugees across the border into India8 would be more serious now than it was 
at the time.
The United States has an interest in preserving stability in the sub-continent. 
From an American perspective, although there was initial opposition to the formation of 
the country, once it had come into being there was a desire to see stability restored in 
order that other powers, the USSR being the most obvious, could not take advantage of 
the situation and to establish themselves as stronger influences in the region. It also made 
sense for the United States to seek to establish itself with a friendly regime in order to re­
establish the influence it had lost with the reduction of Pakistan from a country spanning 
the sub-continent to simply a strategically placed Islamic country.
Political: reward. In more recent times the United States has provided aid as 
a reward for Bangladesh’s continuing moderate stance and gradual return to a more 
capitalist economy. Such programmes as the American PL 480 Title III food aid 
programme are specifically designed to influence the domestic economic policies of 
developing countries and to reward them for taking policy decisions that support 
American views.
For example, in Bangladesh the elimination of the limitation on the number of 
cotton spindles in private cotton mills was part of the agreement covering the provision of 
cotton under the 1982 PL 480 Title III programme.9 This was specifically designed to 
promote the interests of the private sector and to enable it to expand. Thus, aid is used 
as a reward for following specific economic policies.
Political: strategic interests. While in context of global strategy Bangladesh is 
scarcely a front line player, its position is of strategic importance to the region, to India,10 
the USSR,11 the United States12 and China.13 It is, though to a lesser extent, also
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important to the United Kingdom in its role as an ally of the United States, as a previous 
colonial power and as focal point of the Commonwealth.
The strategic importance of the country to India is obvious. Relations 
between China and India have historically been troubled, but at least divided by a natural 
barrier, which admittedly is more psychological than real given today’s technology of 
war. A large Chinese presence across the permeable Bangladesh/Indian border would 
probably be unacceptable, given the political volatility of the surrounding Indian states. 
India has been one of the major donors to Bangladesh.
The strategic perspective for the Americans is largely to counteract the Soviet 
presence and to continue to assert the influence that it lost with the break up of Pakistan. 
It is not, however, sufficient to qualify Bangladesh for Economic Support Fund 
assistance14 although it does have a modest military assistance programme.15 Officially 
American foreign aid to Bangladesh is justified as being humanitarian,16 but in reality 
strategic interests predominate.17
The USSR also has strategic interests in Bangladesh. It maintains a large 
diplomatic mission in Dhaka and has had a cultural centre in Chittagong, although the 
latter has been closed in recent years. Relations during the Mujib period were close, but 
the receipts from aid disappointing.18 Relations in the post-Mu jib era have not always 
been amicable and in 1981 Bangladesh refused to allow the entry of "sophisticated 
electronic equipment, obviously for espionage purposes".19 From the Soviet perspective 
Bangladesh is an attractive target for penetration and influence both to counteract the 
American presence and potential Chinese influence in that part of the sub-continent, and 
to reinforce its position on the sub-continent.
With a multitude of parties*, at last count some six of them Communist, the 
field is fertile for the sowing of political dissent. In comparison with aid to other 
countries the USSR has been relatively generous in Bangladesh, not only during the 
Mujib regime when overtures were being made, but even during the latter part much 
more pro-American Zia era.**
'Estimated to be between 60 and ISO, the political situation is fragmented at best and very fluid. The political parties of 
President Zia’s time were called "Volkswagen” parties because they had room for a President and an Secretary in the front seats and 
two members in the back seat. During Ershad’s attempts to form a viable political party these parties were, according to rather 
skeptical observers, transformed into "Honda" parties with room only for the President and Secretary.
**As an indication of the Soviet attitude towards aid the following is a brief example of their pragmatic approach. The writer,
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The United Kingdom, although it has withdrawn its military presence east of 
Suez, continues to have strategic interests in the sub-continent. Its commercial interests 
are substantial and domestically a significant, and growing, proportion of the population 
of the United Kingdom has its origins in the sub-continent resulting in a sizable domestic 
interest group.
Political: influence. Two countries, India and the USSR, had specific 
objectives in Bangladesh during the period immediately following independence. India, 
having dealt a crippling blow to Pakistan by helping to split the country had an interest in 
ensuring that it consolidated its position in the immediate post-war era. Encouraging its 
evolution from the Islamic republic it had been as part of Pakistan to that of a secular 
state was one such objective. It was, therefore, in India's interests to ensure a rapid 
return to stability in order that the friendly regime of Sheikh Mujib could consolidate its 
position and return the country to both stability and moderate government that was 
sympathetic to India’s interests.
The USSR saw an opportunity to build upon the linkages that had been started 
during the pre-liberation period through the diversion of Soviet, and other East bloc aid, 
from West Pakistan to the east wing of the country.20 The development of close ties with 
Bangladesh would accomplish several objectives. Strong Soviet ties would keep both the 
Americans and the Chinese from establishing themselves, leaving the coast from Pakistan 
to Burma in the hands of countries sympathetic to Soviet interests. It also provided an 
excellent opportunity for the Soviets to establish themselves with a new nation almost 
without effort. Furthermore, the new Government of Bangladesh was particularly 
anxious to develop economic ties with the socialist countries of eastern Europe. This was 
indicated by the fact that Sheikh Mujib made his first state visit to the Soviet Union 
carrying "a big shopping list”21 only a month after taking office.*
In more recent years the attitude has shifted from hostility toward the United 
States, and with the change in leadership in 1975, toward closer, more amicable
having returned from the 1984 Annual aid Donor Meeting in Pahs, was commiserating with a colleague who was a senior member of 
the Soviet Embassy. Somewhat facetiously the writer suggested that perhaps the only solution to the problems facing the country was 
a revolution. The Soviet official’s reply was "My government could never support that. Not if it costs $1.6 billion a year". The 
pledging by the donors in Paris had been reported in the local press at $1,600 thousand.
* Sheikh Mujib actually visited the United Kingdom immediately upon his release from prison in West Pakistan, but this was 
before he had formally assumed the position of Prime Minister of the new country. It was, therefore, not considered a state visit.
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relations. With this improvement the amount of aid has increased.22 The development of 
closer ties has resulted in cooler relations between the USSR and Bangladesh and a 
consequent reduction in the aid from the Soviet bloc.23
Political: liberalisation. There are two aspects to liberalisation. One is the 
Government’s attitude toward human rights and the rights of minorities. The other is the 
degree of legitimacy that the Government enjoys in really representing the views of the 
majority of the people.
Liberalisation, with respect to human rights or minorities, has not been a 
major theme of any donor to Bangladesh. The record in Bangladesh for tolerance of 
minorities is marred in two respects. The most serious accusation of deliberate 
oppression is of the hill tribes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts where it is alleged for 
example that:
The Bangladesh army and air force are conducting a campaign of unparalleled violence 
against the tribal minorities. They have been subjected to large scale evictions torture, rape and 
massacres — 10,000 tribal people were killed in 1981 alone. . . ,24
There is no question that the land in the Chittagong hill Tracts presents a great temptation 
to the Government, considering that Bangladesh is one of the most heavily populated 
countries in the world, but the picture of repression is sketchy and, for the most part, 
based on anecdotal evidence that is open to question. That there have been conflicts 
between the armed forces and the Shanti Bahini freedom fighters is beyond question. 
There is, however, little evidence that there is any attempt at systematic extermination of 
tribal peoples as alleged in the quotation above. Rather, the conflict appears to be based 
on the ever-expanding population’s almost insatiable demand for land.
Second, there is the treatment of the Biharis. These were muslims who 
emigrated to East Pakistan at the time of Partition, but who supported West Pakistan 
during the War of Liberation. Many are confined to camps and live under squalid 
conditions. They are often harassed by Bengalis. Some progress has been made over the 
years to resettle some of them in Pakistan, but the problem continues and they maintain a 
precarious existence in camps set aside for them.25 Compared, however, to the communal 
violence in neighbouring parts of India and in Sri Lanka, the problems in Bangladesh are 
relatively small.
The treatment of political dissidents has at times been harsh and attracted 
world criticism. Various governments have imprisoned their opponents during times of
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political crisis. There is little evidence that it has been the policy of the Government to 
hold great numbers of political dissidents for long periods of time. President Zia did 
incur international condemnation for the alleged execution of some 1143 men in the two 
months26 following the mutiny of September 30, 1977.27 This is the only instance of real 
repression by any regime, although as in other parts of the sub-continent, imprisonment 
or restriction of political opponents has not been uncommon.
Pressure for liberalisation has therefore not been great. Curiously none of 
the donors have made minority rights an issue and the only donor to openly examine the 
question of minority rights with respect to its aid programme has been Norway.28 Their 
conclusions with respect to the Chittagong Hill Tracts were that there had been brutality 
on both sides and that the Government had done little to bring an end to the conflict.29 
There has, however, been pressure for the return to democratic government, primarily 
from the Americans. It has been alleged that the election in January 1979 held by 
President Zia was in direct response to American pressure.’ S. Kamaluddin, 
correspondent for the Far Eastern Review in Dhaka, recounts:
Although Zia was committed to a general election, he is said to have been pressed by Western donor 
countries, especially the United States, to go ahead. A senior Bangladesh army officer recently told 
a visiting foreign journalist in Dacca: "The West, especially the US Congress, likes it if we can be 
called a democracy. It will make it easier for us to get aid. That is the main importance of the 
election."30
In more recent years the has been pressure from the Americans for a return to 
a democratic form of government.” This should not necessarily be interpreted as 
liberalisation. The Ershad regime has not been noted either for excessive harshness nor 
for granting complete freedom. The referendum in 1985 and the parliamentary and 
Presidential elections of 1986, which were marked by violence and intimidation, render 
President Ershad’s claim of a 94.1 percent victory in the referendum to be less than 
credible. Nor is the reported turnout of 72 per cent of the registered voters any more 
credible.31 The continuing opposition that has followed the period we have considered
*During the period that the writer lived in Bangladesh it was often alleged that President Ershad’s efforts to hold elections, 
elections that he wanted to be sure that he won, were the result of donor pressure. There was unquestionably pressure from the 
Americans, but with the exception of polite comments in speeches and interventions at the Aid Donor Meetings that everyone looked 
forward to the return to civilian rule, there was, to the writer’s knowledge, no evident threat by donors to reduce aid or withhold aid 
until legitimate government was restored.
**This is more difficult to document but the American Ambassador is alleged to have called upon President Ershad several 
times to convince him to hold elections during 1985. Parliamentary Elections were eventually held in 1986.
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here lends credence to this assertion. Nevertheless, a form of nominally democratic 
government has been preserved.
Donors have tended to simply avoid politically sensitive areas rather than to 
try to influence them. Carvell notes in his treatment of the Asian Development Bank’s 
participation in a project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, one of very few development 
projects in the area, that the Asian Development Bank has stood fast in response to 
criticism of its participation in the project in continuing their project. He adds "the ADB 
staff, however, does not intend to venture into the Hill Tracts [with new projects] again 
in the near future. . . . "  and that in the "future any project in the Hill Tracts would be 
scrutinized very carefully by the [ADB] Board."32
Economic: balance of payments. The economic motives for providing 
development assistance to countries can be roughly divided into the three categories 
shown in Table 5.1: balance of payments support, the promotion of growth and the 
promotion of trade. The less developed countries frequently suffer from severe balance 
of payments problems. The underlying reasons for this have been well documented. 
Over-reliance on a single export crop or primary product, which is subject to the 
fluctuations of the international marketplace, is one of the most common reasons for 
balance of payments difficulties. The developing country is often caught in a situation 
where it needs foreign exchange to finance capital equipment to diversify its economy, or 
intermediate products for its industrial or agriculture sector (e.g., fertiliser for agriculture 
or cloth for an export oriented garment industry), but is reliant on a crop such as cocoa 
or jute or a raw material such as copper. These commodities, while they are required in 
the world markets, are subject to the wide fluctuations in demand and price that 
characterise primary commodity markets. Over-dependence on a single item for foreign 
exchange leads to greater vulnerability to market forces than would be true if the range of 
exports were greater. Hence, countries with this type of economy are frequently subject 
to balance of payments difficulties.
Development projects required to provide the basic infrastructure to support 
development, such as dams or power generating stations, are "lumpy" with respect to 
their foreign exchange components, meaning that once the country has embarked on an 
investment of this type, the foreign exchange commitment is locked in. If construction of 
a capital project, such as a bridge, is halted halfway through, the entire investment is
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lost. A fall in the price of the primary export may cause the country to cut back on other 
equally vital imports such as food, raw materials for new industry or spare parts, oil to 
meet energy needs. The alternative is to cut the imports needed to meet the requirements 
of the capital project and suffer the loss of the entire investment.
In order to encourage development and ease balance of payments problems, 
donor countries often choose to provide development assistance in the form of credits for 
overseas purchases from their own countries or, as in the case of Japan, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, untied credits to purchase from any country.33 
The multilateral agencies also provide untied aid. In Bangladesh, which is seen to be a 
chronic food deficit country, food aid is frequently part of the aid package, particularly 
from the food-surplus countries. In addition there is the provision of commodity aid or 
credits provided at concessional rates of financing,i.e., programme aid. Balance of 
payments support, in one form or another, makes up a part of nearly every donor’s 
inventory of development strategies. Sometimes the assistance is provided directly as a 
foreign aided capital project, part of whose justification is balance of payments support, 
but more often a donor may choose to supply aid in another form, such as programme, 
(commodities or lines of credit) or food aid.
Food aid deserves particular attention in Bangladesh. For food-surplus donor 
countries it is one of the means by which to transfer resources. The recipient’s own 
foreign exchange resources are more fungible than the donor’s contribution, which is 
often constrained by tying requirements or availability. This allows Bangladesh to free 
foreign exchange for the purchase of capital items of its own choosing or for the purchase 
of other types of imports which might not be permitted under an aid programme. 
Examples might be military equipment or luxury goods. Food aid has been one of the 
major forms of aid accounting for some 25.9 per cent of all aid disbursed between 1971 
and 1985.34
Economic: trade and export promotion. The trade motive of the donor is an 
important one. The developing world in 1984 already accounted for 39 per cent of the 
United States’ merchandise exports (United Kingdom, 18 per cent; Japan, 37 per cent; 
Canada, 10 per cent; Australia, 41 per cent)35
With respect to food, while China and the USSR remain much more 
important international markets for such countries as Australia, Canada and the United
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States, three of the major food aid donors to Bangladesh, it is conceivable that at some 
time in the future, when the country has overcome the worst of its problems, that it may 
become a worthwhile market.
For example, in the area of food Bangladesh has imported wheat and rice 
commercially. Bangladesh was contracting to buy food commercially from the United 
States, Canada and Australia prior to the famine in 1974, but did not have sufficient 
foreign exchange to complete the transaction.36 Wheat, the single largest food import in 
Bangladesh was not a major source of nutrition at independence accounting for only 9.5 
per cent of consumption and 1.0 per cent of production in 1970/71.37 With the growth of 
food aid wheat imports consumption patterns have changed and wheat by 1983/84 
accounted for 16.5 per cent of consumption and 7.7 per cent of production in 1983/84.38 
Wheat has also been the most spectacular performer in the agricultural sector since 
independence in terms of production, growing at an average rate of 20.6 per cent from 
less than 60 thousand tons in 1967/68 to almost 1.2 million tons in 1983/84.39 
Furthermore, since domestic wheat production did not compete with the traditional rice 
crop, aman, it was a additional to the nation’s food production. There is, however, a 
limiting factor, the availability of suitable land. It is unlikely that such spectacular 
growth can be sustained indefinitely and that domestic production will be able to meet 
future demand.
Since the demand has been created for wheat, the provision of food aid to 
Bangladesh is likely to continue for the foreseeable future as long as balance of payments 
problems continue. In the long term there may be a market for the West’s wheat if the 
balance of payments situation improves.
While Bangladesh does not appear to be a particularly good prospect for 
future market development now, there are other countries where aid relationships have 
been gradually transformed into trading relationships. Despite the limitations of the 
commercial wheat market, suppliers still saw fit to impose a "usual marketing 
requirement" (UMR) on Bangladesh in 1985. Ironically this was at the suggestion of 
Canada the second largest bilateral food donor. The usual marketing requirement 
demanded that at least 100,000 tons be bought in the commercial market before food aid 
would be supplied by any of the participating countries.40
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In other areas trade has been an important factor. The United Kingdom, for 
example, has actively promoted the sale of tea processing equipment under its aid 
programme in Bangladesh in order to stave off competition from China which could 
supply at significantly below the British price. Canada has pursued similar efforts in 
tying trade to aid as Ehrhardt describes:
While Canada has recently shown more willingness to become involved in these areas 
[maintenance and training in the railway sector], it is still heavily oriented to rolling stock. In 
1979, when Bangladesh awarded the procurement contract for 30 diesel locomotives financed by the 
Saudi Fund for Development to a Japanese rather than a Canadian firm, there was much displeasure 
in Canada. Thus in 1980, when Bangladesh requested financing for 50 additional locomotives, 
Canada indicated that it would be willing to fund 25 locomotives, but only if Bangladesh would find 
another source of funds for the other 25 and purchase all 50 from a Canadian firm.41 . . ,14
14lnterviews with CIDA officials, Ottawa, September 1982.
Humanitarian: disaster relief. Disaster relief is the rationale for aid which 
gamers the most domestic support for foreign aid. In fact the general public often equate 
development with emergency relief. The response of most governments to emergencies is 
the provision of food aid, although other forms such as provision of transport, clothing, 
etc., may also be included.
Food aid has been among the most prominent forms of aid among the choices 
offered for emergency assistance. For virtually every disaster from the desertification of 
the Sahelian Region in Sub-Saharan Africa, to the Ethiopian drought, to the earthquakes 
in Managua and Mexico City, food aid is one of the first means by which aid is 
extended. From the perspective of the donor country it is also one of the easiest ways in 
which to mobilise public support. Thus, we see that commercial imperatives also affect 
donor responses response to disaster.
Interestingly, there is evidence that famines are rarely caused by shortages of 
food. They are rather the result of decreased purchasing power. Where well developed 
markets exist famine can be largely avoided by maintaining the purchasing power through 
targeted public works programmes. This obviates the need for the recipient government 
to handle large amounts of imported food and straining existing transportation capacity. 
The theory is that the natural market forces determine where the food goes, i.e., where 
purchasing power has fallen, food will flow to areas where viable markets still exist. 
When incomes are maintained, even at a reduced level, food will flow in to meet 
demand. This approach has been used by India in averting famines in Bihar in 1967 and
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in Mahararastra in 1967 and in Bihar in 1973. In both cases cited by Professor Sen, food 
production was lower than other areas where famine has occurred, such as Ethiopia and 
the Sahel in the early 1970s.42 Two factors preclude the use of aid in the form of cash, 
first the commercial imperative and, second, the fear that cash is more susceptible to 
misuse.
Another characteristic of relief aid for humanitarian reasons is that it may 
even be given by donors that are antagonistic to the recipient, such as the American 
Government’s aid to Bangladesh during the Mujib era, or to Ethiopia in the 1980s.43
Humanitarian: poverty. Most of the early donors to provide assistance to 
Bangladesh did so for humanitarian reasons and to alleviate poverty. This aid was for the 
most part in direct response to the tragedy of the War of Liberation which had taken an 
estimated one million lives. Those donors which have provided aid for primarily 
humanitarian reasons are the Scandinavians, the Netherlands, West Germany,44 Canada45 
and Australia46, although in the latter two trade considerations clearly impinged. The fact 
that the aid was provided for humanitarian reasons does not, however, mean that it was 
aid that benefitted the poorest It simply meant that poverty was the primary justification. 
This is a major criticism that Bauer has raised regarding the justification for such aid.47 
Aid is justified by poverty but delivered in such a way that it does little to alleviate it.
Humanitarian: equity. Humanitarian aid also goes beyond simple emergency 
relief for disasters and to alleviate poverty. With the emergence of a school of thought in 
the planning and implementation of development projects that emphasizes equity and the 
alleviation of poverty there developed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a belief that 
some portion of development assistance should be allocated to those who might suffer 
through the imposition of development policies that hurt some segments of the 
population.
More recently, with the increasing frequency of structural adjustment 
programmes for countries suffering balance of payments problems, the concern for equity 
has spread beyond the simple distribution of aid to other aspects associated with it, such 
as the impact of budget restraint on social programmes. This has resulted in conflict 
between such agencies as UNICEF, which have strong social objectives, and the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have primarily economic 
growth oriented objectives. Most donors are caught in between because they are
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members of the IMF and the World Bank, yet domestically they promote their aid as 
being designed to benefit the least endowed in recipient countries.
For example, it is one of the underlying rationales for the provision of food 
aid to Bangladesh that it is used to provide support for such programmes as Vulnerable 
Group Feeding or Food for Work which are designed to benefit the most needy elements 
of the society. Some project aid, such as support for rural development, is also justified 
on the basis of this rationale.
We can see from the foregoing that political stability has been one important 
factor to some donors providing aid to Bangladesh. The United States and the World 
Bank have rewarded Bangladesh for following specific economic policies aimed at 
restoring a free enterprise, free market system. A number of countries have also 
provided aid for strategic reasons in order to maintain a friendly presence in the region, 
but mainly it would appear to counteract the presence of others. Political influence has 
largely been linked to strategic aid rather than as a means to achieve any specific political 
ends.
Among the economic justifications, balance of payments support seems to 
predominate, being the rationale for both much of the food aid programme and the 
commodity aid. Some countries, however, particularly France and Japan, and to a lesser 
extent the United Kingdom, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, have allowed 
trading interests to dominate, or at least to influence, their programmes. Economic 
growth, as an objective, has been a factor in most donors’ programmes it still being 
equated with successful development.
Under the humanitarian justification for aid, poverty, which is a rationale for 
providing aid in practically all assistance programmes, does not appear to be a major 
factor in the actual implementation, although it underpins almost all aid programmes. 
We will explore this aspect of foreign aid in Bangladesh later in the chapter. Most donor 
countries, and several non-traditional donors, responded to various disasters that have 
occurred over the last decade and a half, but such aid is sustained only by the traditional 
donors. Finally, equity does not appear to play an important part in the programmes of 
any donor except perhaps the Scandinavians. Norway in its commissioned review of 
human rights, Human Rights in Developing Countries, considers the issue of economic 
and social rights,48 but because of administrative bottlenecks has still provided 68 per cent
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of its aid in the form of commodities,49 recognising all the while that this does not meet 
the ultimate objectives of Norwegian aid which call for targeting aid to specific groups 
and improving the lot of the poor.50
As we will see in the section below on development administration, the aid 
provided by donors is not necessarily the aid requested. Furthermore, it is not 
necessarily the aid recommended by the World Bank, nor often even is it what is called 
for in the donors’ own development objectives. The poor and the landless are not a 
potent political force in Bangladesh and so they do not have a significant say in the type 
of aid provided, even though they provide much of the rationale. We have shown how 
poverty has grown in Chapter IV, and how in various ways they are deprived of aid 
which is specifically targeted at them. In the next section we will show how the structure 
of the donor agencies fails to meet many of the requirements that would be necessary to 
ensure that even an acceptable percentage of aid gets to the very poorest.
Problems in Development Administration
The quality of the administration of aid is one of the key factors in how well 
development programmes are likely to achieve their goals. As Bauer comments:
Altogether, the mainstream advocacy of aid rarely addresses itself to actual operation, and 
notably not to its efficacy in terms of the proclaimed objectives. The advocates do not examine 
whether aid actually promotes development or improves the lot of the poor. Nor do they examine 
its adverse repercussions. . . ,51
It is to the subject of the problems of the administration of overseas aid that we now turn.
Centralisation.* One of the principal characteristics of aid agencies is the 
problem of over-centralisation. Most aid donors organise the delivery of development 
assistance in a highly centralised manner with most administrative and planning personnel 
based in the headquarters of the donor country. The most notable exception to this is 
USAID which has the majority of its personnel in the field and considerable delegated 
authority. Within policy guidelines most USAID missions can approve projects up to 
US$ 20 million.52 Even the World Bank, largest of the donor agencies, identifies,
^Several of the examples in the following section on centralisation draw upon the experience of CIDA. In all fairness the 
attitude about the necessity of decentralisation has changed among senior management inasmuch as the validity of a decentralised 
approach is accepted. Acceptance does not, however, mean implementation and such impediments as the attitude of the Department 
of External Affairs cited by Wyse remain, as does the reality that serving in the field does not further one's career.
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appraises, supervises and evaluates projects with missions from Washington supplemented 
by small offices in the field.53 In Bangladesh, a partial exception to this pattern, it 
maintains one of its largest overseas offices in a developing country, although it is still 
small by USAID standards.
The UNDP is another exception, however, being a multilateral donor with 
somewhat different perceptions of its responsibilities than most bilateral donors or 
international financial institutions, it is unique. The UNDP budget is comparable to that 
of small to medium-sized donors rather than to the budgets of the large donors, ranging 
from US$ 20.6 million in 1977 to US$ 28 million in 1981.54 The UNDP has 67 per cent 
of its professional staff working overseas.55 In Bangladesh it had a staff complement of 
about 250, not including the short-term experts who visited.56
The most notable exception to the principle of centralisation exceptis 
excipiendis. USAID, is UNICEF, with a large geographically diffuse staff, some 36 
per cent of whom are not located in Dhaka,57 but in the field. Carvell compares the 
amount of money spent per professional field officer in UNICEF to that spent by CIDA 
in Bangladesh. UNICEF spent some US$345,000 per professional staff in Dhaka as 
against some US$ 20 million per Canadian development officer spent by CIDA.58 It is 
small wonder then that UNICEF is leading the way in the introduction of small scale 
relevant technologies such as the US$70 hand pump for irrigation cited by Jansen in 
Chapter III.59
For example, the Canadian International Development Agency in 1981-82 had 
some 1000 people stationed at their headquarters in Hull and 54 field officers plus about 
another 50 employees of the Department of External Affairs devoting a part, or all, of 
their time to development administration.60 While Canada has one of the most centralised 
aid organisations,61 the model is much the same as that used by other donors. The Dutch 
differ slightly in that the aid agency actually forms part of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Scandinavian countries are organised in the same general manner as 
Canada, however, they tend to have somewhat more flexibility in hiring contract 
personnel to supplement their regular staff. The United Kingdom is similar. The Federal 
Republic of Germany also operates from the embassy administrative setup, although aid 
personnel from the Ministry of Economic Cooperation in the embassy represent the 
interests of several aid agencies in West Germany: the German Agency for Technical
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Cooperation (GTZ); Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KW); etc. Japan is represented in 
Bangladesh both by the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) and the Japanese 
International Co-operation Agency (JICA) although all communication is through the 
embassy despite the fact that the latter maintain an office to look after administrative 
matters. USAID is the anomaly, with a large administration, functionally separate from 
the American Embassy although technically the AID director is responsible to the 
Ambassador, a relationship that has caused tension in more than one capital.
It is worth noting the obvious exception, USAID. USAID is highly 
decentralised and as a development agency it differs markedly from others. The 
significant characteristic that differentiates USAID from most other agencies is that its 
primary objective is promoting policy change, not providing resources. To that end 
much of its food aid is provided as a carrot for promoting change. In Bangladesh 
USAID’s efforts at bringing about policy change would be rated as quite successful. This 
was evident in the privatisation of large areas of the public sector and, in particular the 
privatisation of much of the fertiliser distribution system. It remains to be seen whether 
this approach has more merit than simply providing resources.
The centralised approach to the administration of development assistance by 
donors has been brought about by several factors. There has always been a reluctance to 
delegate authority to field personnel. This is to an extent due to the historical 
development of the administration of development assistance programmes. The aid 
offices of most of the bilateral donors are run from their embassies or from offices 
attached to embassies and managed within the embassy’s administrative system. The 
reason for this is that for the Western donors’ aid has traditionally been the responsibility 
of the donor country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*
In some countries, such as Sweden and Canada, where independent agencies 
have been established, their reporting responsibility is still through the respective Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Even where there is a separate minister responsible for economic 
assistance, for example, in the United Kingdom under the Labour Government and in 
Canada under the Progressive Conservative Government, the Foreign Minister has 
retained ultimate responsibility and, in the field, the Embassy or High Commission has
*Based on the writer’s experience in Bangladesh, of the bilateral donors, only USAID and JICA had separate offices, and in 
the case of the latter all official discussion were carried on by the Japanese Embassy.
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remained the focal point of authority, implying that foreign policy and trade objectives 
predominate. This is clear for countries such as France, where trade personnel in the 
Embassy take care of aid interests, and Japan where foreign service officers handle most 
aid matters with the Government at the policy level. To a lesser extent the same holds 
for the British High Commission where the aid section is small compared to the other 
interests.
This approach makes sense from the point of view of the overall coordination 
of general foreign policy, but not from the perspective of the administration of complex 
development assistance programmes. It is significant that some embassies, the Danish, 
the Canadian, the Dutch prior to their reorganisation in 1984, and the Norwegian are 
largely staffed by aid personnel. Thus, development officers are trying to run a 
development programme through an administrative system which was designed to achieve 
something entirely different. The competition between foreign policy bureaucrats and 
development bureaucrats varies from Embassy to Embassy, but remains a major 
impediment to the effective delivery of aid.
The main complicating factor to the structure outlined above, apart from the 
conflict it engenders, has been the decreasing authority of embassies. With the 
development of modern communications, diplomatic missions are increasingly reliant 
upon instructions issued from their capitals and serious negotiations are carried on by 
senior officials who fly in and fly out. In fact the modem diplomat, unlike his 
predecessor, even a quarter of a century ago, has very little scope for initiative. 
Diplomacy is increasingly carried out in the style that Henry Kissinger popularised. The 
Embassy’s, or High Commission’s, role is to provide the background, the administrative 
backup and the entertainment. Traditional diplomats rarely take substantive decisions. 
This lack of scope for independent action, even within an agreed upon foreign policy 
framework, has been transferred to the modem aid administrator, despite the fact that the 
two jobs share little in common; the diplomat’s being to report upon events and to 
communicate his country’s views, while the aid administrator’s is to design and 
implement, in consort with his counterpart in the relevant ministry, an activity designed 
to contribute to development.
There is, therefore, a fundamental conflict between the diplomatic approach, 
highly dependent on guidance from headquarters, essentially a risk minimising role, and
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that of the aid administrator who is engaged in the high-risk pastime of trying to 
introduce new concepts into a situation with linguistic and cultural barriers which calls 
for on-the-spot assessment and action, usually without the guidance of some headquarters 
body.*
The World Bank is fairly typical of the centralised approach. As Mason and 
Asher recount in describing the administration of the World Bank in the early 1970s:
The Bank is a highly centralised institution, not only in its headquarters operations but also 
with respect to its overseas activities. All stages of the project cycle are managed from Washington, 
and field operations are carried on by short-term missions. Except in one or two cases, country 
economic reports are prepared in Washington, again with the help of short-term missions to the 
field. Even in the countries and areas in which the Bank has permanent representatives, 
headquarters holds these representatives in most cases on a very short leash. . . . Most country 
missions are small—one- or two-man affairs—and their functions are limited to economic reporting 
and to preliminary project identification. . . .
It should be obvious that certain segments of Bank operations can be more effectively 
performed in the field than in Washington, provided that the field mission is well staffed—an 
important proviso. . . .c
Finally, even Norway, a donor country with much demonstrated concern for 
the social sectors, had very limited resources in the field to administer their aid 
programme:
Until recently, Norway has had very little contact with the realities of Bangladesh. Until the 
summer of 1984, NORAD’s Representation in Dhaka consisted of a Resident Representative, an 
Assistant Res. Rep., a Bangladesh professional dealing with women’s projects and a Norwegian
* Three examples of this headquarters oriented approach to the relations between the two countries during the writer’s tour in 
Bangladesh come to mind.
The first was the call for negotiations by the Government of Canada under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 1984. The 
Canadian High Commission was instructed to advise the Government of Bangladesh that they were being called to negotiations for 
market disruption in the Canadian economy. There was no consultation with the Post whatsoever. In fact when the High 
Commissioner pointed out the inconsistency of curbing the exports of a country that Canada was assisting with balance of payments 
support, he was advised in so many words that the matter did not concern the Post.
A year later when Canada appeared to be on the point of imposing quotas on Bangladesh the response was the same. 
Ironically, they intended to impose the quota immediately following a devastating cyclone which had killed an estimated 10,000 
people along the coast. What stopped them was a speech given in Calgary by Bernard Wood, the (then) Director of the North-South 
Institute, which had researched the cost to the Canadian economy and the Canadian taxpayer of Canada’s restrictive policy on 
garment imports. He said in part "I am ashamed to be a Canadian* with respect to the forthcoming imposition of quotas. The 
speech was highlighted in an editorial by the Globe and Mail and the Government relented.
A second example was the imposition of a "usual marketing requirement* (UMR) on Bangladesh in the spring of 1985. To 
that date Bangladesh had been exempted from the requirement that it satisfy a UMR prior to the receipt of food aid. (The UMR 
requires that a country purchase, or show that it intends to purchase, a set amount in the commercial market prior to the releasing of 
food aid. The purpose is to ensure that traditional markets are not disrupted by food aid.) In this case Canada instigated the idea of 
imposing a UMR on Bangladesh of some 600 thousand tons. Not only were the Post not consulted, they were not even notified, and 
learned about it from the American Embassy which was trying to formulate a consistent donor position. Once again the views of the 
Post were not welcomed, particularly so since they showed that the headquarters office did not even have correct import figures for 
commercial imports to Bangladesh.
These two examples, it should be stressed, were not C ID A/Post communications, but rather from other departments. They do 
exemplify the very low priority that is put on diplomats’ views in the field.
A third example involves the ambassador of a European country who was involved in several demarches with the Government 
of Bangladesh. He was unable to make any statements without clearance from his Foreign Ministry in Europe. The result was that 
most statements during the series of discussions were drafted and presented by the more junior head of another aid agency.
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administrative secretary. Officials from the Ministry of development Cooperation in Oslo visit 
Bangladesh every second year . . .63
In addition to lack of enthusiasm for decentralisation on the part of donor 
governments, and most other aid agencies, there is the pressure on development agencies 
to curtail the cost of the administration of development assistance. This last factor is 
because most aid agencies, whether they are part of their respective Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or are semi-autonomous, still form a part of the donor’s civil service. As such 
they are subject to the same constraints on growth as the rest of the civil service. 
Governments frequently go through cost cutting exercises. Aid agencies, without a 
domestic constituency who might complain about a deterioration in service to a member 
of parliament, are particularly vulnerable to the imposition of constraints on person-years 
and cutbacks in personnel.
For example, Peter Wyse in Canadian Foreign Aid in the 1970s: An 
Organizational Audit writes:
Yet CIDA’s centralized structure was no accident. The Department of External Affairs 
opposed initiatives to place more aid officers overseas. It did not want to see senior aid officers 
overseas, since they would have outranked its own diplomats. It did not want aid offices in 
countries where Canada did not have embassies of high commissions, since such offices would have 
been removed from direct External Affairs control. . .
CIDA itself was not an active proponent of decentralized administration. When CIDA’s 
senior managers carried out a major reorganization in 1977, decentralization was the 55th of 56 
issues dealt with.23 Undoubtedly, for senior executives, decentralization meant a dissolution of 
headquarters empires. Senior executives feared the consequences of a decentralized organization in 
which many overseas officers would be outside their effective control.64
23.CIDA, Corporate Review (Ottawa: CIDA, 1977), p. 8.
The effort to decentralise such agencies as the Canadian International 
Development Agency, has in the past been thwarted by the cadre of traditional diplomats 
who fear that too much delegated authority to heads of aid will diminish their importance, 
indeed their relevance, in countries with large aid programmes.65 In the words of one 
head of post "We don’t want to duplicate the American situation where the USAID 
Director has more power than the Ambassador".66 Again to cite Wyse discussing the 
situation in the Canadian International Development Agency:
Project team members were overworked because Treasury Board (which is responsible for 
controlling the size of the civil service and the government departments within it) was under 
pressure to limit the size of the civil service. CIDA, a government agency without a high domestic 
profile, was an easy place to start. Junior officers were employed by project teams because of 
Treasury Board’s unwillingness to allocate senior positions to CIDA. In effect, the Treasury Board 
treated CIDA like other government departments in order to apply standard administrative concepts, 
regulations and procedures across the civil service. In doing so, it failed to take into account certain
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aspects of CIDA that were special: its large budget; its complicated programs and projects; and its 
need to work through sovereign foreign governments.67
The result of all the above factors is that, even including headquarters staff, 
most aid programmes have very few administrators in relation to the amount of money 
being spent, they are overstretched and unable to supervise adequately a wide range of 
projects, geographically scattered and involved in different sectors.
Morss, quoted in Rondinelli, describes the success of projects in which quick 
action has been able to be taken with the intervention of field personnel to correct project 
problems when compared to those that have been allowed to continue without 
modification despite encountering problems.68 The latter situation usually prevails when 
projects are the product of an overwhelmingly centralised aid administration that is too 
far away and too rigid to respond or with too little ability and knowledge to intervene.
Programme planning and supervision. The decentralised nature of the aid 
administration in turn gives rise to two factors which affect the efficacy with which 
donors’ programmes and projects can be carried out. Planning is usually done at 
headquarters thousands of miles from where the activity will eventually be implemented. 
Supervision, meaning supervision with the power to take action to correct problems, also 
resides far away or is carried out by quick visits of experts. Before proceeding it is 
worthwhile to consider how programmes are decided upon. Rondinelli describes the 
evolution of planning for development:
The methods of planning, analysis and management introduced during the 1960s and 1970s, 
and which still dominate the procedures of most international organizations and governments in 
developing countries, however, were not primarily concerned with flexibility, responsiveness and 
learning. They were more concerned with efficiency and control. Systems approaches were 
introduced not only because they were compatible with macro-economic concepts of development 
prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s, but also because they were perceived as effective methods of 
reducing uncertainly and increasing the influence of technocrats. Ironically, politicians and 
administrators embraced control-oriented planning and management techniques that were either 
ineffective or inherently incapable of reducing uncertainty at a time when the recognition that 
development was an uncertain process was becoming widespread.69
In the foregoing Rondinelli appears to restrict his observations to international donors and 
recipient governments. The same observation can be made, however, about the bilateral 
donors. The international agencies draw at least some of their staff from the former and 
the philosophical approaches toward management are not fundamentally different.
Wyse comments on the Canadian approach to decision-making in the 
determination of programmes in recipient countries:
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. . . CIDA developed a complicated bureaucratic process which was devoid of substance, yet 
effectively masked the failing. The process was called the "country program review cycle," and 
consisted of the following elements: preparation of "country program review" formats by central 
planners; writing of "country program review" documents by desk officers5 according to the 
formats; evaluation of the "country program review" documents by senior management; and 
subsequent selection of aid recipients.
The country program review formats gave CIDA’s managers an opportunity to solicit 
information essential for the selection of aid recipient countries, but this opportunity was not taken 
up. Instead of focussing on a few key variables in the development process, they sought 
information on a full range of subjects pertaining to development: economics, politics, sociology. 
Inevitably, the country program review documents resulting from the formats were long, 
comprehensive document providing far too much information for senior mangers to digest and 
translate into meaningful decisions. . . .
Not only were the country program review documents too long to be used, they were also 
biased. The document for a particular country was prepared either by desk officers who worked 
with the country or who would be working with the country if it became and aid recipient. . . .  As 
a result, their country program review documents tended to be apologies for the countries under 
consideration, not critical appraisals, and their value as a basis for decisions was undermined.
In addition, many documents were prepared by desk officers with little first-hand experience 
of the countries they were writing about. They tended to rely on secondary sources such as the 
World Bank reports and official government documents of the recipient country.70**
5 Desk officers worked in Ottawa and were responsible for specific Third World countries; 
thus, the officers on the Bangladesh desk dealt with Bangladesh from their positions in Ottawa.
Wyse comments further on the CIDA experience in project planning and 
management:
Because of CIDA’s centralized structure and its inadequate travel budgets, project teams were 
forced to rely almost totally on consultants to appraise, design, implement, monitor and evaluate 
projects. . . . Consultants were out to make money; therefore they had to be controlled. 
Unfortunately the project teams were not in a position to exercise fair control; based in Ottawa, they 
had difficulty knowing how much work was involved in particular projects. Often the consultants 
were not familiar with CIDA’s systems, idiosyncrasies, and policies, and therefore made 
recommendations that could not be implemented. But just as often they were dispatched into 
complex Third World environments on short-term missions and expected to produce workable 
solutions on the basis of superficial, preliminary impressions.71
*In fact Wyse is describing the system as it worked in the mid-1970s. As it evolved into the 1980s the process changed from one 
to determine the eligibility of countries to one whereby the amount allocated to eligible countries was decided. The actual eligibility 
was decided by an interdepartmental committee which then recommended the list to Cabinet based on three different levels of 
eligibility: core countries; category II countries which were limited to a little bilateral assistance and support from NGOs or through 
the Industrial Cooperation Programme and; Category III countries which were not eligible for bilateral funding but for which it was 
permissible, but not encouraged, to give funds through NGOs and Industrial Cooperation. The process was so complicated and 
lengthy, taking, as it did, into consideration the views of all Government departments and any particular interests of cabinet members 
and senior bureaucrats.
Very much the same procedure is now used to raise or lower the allocation of funding (called the indicative planning figure 
[IPF]) for individual core countries, that are already eligible for aid. Countries can lose their eligibility through the process, a 
subsequent recommendation to cabinet, but countries gaining eligibility usually do so through political pressure and subsequent 
recommendation to cabinet. In other words it was a system so cumbersome that it ceased to work at all, the last review having taken 
place in the late 1970s! Every change was an exception. Under the Progressive Conservative Government which came to power in 
1984 the system was changed again following a review by a Parliamentary Committee, but it remains cumbersome.
**This has changed somewhat in recent years with the advent of more liberal travel budgets, as administrative expenses 
increasingly were charged to official development assistance, but in 1988 the general approach was much the same generally even if 
there was more scope for travel by desk officers.
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In another example, the World Bank experience also follows much the same 
course. Initially in the 1950s the World Bank found that the choice and quality of 
projects that was being offered for financing was disappointing. The Bank therefore took 
a more proactive role in the selection and preparation of projects.72 Tendler describes the 
process as being similar to the backward integration of industry. The Bank had an 
inadequate supply of projects so it produced them itself.73
Despite the protestations of donors that aid is given on a purely responsive 
basis this model, in which a highly centralised organisation decides which projects to 
support in virtual isolation from the recipients, holds for other agencies as well. The 
consequence of this approach is that aid projects are frequently not suited to the 
environment in which they are placed. An added factor is that the field personnel of the 
aid agencies and the local managers, who have in the end to implement the projects long 
after the aid funds have been approved, were scarcely involved in the planning process at 
all. It is, therefore, little wonder that projects frequently do not achieve the ends which 
they were designed to, or that they sometimes achieve ends which they were never 
designed to.
Programme supervision is another area which is bound to suffer when project 
management is highly centralised. Almost by definition field strength is minimised in a 
development assistance system that is highly centralised. In contrast the highly 
decentralised USAID Mission in 1986 in Dhaka, more than 50 American officers and 
support personnel and more than 100 locally engaged staff. In Washington they had 2 to 
3 officers and support staff. They managed programmes* disbursing between US$150 
and US$190 million per annum.74
The CIDA programme, administered through the Canadian High Commission, 
had 5 Canada-based staff and 5 locally engaged staff in Dhaka** to manage a programme 
disbursing about half the American amount. In Ottawa there was a staff of 10 Officers 
and 5 support staff. The British High Commission, administering a highly centralised aid 
programme for Overseas Development Administration, had 3 British staff and only a few 
locally engaged staff. They managed a programme one third the size of the American
*This estimate is based on the personal knowledge of the writer about the structure of USAID operations in Dhaka.
**This is based on the personal knowledge of the writer who managed the programme for almost 4 years.
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programme. The problem was similar in missions such as that of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.
The problem of over-centralisation has another effect. The under-staffing of 
field offices so that multi-million dollar programmes are administered by offices staffed
by one or two development officers. They are sometimes quite junior and are often
supervised by embassy personnel with little or no administrative or planning experience. 
Often the supervisors have no development experience at all. As Wyse notes on the 
general staffing of CIDA positions:
. . . Fifty percent of the overseas staff came from External Affairs and many were inexperienced in 
development and aid administration; the rest came primarily from CIDA’s middle (not senior) ranks. 
Senior executives had relatively little control over hiring, firing, and salaries within the government 
staffing system. For middle mangers decentralization would have required that they move overseas. 
Such overseas postings involved personal costs: . . .M At the same time, promotions and career 
advancement depended on recognition by senior executives in Ottawa, and the nature of the system 
therefore favoured the managers who remained at home.75*
24.The aid programs in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were handled out of the Canadian 
Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa. The developed nature of South Africa for the white population
made the Pretoria aid posting one of the more sought after postings.**
In an anecdotal account of the attitudes at the World Bank Watson comes to 
much the same conclusion:
As a workplace, the Bank was like any large company in that it was run by white middle- 
aged men with a few women or people from the Third World in senior positions. Some people 
were good at their jobs, others did little . . . Rumour had it that the Bank never fired its staff; 
instead it sent them to work in the Personnel Department or to an overseas posting. Most Bank 
staff are in Washington and no one apparently wanted to be posted overseas. It was spoken of as a 
term of exile in an uncomfortable place.76
It is scarcely surprising then that Payer can cite an instance where nine 
successive missions to a project failed to discover, let alone correct, a fundamental design 
fault in a reservoir for an irrigation project,77 nor that Wyse can state with confidence that 
only a few project failures came to light and that:
. . . Project choices were often made without adequate understanding of project opportunities; that 
few projects proceeded as planned, while many developed behind schedule and over budget; that 
predictable events arrived unforeseen and undermined projects; that project expectations were 
usually unrealistic; that consultants, contractors and technical assistance advisors, and suppliers 
frequently performed poorly; that in every project, something always seemed to go wrong.78
*This fact remains true today. Despite pronouncements by CIDA executives that overseas service would be a requirement for 
advancement, it has been watered down so that short trips taken by officers are considered the equivalent of overseas service.
**The writer disagrees with Wyse on this point having worked on the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Programme from 1975 
to 1979 as Senior Planning Officer and having been offered the post. The first incumbent certainly did not choose to go because of 
the amenities and in fact later served for some years in Swaziland and in China with an NGO. Others may well have found the 
amenities inviting.
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The results are particularly evident in Bangladesh as outlined in Chapter III. 
There is a lack of appreciation on the part of the donors of how dependent the 
Government has become on the proceeds from the sale of food and commodities to meet 
it day to day budgetary needs. The impact of the Food Distribution System on 
agricultural growth is ignored. More difficult areas to programme in such sectors as 
agriculture, rural development, health and education remain under-financed by 
comparison with the more traditional sectors of donor support, energy and modem 
transportation. Yet the system of decentralised aid administration persists.
Tying, procurement and other administrative procedures. Another problem in 
the administration of aid is the regulations that donor countries impose on the purchase of 
goods and services for projects and programmes. Tying is the requirement that the 
goods, or some set proportion thereof, financed with aid funds must be bought in the 
donor country. The practice of tying has been criticised in most donor programmes. It 
originates from the trade justification for aid and the belief that public support will be lost 
if a donor government is not seen to be benefitting its own constituency. It is criticised 
on the basis of forcing recipient countries to accept solutions that are both more 
expensive and less appropriate than available alternatives.79 It is also criticised on the 
basis of making procurement needlessly complex and for forcing inappropriate 
technologies on the recipient.
The most obvious example of this is the continuing provision of wheat, by 
wheat surplus countries rather than rice as food aid. This has resulted, in a level of 
demand that already exceeds the country’s capacity to supply. This can only result in the 
long term in a balance of payments situation that continues to worsen.
Cultural factors. An additional item which militates against the effective 
design and implementation of aid programmes is the socio-economic background of the 
people administering foreign aid in donor countries. Bureaucrats, whether they come 
from middle-class backgrounds or not, have achieved a place in the middle-class by the 
time they become aid administrators. They come from urbanised societies.80 It is 
difficult for them to understand or identify with the marginal farmer or landless peasant. 
A small number of people in the aid agencies have studied such societies and lived in 
villages. The proportion, when compared to the number of administrators, is very small 
indeed. The same observation can be made about the consultants, contractors and experts
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who work in developing countries. A small proportion may have been volunteers or 
missionaries, but even this is no guarantee that they can span the economic and cultural 
gulf that stands between them and a subsistence peasant farmer. Volunteers and 
missionaries usually come from middle class backgrounds also.81 Indeed many find it 
difficult to even associate with indigenous people of their own socio-economic 
background, or the equivalent, in a country such as Bangladesh. Social clubs and special 
privileges cushion the experience of living in a developing country. Bangladesh is a 
particularly difficult country to work in given its grinding poverty, different religion and 
language. It is really no surprise then that administrators have difficulty in designing and 
mounting programmes designed to alleviate a poverty they scarcely understand 
themselves.
Measuring the "Appropriation" of Aid: A Framework for Analysis
Measuring the amount of aid that has been "appropriated" by the upper 
classes with any precision on an ex post facto basis is a difficult and imprecise task. 
Measurement of almost any phenomena in Bangladesh which relies upon statistical data is 
bound to be inexact. Furthermore, there is no way of avoiding a subjective assessment of 
the evidence available although if the proportion of targeted aid were built into project 
evaluation frameworks prior to implementation the task would yield more accurate 
results.
Various writers have estimated the amount of aid that is diverted to the 
wealthy. Farouk, for example, estimates the total benefit to the poor as being no more 
than 3 per cent of the development budget. He does this on the basis of the size of the 
allocations to the Rural Works and the Food for Work Programmes both of which are 
specifically targeted at the poor. He concludes that this is an indication of how much the 
poor, who are after all the justification for aid, would suffer if it were to be cut, i.e. they 
would scarcely suffer at all.82
We propose a crude ex post facto analysis of development projects. It will 
depend to a large extent on subjective estimates of the amount of aid that reaches the 
poor, although, as we have said, the establishment of targeting criteria prior to 
implementation could make the model a useful tool in evaluating the impact of
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development programmes. Another shortcoming of the model is that it measures only the 
short term impact of aid on the poorest. It might be argued that there are long term 
benefits to be gained from some projects. This is true, however, the net present value of 
such benefits would be comparatively small taking into consideration the average time it 
takes a project to become fully operational and start generating benefits. Finally, to 
maintain consistency with other data sources used Gross Domestic Product was used as a 
proxy for National Income. We believe that while not absolutely accurate its substitution 
for National Income will have only negligible effect on the totals and no effect on the 
trends discussed.
This assessment is not fundamental to the arguments presented in this study; 
rather it provides us with an indication of the magnitude of the problem and a 
framework. An accurate analysis would have to be designed in advance and integrated 
with the regular monitoring during the implementation stage. There are bound to be 
areas of disagreement. As we have seen the World Bank and the Government disagree 
about statistics as fundamental, for example, as the GNP by a factor of almost 20 
per cent for the Fiscal Year 1983/84.83
What we propose is to examine a range of development projects and to 
estimate the proportion of the project that is likely to benefit the poor. The remainder 
will be the aid that has been "appropriated" plus the aid which was never intended to 
benefit the poor.*
The methodology we shall adopt here shall be as follows:
1. We examine separately each of the three types of aid: food aid, programme aid and 
project aid. We estimate how much aid in each project is targeted toward the poor 
or how much is likely to reach them directly or indirectly. This is termed the 
Target Factor. We use the List of Aid Worthy Projects: 198484 as a proxy for the 
development programme in its entirety. It consists of 183 projects requested by the 
government for financing by the donors in all sectors in which aid might be 
provided. Five projects were omitted, 3 concerning religion and 2 concerned with 
sports, as being unlikely to be. attractiveJto typical donor£ alffiouBi thev 
some attraction for non-traditional donors. Each project is examined and the results 
summarised giving an estimate for how much aid in each sector is likely is likely to
*The model, with adaptions, was used in March 1989 by consultants at CIDA to try to estimate the amount of aid that reaches 
the poor. In discussions we concluded that, while it served as a useful guide, the construction of a full scale real model to monitor 
the whole aid programme was probably not likely due to the time and amount of data that would have to be maintained by CIDA to 
keep the it current. Given the difficulty CIDA has in maintaining even a rudimentary project monitoring system, the level of record 
keeping was probably beyond them. In contrast, the World Bank could probably manage such a monitoring system if there was the 
interest.
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reach the poor. This gives us an index of targeted aid for each sector termed the 
Target Factor. When this is weighted with the actual allocation of aid the resultant 
is the Target Index.
2. We define the poor, for whom targeted aid is meant, as that proportion of the 
population living beneath the poverty line. In Cases I and II we assume that it is 
60 per cent, a figure somewhat lower than FAO estimates and closer to Ahmed and 
Hossain’s estimates.85 In Case III we assume it is 80 per cent
3. The proceeds from commodity aid are used to finance the Annual Development 
Plan, therefore, proceeds are allocated to the various sectors in the same proportion 
as the Annual Development Plan.
4. Food aid is somewhat more complex since it takes several forms. The food sold 
through statutory rationing and priority categories is initially allocated a targeting 
factor of 0.0 per cent in Case I reflecting that it benefits a fixed income, urban 
population. Food sold through the modified ration system is allocated a targeting 
factor of 33 per cent, a rough approximation of the subsidy element (see Table 
3.5). Food aid distributed through the Relief, Vulnerable Group Feeding and Food 
for Work programmes is allocated an 80 per cent targeting factor representing a 
conservative estimate of how much is "appropriated". Marketing Operations and 
Open Market Sales are allocated a targeting factor of 0.0 per cent. In Cases II and 
III it is accorded the targeting factor of the ADP.
5. Project aid is allocated among the sectors in the same proportion as it has been 
historically as detailed in the Flow of External Resources.
6. Using the split between investment and non-investment expenditure as calculated 
from the Annual Development Plan86 and incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) of 
2.587 we then calculate the addition to national income derived from aid for both 
groups.
7. The contribution to each group is then distributed evenly throughout the group, i.e., 
that allocated to those below the poverty line is distributed among the bottom 60 
per cent and that allocated to those above the poverty line is allocated to the top 40 
per cent for Cases I and II and among the bottom 80 per cent and the top 20 
per cent in Case III.
8. Starting with the known distribution of income for 1973/74 we subtract that amount 
which our model predicts is attributable to foreign aid. The same process is then 
applied to the predicted 1974/75, 1975/76 and 1976/77 distribution. The result is 
then compared to the actual known 1976/77 distribution of income and resultant 
Gini Coefficient.
9. Finally we vary some of the assumptions in order to see the effect that this has on 
the results.
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It should be clear from the foregoing that we will not arrive at a specific 
number which will give us a quantitative answer as to the effectiveness of aid in reaching 
the poor. Rather what we expect will be an order of magnitude within which we can 
estimate the impact on poverty from changes in the allocation of aid from one sector to 
another and from one form of aid to another. We expect also to gain some appreciation 
of the effects of changes in various assumptions.
In Table 5.2 we develop the Target Factor of the expected allocation of aid to 
the poor based on analysis of the projects that the Government has developed for 
financing and published in the "List of Aid Worthy Projects".
In Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, using the weights developed in Table 5.2 and the 
estimates of aid targeted the amount of foreign aid likely to benefit the poor, we 
calculate the weights for food aid, commodity aid and project aid.
In some sectors it will be easy to come to a conclusion as to what portion of 
aid or of the ADP is likely to reach the poor, but in other sectors the selection of weights 
will be more contentious. In order to give an accurate estimate it would be necessary to 
evaluate the amount "appropriated" by Government, corruption and the amount which 
was targeted at more well off segments of society for every project in the ADP and for 
every aid project. Given the scarcity of accurate information, the fact that this question 
does not even form a requisite part of most project evaluations, particularly in the 
traditional infrastructure oriented sectors, it is doubtful whether we would be much the 
wiser at the end of such a valuation. The very simple methodology could, however, be 
incorporated into future programme designs in order that projects could be assessed on 
the share they contribute to the poorer elements of society.
In Table 5.2 the Target Factor is the estimated percentage of aid in each 
particular sector that reaches the poor from the financing of the Annual Development 
Plan. The first column is our estimate from the analysis of 178 projects from the total of 
183 in the "List of Aid Worthy Projects: 1984". Five projects in the religious affairs 
sector and the area of sports and culture were not included since neither were unlikely to 
be considered by most donors.
It should be noted that for some types of aid such as cyclone reconstruction 
and population which are targeted at people living in vulnerable areas we have assumed 
that 100 per cent reaches the poor. It should also be noted that we have not made any
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specific estimate of the amounts "appropriated" through corruption because of the 
difficulty in substantiating any particular figure despite the cases documented in Chapter 
III. It might be assumed that it will be "appropriated" from those least able to protect 
their share and hence most would come from that portion allocated to the poorest. As we 
have seen from the research carried out by BRAC and documented in The Net at least 
some 20 per cent is "appropriated" either through corruption or use for other purposes. 
This will have to serve as a rough approximation of the case with corruption included. 
From our examples this would appear to be a credible figure.*
The Target Factor was developed for each sector from an analysis of 178 "aid 
worthy" projects in the List of Aid Worthy Projects: 1984. We reviewed all the projects 
listed except 5 projects under religious affairs and culture and sports. There were 178 
projects worth some $7,976.9 million. We have used the total value of projects in each 
sector to calculate the Target Factor which was then used to calculate the Target Index of 
the Annual Development Plan, and the allocation of project aid. The following are the 
classes of project included:
1. 17 projects in the agriculture sector worth $1,486.9 million;
2. 9 projects in rural development worth $137.6 million;
3. 14 projects in irrigation worth $702.3 million;
4. 24 projects in the industrial sector worth $1,322.9 million;
5. 16 projects in the power sector worth 1,775.6 million;
6. 10 projects in the natural resources sector worth $668.4 million;
7. 3 science research projects worth $24.2 million;
8. 9 communications projects worth $106.1 million;
9. 4 media projects worth $7.5 million;
10. 15 physical planning projects worth $133.7 million;
11. 18 transportation projects worth $765.2 million;
12. 12 education projects worth $371.8 million;
13. 1 public administration project worth $1.1 million;
14. 16 health projects worth $79.7 million;
15. 3 population projects worth $51.3 million;
*In the writer’s experience the figure generally accepted by CIDA management, but not formally acknowledged, was about 20 
per cent of all food aid to Bangladesh was diverted through corruption.
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16. 4 social welfare projects worth $9.4 million;
17. 2 manpower projects worth $9.6 million, and;
18. 1 government decentralisation project worth $200.0 million.
Agriculture: Projects in the agriculture/rural development/irrigation sector, 
which has accounted for 49.6 per cent of GDP at market prices from 1973 to 1985,“ 
have a total value of 19.6 per cent of the total value of projects in our proxy.89 If we also 
compare this with the total value of actual project aid to this sector from 1973 to 1985 we 
find that it is very similar at 20.9 per cent.90
Crops: Within the sector there were nine projects in the crop sub-sector: four 
are concerned with the construction or rehabilitation of food storage facilities, one with 
the modernisation of a flour and feed mill, one with the rehabilitation of the food 
transport system, one with the reorganisation of the food directorate, one with the 
establishment of agricultural sectors centres for the supply of inputs such as fertiliser and 
HYV seed which were designed to meet the needs of the cooperative system which is 
dominated by the wealthier elements of the rural community. The last, and largest, was 
for the importation and distribution of fertiliser. Construction projects are unlikely to 
benefit the very poor even as a source of employment, since the poor are generally 
unskilled except at basic agriculture and associated activities. Some benefit might 
possibly be derived by the poorest from the fertiliser project which accounts for the bulk 
of the value of the projects in the crop sector, however, as de Vylder and others have 
pointed out the utilisation of inputs, such as high yielding varieties, irrigation and 
fertiliser on a per acre basis is far lower for small farms than for large91 and we also 
know that share croppers are among the lowest users of fertiliser and other inputs because 
they incur the expense, but the owner derives most of the profit.92 Furthermore, if we 
recall that about 40 per cent of the population are functionally landless so that even small 
landholders are relatively well off. We therefore allocate a nominal 20 per cent of the 
fertiliser portion in the crop sector to the poorest. In the agriculture sector there are also 
two forestry projects, but both are heavily capital intensive providing no benefit to the 
poorest and possibly even having a negative employment effect. We allocate a Target 
Factor 0.
Two fisheries projects are listed, one establishing wholesale markets and one 
monitoring catches. Considering that Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita
Chapter V
218
consumption rates of animal protein in the world, at 3.62 seers per person per annum93 
(1 seer = 0.9331 kg.), it is unlikely that wholesale markets would do much to benefit the 
poorest.
Finally in the livestock sector we find only one project of the four listed, the 
introduction of village poultry, that would benefit the poorest. The others: feed and 
fodder production, veterinary dispensaries, artificial insemination were unlikely to benefit 
any except the better off farmers or the bureaucracy.
Our conclusion is that the poor farmer or landless sharecropper does not 
derive any benefit from any of the projects listed in the Government’s list of selected 
projects except from the poultry project which represented 0.05 per cent of all the 
agricultural projects or 0.7 per cent of the agriculture projects less the provision of 
fertiliser. Target Factor, 0.1.
Rural Development: A review of nine rural development projects concluded 
that five of the nine worth 57.4 per cent on the total value of all the rural developments 
would directly benefit the poor. These were training programmes for landless people 
such as mechanics, small scale irrigation projects, two targeted income generation 
programmes and a rural roads project. Those judged to not contribute were such things 
as training of thana (upazila) officers and produce marketing which would likely be of 
benefit to the better off farmers who are members of the co-operative system, which it is 
known to benefit largely the relatively wealthy farmer. We thus calculate a value of
57.4 per cent to the Target Factor.
Irrigation: In the irrigation sector we assumed that the irrigation projects 
proposed in themselves were unlikely to benefit the poorest since they tended to be 
capital intensive. It has been shown in Chapter III how rural elites tend to dominate the 
irrigation sector. We assume, however, that they would benefit from drainage and flood 
protection so that out of the 14 projects listed five had large drainage and flood protection 
components representing some 21.7 per cent of the proposed investment. If we assign 50 
per cent of the benefit to the poor this will give us a Target Factor of 10.8 per cent for 
the irrigation sector.
Industry: In the industrial sector, of the eighteen projects listed, six were 
proposed by the Bangladesh Small Cottage Industries Corporation are aimed at small 
businessmen. We include them as potentially benefiting the poor simply because they are
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aimed at small businessmen and might provide employment for the unskilled poor. Such 
projects as the rehabilitation of a paper mill, construction of a soda ash factory and a 
polyester plant are excluded. The Zia Fertiliser Factory is also excluded since we have 
counted the some benefits from fertiliser in the agriculture sector and the plant itself 
would not help the very poor. These are all capital intensive projects providing little or 
no employment opportunities for unskilled labour. The fertiliser factory would benefit 
poor through lower prices but there would be a significant lag effect. Target Factor is 
0.7 per cent.
Energy: Power, research and natural resources projects were calculated both 
individually and then aggregated since they are considered a single sector in the ADP, but 
differentiated in the breakdown of project aid. In the power sector all projects were 
concerned with generation and transmission were excluded on the grounds that only 3.5 
percent of the total population have access to electricity.94 We include rural electrification 
on the grounds that it has the potential to provide rural employment although, as has been 
pointed out by observers, it also has the potential to create unemployment, as in the much 
cited case of the mechanised rice mills. The value of projects that would benefit the poor 
was 14.2 per cent for the energy sector. Construction projects benefit the poor and 
unskilled in brick breaking but these are negligible when compared to the rest of the 
investment.
Natural Resources: Natural resources projects were almost wholly concerned 
with the exploration, transmission and distribution of natural gas. No projects were 
likely to benefit the poor. Gas is not distributed in the rural areas. Two research/science 
projects included were also unlikely to benefit the poor. Combined together they gave us 
Target Factor of 10.2 per cent for the natural resources sector.
Communications: In the communications sector, the projects were concerned 
largely with the improvement of the telephone and telex systems. These were unlikely to 
benefit the poor. Two projects aimed at improving communications with the rural areas 
were worth 39.9 per cent of the value of the communications projects and we estimated 
that possibly 50 per cent of the benefit might accrue to the poor so our Target Factor for 
the communications sector was calculated to be 18.7.
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In the area of media, community broadcasting was considered potentially 
beneficial as a teaching tool, but it accounted for less than half a per cent of the projects 
presented, resulting in a Target Factor for the sector of 0.4 per cent.
Housing: The area of physical planning yielded 4 out of 15 projects concerned 
with rural sanitation that could potentially improve the lot of the poor. The Target Factor 
was 49.8.
Transport: In the transport sector, two projects, concerned with the 
improvement of rural roads, out of 18 transport projects, were potentially of benefit to 
the poor. One consisted of the improvement of upazila roads that could provide 
employment and improved access to markets. The other project was concerned with the 
provision of bridges and equipment for rural roads. The balance of the projects were 
concerned with such projects as the purchase of vessels for Bangladesh Shipping Lines, a 
maintenance hangar complex for Bangladesh Biman’s DC 10 aircraft and the provision of 
locomotives for Bangladesh Railway. All these were highly capital intensive. The 
Target Factor was 38.7.
Education:In the education sector, 2 projects accounting for 43.8 per cent of 
the projects analysed were of benefit to the poor and assigned Target Factors of 100. 
Secondary and tertiary education were excluded on the grounds that the poorest, with 
very limited access to education both by virtue of their access to schooling and their 
economic situation, would not benefit from it. The projects included were Universal 
Primary Education and Distance Education. The Target Factor was established at 43.8 
per cent for the education sector.
Public Administration: There was on public administration project. Target
Factor, 0.
Health: In health, four of the sixteen projects presented could benefit the 
poor, and they were each assigned a target factor of 100. Most health projects were 
concerned with the provision of curative facilities that the poorest would never have 
access to; or with training for hospital workers, rather than for rural health assistants who 
work in the rural areas. The Target Factor was 8.5.
Population: In the population sector all projects potentially benefitted the poor 
being concerned with the provision of maternal and child health care that has proven in
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the past to be a necessary adjunct to successful family planning. Target Factors were 
assigned to each. The Target Factor was 100.
Social Welfare: Of the social welfare projects that were included, one out of 
the four assessed qualified, the others being concerned mostly with rehabilitation of the 
handicapped.* Our Target Factor was 71.4.
Manpower an Labour: In the area of manpower, most planned resources were 
targeted at the poor mainly through employment creation programme. The Target Factor 
was 97.7.
Government Decentralisation: Finally, on the upazila allocation we estimated 
that some 25 per cent of the proposed expenditure which is mainly concerned with the 
provision of infrastructure in the rural areas might benefit the poor through employment 
opportunities created in the rural areas and assigned a target factor of 25. The Target 
Factor was set at 25.
Non-Governmental Organisations: Private contributions, the non­
governmental organisations, contribute a substantial proportion of the foreign aid which 
reaches Bangladesh. Their assistance is generally aimed at the poor. Nevertheless, they 
too have expenses such as housing, transportation, local salaries, etc. We assigned 
private organisations a Target Factor of 75 per cent.
The foregoing is certainly not comprehensive and is largely the result of 
subjective judgments, but it serves to give us an indication of what priority the 
Government puts on the rural areas when drawing up its list of priorities. The other 
projects are not "bad" projects. Even the poorest countries must undertake hydrological 
studies, civil aviation training and the exploitation of natural resources. Such projects do /  ' 
not, however, contribute to a short-run improvement in the distribution of income since 
they improve the incomes of those who are already relatively well off: bureaucrats, 
professionals, skilled labour and the modem private sector. The foregoing distribution of 
proposed investment is strongly biased against the rural poor who in the case of 
Bangladesh form the majority. A country which has a smaller proportion of its 
population below the poverty line, such as Sri Lanka, might be able to afford to balance a 
slight erosion in distribution of income against the benefit of improved economic growth,
*Only the relatively well off of the handicapped receive assistance or access to facilities in this very poor country. Most 
handicapped are left to eke out a subsistence existence as best they can from begging or scrounging.
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but a country such as Bangladesh which allows the standard of living of the majority of 
its population to deteriorate while a small minority get wealthier is headed toward 
disaster. The calculations are summarised in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2
Development of Indices for the Allocation of Aid to the Poor
Sector
AWP
Sectoral
Share Valne
Value of 
Targeted 
Projects
Target
Factor
Agriculture Sector
Agriculture 19.5% $1557.3 $290.8 18.7%
Rural Development 1.7 137.6 79.0 57.4
Water & Flood Control 8.8 702.3 152.6 21.7
Industry 16.6 1322.9 9.7 0.7
Power 22.3 1775.6 251.8 14.2
Natural Resources 8.7 692.0 0.0 0.0
Transport 9.6 765.2 289.1 37.8
Communications 1.4 113.6 41.8 36.8
Physical Planning & Housing 2.1 168.9 67.1 39.7
Social Sector
Education 4.7 371.8 163.0 43.8
Health 1.0 79.7 5.2 6.5
Population 0.6 51.3 51.3 100.0
Social Welfare 0.4 28.0 20.0 71.4
Manpower 0.1 9.6 9.4 97.9
Public Administration 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
Upazila (None) 2.5 200.0 100.0 50.0
Cyclone Reconstruction (None) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other (None) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0% $7,976.9 1,530.8 19.2%
Sources: ADP sectoral shares are calculated from World Bank, Bangladesh: Recent 
Economic Development and Medium Term Prospects. Report No. 6049 in 2 vols, Vol. 11:
Statistical Appendix, March 17, 1986, table 5.4, p. 29. Target Indexes were calculated from 178 
projects in Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, P lanning Commission, List of Aid Worthy Projects:
1984.
Projects in media, religious affairs and culture and sports were not calculated.
Food Aid. Next we consider the case of food aid. This includes Vulnerable 
Group Feeding and Food For Work and to a lesser extent the Modified Ration System 
which, though it sells the food, does so at a subsidised price. Food aid is not included in 
the ADP and so we will have to determine separate indices for them. It is generally 
agreed that much food is diverted by those responsible for its distribution. As we have 
seen in the cases cited in Chapter III. Let us assume that 20 per cent of the food in the 
first two programmes is "appropriated” for handling charges or through corruption 
resulting in a Target Factor of 80. This would be consistent with what, in this writer’s 
experience, aid officials appear to be satisfied with and to tolerate. We know that 7.5 
per cent of the food is used to pay administrative charges. This is the figure negotiated 
with the Ministry of Food for the handling of food that was monetised to finance the
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Rural Maintenance Programme carried out by CIDA and CARE in 1985.* That another
12.5 per cent goes astray is credible. For the modified ration system we will assume a 
figure equal to the average subsidy on the value of the food provided through this 
channel. We see from Table 5.3 that the proportion of food aid that is targeted at the 
poorest through the Food for Work Programme has averaged 22.2 per cent from 1974 to 
1985, for the Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding in Programmes is 7.7 per cent and 
for the modified ration system is 33.9 per cent. The subsidy element of the modifies 
ration system averages about 33** per cent (See Table 3.7) so we use this as the Target 
Factor for the Modified Rationing System.
TABLE 5.3
Apportionment of Targeted Food Aid Resources to the Poor
Target
Share
(Average)
Target 
Factor 
Case I
Target 
Index 
Case I
Target 
Factor 
Cases II
Target 
Index 
Case II
Target 
Factor 
Case III
Target 
Index 
Case m
Statutory Rationing 20.1 0.0 0.0 25.6 5.1 28.1 5.6
Priority Categories 34.0 0.0 0.0 25.6 8.7 28.1 9.6
Modified Rationing 22.3 33.0 7.4 33.0 7.4 33.0 7.4
Relief and VGF 5.1 80.0 4.1 80.0 4.1 80.0 4.1
Food for Work 14.6 80.0 11.7 80.0 11.7 80.0 11.7
Marketing Operations 1.4 0.0 0.0 25.6 0.4 28.1 0.4
Open Market Sales 2.5 0.0 0.0 25.6 0.6 28.1 0.7
Total 100.0% 23.2% 38.0% 39.5%
Sources: Average share of food allocated to each channel calculated from World Bank: Bangladesh: Economic and 
Social Development Prospects. Report No. 5409, 4 vols, Vol. IV: Statistical Appendix, April 12, 1985, tabic 10.1, p. 134.
After allocations to the Relief, Vulnerable Group Feeding and Food for Work 
Programmes, the remaining food aid is sold through the ration system or through open 
market sales. The proceeds go to finance the Annual Development Plan. In Case I we 
ignore this and in Cases II and III the revenues are apportioned according to the weight 
of the sectors in the Annual Development Plan.
The following are the assumptions about whether sectors are likely to benefit 
the poor or not. We should recall that the Annual Development Plan is a reflection of 
the Government of Bangladesh’s priorities. The non-project portion is largely financed 
with the proceeds from the sale of commodities to state corporations or companies in the
*In 1985 the writer negotiated a food aid programme with the Government of Bangladesh. The proceeds from the sale of a 
fixed amount of food provided by Canada were to be monetised and the proceeds used to pay women in the unions to maintain union 
roads. Initially the Ministry of Food demanded 30 per cent in administrative charges for converting the food into currency. Finally a 
figure of 7.5 per cent was agreed upon.
**An unweighted average of the periodic subsidy factor works out to be about 26 per cent for rices and 12 per cent for wheat. 
Since we have no way of calculating the real subsidy factor. Thirty three per cent appears to be a realistic estimate.
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private sector and the sale of food through the ration system. On the average from 
1972/73 until 1983/84 domestic revenue financed 21.5 percent of the Annual 
Development Plan revenue, project aid 36.2 per cent, non-project aid, i.e., commodities, 
32.0 per cent and food aid 10.2 per cent.
TABLE 5.4 
Application of Target Factor on the ADP
ADP
Sectoral
Share
Target
Factor
Target
Index
Agriculture Sector
Agriculture 13.1 18.6 2.4
Rural Development 3.3 57.4 1.9
Water & Flood Control 13.3 21.7 2.9
Industry 11.7 0.7 0.1
Power & Natural Resources 19.6 14.2 2.8
Transport 14.5 37.8 5.5
Comm unications 3.0 36.8 1.1
Physical Planning & Housing 5.7 39.7 2.3
Social Sector
Education 4.1 43.8 1.8
Health 2.9 6.6 0.2
Population 2.5 100.0 2.5
Social Welfare 0.6 71.4 0.4
Manpower 0.5 97.7 0.5
Upazilas 3.2 25.0 0.8
Cyclone Reconstruction 0.4 100.0 0.4
Other 1.2 0.0 0.0
Total 99.6 25.6
Sources: ADP sectoral shares are calculated from World Bank, Bangladesh:
Recent Economic Development and Medium Term Prospects. Report No 6049 2 vols,
Vol. II: Statistical Appendix March 17, 1986, table 5.4, p. 29. Target Indexes were 
calculated from projects in Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Planning Commission,
List of Aid Worthy Projects: 1984. p. 1-431.
Projects in media religious affairs and culture and sports were not calculated
What we see from the above is that aid that is targeted at the poor tends to be 
in sectors that are small in terms of the aid that they receive. Thus, in sectors such as 
population and social welfare, even if all the aid is targeted at the poor it does not
significantly affect the total amount that they receive. Conversely, in sectors such as the
energy and natural resources sectors, only a small amount reaches the poor while the rest 
benefits the middle and upper classes. Even a modest increase in the amount of aid for 
energy focussed on projects that the poor would benefit from, such as social forestry for 
firewood production, would increase their share considerably. The problem is that, given 
the capital bias95 and the limited administrative capacity of both the donors and the 
recipient96 and the stress on disbursement by the former, it is far more attractive to spend
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millions on a thermal generating station than it is on a demonstrably more complex and 
diffuse project such as social forestry. Likewise, we also see that, while transport is only 
a small part of the GDP, transport and communications averaged around 7 per cent (see 
Table 3.9),97 but received almost 18 per cent of the allocations under the Annual 
Development Plan (see Table 5.4). Again there were no projects that were targeted at 
the informal part of the water transport sector, i.e., country boats, which account for 
some 80 to 90 per cent of the value added in transport and communications.98 The reason 
is the same as that given above. The capital bias and pressure to disburse means that the 
propensity for the recipient to ask for, and for the donor to respond positively to, such 
items as locomotives for the railway sector which declined from about 4.6 per cent of the 
value added in 1972/73, when the railway infrastructure had been badly damaged by the 
War, to some 2.4 per cent of value added in 1983/84, after million of dollars of aid had 
been invested.99 Once again we see what de Vylder means by the capital bias of aid.100
Project aid Project aid has been allocated using the same indices that we 
developed above, but weighted by the actual historical allocation of project aid among the 
various sectors.
Project aid is more a reflection of donor priorities that the Annual 
Development Plan. We see from Table 5.5 that project aid has even more propensity to 
flow to the capital intensive sectors of the economy. Where the Annual Development 
Plan allocated 10.6 per cent to the social sectors (Table 5.4), project aid from the donors 
only allocates some 9.3 per cent (Table 5.5). In the agricultural sector the Annual 
Development Plan has allocated some 29.7 per cent of the country’s resources to 
agriculture rural development and irrigation (Table 5.4), whereas the donors have only 
spent some 20.9 per cent of their aid on agricultural assistance. What de Vylder terms 
the "capital bias" is again made clear.101
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TABLE 5.5 
Apportionment of Project Aid
Sector
Project
Aid
Allocation
Target
Factor
Target
Index
Agriculture Sector
Agriculture 9.8 18.6 1.8
Rural Development 2.5 57.4 1.4
Water & Flood Control 8.6 21.7 1.9
Industry 14.8 0.7 0.1
Power 16.5 14.2 2.3
Natural Resources 8.1 0.0 0.0
Transport 17.5 37.8 6.6
Communications 2.2 36.8 0.8
Housing 2.2 39.7 0.9
Social Sector
Education 2.7 43.8 1.2
Health 2.4 6.6 0.2
Population 3.6 100.0 3.6
Social Welfare 0.4 71.4 0.3
Manpower 0.2 97.7 0.2
Public Administration 0.4 0.0 0.0
Cyclone Reconstruction 0.6 75.0 0.5
Private NGOs 7.3 75.0 5.5
Total 99.8 27.3
Average share of project aid to each sector calculated from Bangladesh 
External Resources Division, Ministry of Finance Flow of External Resources into 
Bangladesh (As of June 30. 1985). table 16, pp. 162-163.
The methodology for calculating the share of national income for each group 
is outlined in the following tables for the year 1973/74. From the Target Indices 
calculated above we can now apportion aid actually provided between targeted aid, 
directed at the lower 60 per cent of the society and untargeted aid which benefits the top 
40 per cent. Table 5.6 divides aid in 1973/74 into targeted and untargeted aid using the 
indices that we have developed for each year.
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TABLE 5.6
Apportionment of Targeted and Untargeted Aid - 1973/74
Target
Index
73/74
Aid
Targeted
Aid
Untargeted
Aid
Food Aid 0.1726 $228,745 $39,472 $189,273
Programme Aid 0.2837 108,137 30,675 77,462
Project Aid 0.2825 124,355 34,711 89,220
$461,237 $105,282 $355,955
Sources: Target Index derived from 1984 List of Aid Worthy Projects and
weighted according to the importance of each sector in the distribution of food, the
Annual Development Plan and the breakdown of project aid. Aid for the year taken 
from Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (As of June 30. 19851.
Once aid has been separated into targeted and untargeted aid, its effective 
value is calculated by splitting it into consumption and investment. This is derived by 
using the split between investment and non-investment government development 
expenditure in each year and is shown in Table 5.7. It must also be converted from 
United States Dollars, which is used to denominate aid flows in the Flow of External
Resources and this is done using the average exchange rate for the year in Table 5.9.
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Classification of Development Expenditure
[Taka in Crores]
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84
Investment 215.2 284.6 479.0 647.4 8669.9 9295.6 13493.2 14778.4 15783.5 17424.2 22335.2
Hon-Investment 96.5 143.5 242.5 270.6 3526.4 6250.3 8232.5 9904.6 9745.8 6847.9 8071.2
311.7 428.1 721.5
Sources: Banqladesh Bureau of Statistics
o f Bangladesh, table 9.5, p. 560.
TABLE 5.8
Calculation of Effective Targeted and Untargeted Aid - 1973/74
Ratio of Contribution Ra t i o of Contribution Total
Aid I COR Investment to to National Non-Investment to National Contribution
Developmen t Income of to Developmen t Income of to National
Expend i ture Investment Expenditure Investment Income
Targeted Aid $105,282 0- 4 0.6904 29,073 0.3096 31,698 59,964
Untargeted Aid $355,955 0 . 4 0.6904 98,295 0.3096 111,118 210,210
Sources: Target Index derived from List of Aid Worthy Projects and weighted according to the importance of each sector in the
distribution of food the Annual Development Plan and the breakdown of project aid for the year taken from Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh
TABLE 5.9 
Average Exchange Rates
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84
Fiscal Year Averages 7.9661 8.8759 14.8521 15.4667 15.1215 15.2228 15.4777 16.3447 20.0400 23.7629 24.9486
Sources: World Bank, South Asia Programs Department Bangladesh: Economic and Social Development P r o s p e c t s . 4 vols. Vol. IV: Statistical
Appendix, April 12, 1985, table 6.1, p. 49.
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Finally, in Table 5.10 we allocate the contribution of targeted aid to national 
income to the bottom 60 per cent of the population and the contribution of the untargeted 
aid to the top 40 per cent of the population and subtract it thus simulating the 
performance of the economy if foreign aid were absent. For 1973/74 we use the actual 
distribution of income.102 The equal distribution of income among the different quintiles 
is probably not realistic since those with at the top end of either group would probably 
benefit more.
For the purpose of the model we assume an incremental capital output ratio 
(ICOR) of 2.5 as Faaland and Parkinson have suggested.103
TABLE 5.10
Apportionment of Targeted Aid to the Distribution of Income 1973/74
First Second Third Fourth Ninth Tenth Gini
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Decile Decile Coefficiei
Distribution of Foreign Aid 163.8 163.8 163.8 830.5 415.3 415.3
Actual 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.9% 11.3% 16.1% 23.5% 14.8% 27.4%
Distribution of National Income 6.9% 18.2% 34.3% 57.8% 72.6% 100.0% 0.3438
Cumulative Distribution of N1 4,904.9 12,937.7 24,382.5 41,087.7 51,608.4 71,086.0
Cumulative Distribution of Aid 163.8 327.5 491.3 1,321.8 1,737.1 2,152.3
Derived Cumulative Distribution of NI 4,741.2 12,610.1 23,891.2 39,765.9 49,871.8 68,933.7
Derived Cumulative Distribution of NI% 6.9% 18.3% 34.7% 57.7% 72.3% 100.0 0.3429
Derived 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.9% 11.4% 16.4% 23.0% 14.7% 27.7%
Sources: Distribution of income for 1973/74 from World Bank, World Development Report 1984. (New York: Oxford
University Press for the World Bank, 1984) table 28, p. 272.
Line 1 of Table 5.10 shows our simulated distribution of aid. Line 2 of the 
graph shows the actual distribution of income. Line 3 shows the actual distribution of 
income converted to cumulative. Line 4 shows the distribution of actual national income 
to each quintile or decile. Line 5 shows the cumulative distribution of our simulated 
distribution of effective aid. Line 6 shows the new derived distribution of national 
income with aid removed. Line 8 shows the new distribution of income. In the last 
column of line 3 we have calculated the actual Gini Coefficient for the existing 1973/74 
distribution of income. At the end of line 7 we have calculated the derived Gini 
Coefficient for 1973/74 without aid and we note that it has decreased, reflecting a slightly 
more equitable distribution of income. The conclusion from this, therefore, is that as you 
take away aid, distributed as it is in our model, the distribution of income becomes 
slightly more equitable.
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TABLE 5.11
Derived Distribution of Income 1974/75 to 1976/77 - Case I
First
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Third
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Ninth
Decile
Tenth
Decile
Gini
Coefficient
Actual 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.9% 11.3% 16.1% 23.5% 14.8% 27.4% 0.3438
Derived 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.9 11.4 16.4 23.0 14.7 27.7 0.3429
Derived 1974/75 Distribution of Income 6.8 11.5 16.7 22.5 14.5 28.0 0.3423
Derived 1975/76 Distribution of Income 6.7 11.8 17.3 21.4 14.2 28.6 0.3417
Derived 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.7 11.9 17.7 20.6 14.0 29.1 0.3411
Actual 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.2 10.9 15.0 21.0 14.9 32.0 0.3831
Sources: Actual distribution of income for 1973/74 is from World Bank, World Development Report 1984. (New York: 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1984), table 28, p. 272. and the actual distribution of income for 1976/77 is from 
World Bank, World Development Report 1986. (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1986), table 23, p. 226.
In Table 5.11 the same methodology has been used to calculate respectively 
the derived distribution of income, should aid be removed from the economy, for fiscal 
years 1973/74 to 1976/77. The last column shows the calculated Gini Coefficient for 
each year. We see that it has steadily decreased as we have removed aid from the 
economy resulting in an increasingly more equitable distribution of income. This is 
confirmed by the first two columns where we see that the first two quintiles, the lowest 
40 per cent of the population, have a slightly larger share of the national income. The 
first quintile has dropped 0.2 per cent while the second quintile has increased by 0.5 
per cent. The last line, however, shows the real distribution of income for 1976/77. In 
comparison with our model the Gini Coefficient has actually increased resulting in a more 
inequitable distribution.
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This model is not proof of the how harmful foreign aid can be. There are far 
too many variables, including the crudeness and subjectivity of our assessment of the 
amount that benefits the upper class, the particular time chosen, which coincides with 
both the 1974 famine and the political turmoil surrounding the assassination of Mujib. It 
does show, however, that aid distributed primarily to the better off elements of society 
tends to shift the distribution of income to an increasingly less equitable situation. What 
makes this tentative conclusion all the more interesting is to recall from Chapter IV, 
Table 4.4, that during the time Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, was being neglected and 
not receiving its "fair share" of aid the distribution of income was actually increasing in 
equity. In other words it appears that foreign could be doing precisely what it is 
designed to cure, according to its adherents, worsening the lot of the poorest.
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TABLE 5.12
Derived Distribution of Income 1974/75 to 1976/77 - Case II
First Second Third Fourth Ninth Tenth Gini
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Decile Decile Coefficient
Actual 1973/74 Distribution of income 6.9% 11.3% 16.1% 23.5% 14.8% 27.4% 0.3438
Derived 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.8 11.3 16.3 23.1 14.7 27.7 0.3450
Derived 1974/75 Distribution of Income 6.7 11.4 16.5 22.7 14.6 28.1 0.3468
Derived 1975/76 Distribution of Income 6.4 11.5 17.0 21.8 14.4 28.9 0.3509
Derived 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.3 11.6 17.3 21.2 14.2 29.3 0.3523
Actual 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.2 10.9 15.0 21.0 14.9 32.0 0.3831
Sources: Actual distribution of income for 1973/74 is from World Bank, World Development Report 1984. table 28, p. 272. 
and the actual distribution of income for 1976/77 is from World Bank, World Development Report 1986. table 23, p. 226.
In Table 5.12 we have repeated the same calculations except that we have 
counted as benefits the revenue derived from the sale of food aid through the ration
system and calculated its Target Index from the Annual Development Plan which it
partially finances. The results are more mixed than Case I. The Gini Coefficient 
increases slightly indicating that overall equity is still decreasing, but not to the extent 
that it does with aid included. The conclusion here is that the distribution is sensitive to
the amount reaching the poorer elements.
FIGURE 5.2
Derived Lorenz Curves Without Aid 
Case II
100 '
90-
80-
03
I 70-Oc
60-co
0
1z No Clear Trend 
Case II
Actual30-I
20 -
1 0 -
90 100
Percentage of Population
 A c tu a l 1 9 7 4  -------  D e r iv e d  1 9 7 4  -------  D e r iv e d  1 9 7 5
  D e r iv e d  1 9 7 6  -------  D e r iv e d  1 9 7 7  ------- A c tu a l 1 9 7 7
_________________________________________________________
Chapter V
233
Finally in Table 5.13 we repeat the exercise, but we decrease our definition 
of the upper class from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. This would be consistent with both 
Farouk’s and Sobhan’s assessment of the size of the population really benefitting from 
foreign aid. We also increase the benefit from fertiliser from 20 per cent to 40 per cent 
for the poorer classes since the additional 20 per cent of the population would include 
small landholders who would use fertiliser.
TABLE 5.13
Derived Distribution of Income 1974/75 to 1976/77 - Case HI
First
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Third
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Ninth
Decile
Tenth
Decile
Gini
Coefficient
Actual 1973/74 Distribution of income 6.9% 11.3% 16.1% 23.5% 14.8% 27.4% 0.3438
Derived 1973/74 Distribution of Income 6.9 11.4 16.4 24.0 14.2 27.2 0.3391
Derived 1974/75 Distribution of Income 6.8 11.5 16.7 24.6 13.4 26.9 0.3338
Derived 1975/76 Distribution of Income 6.7 11.8 17.3 25.8 12.0 26.4 0.3236
Derived 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.7 12.0 17.8 26.6 10.9 26.0 0.3155
Actual 1976/77 Distribution of Income 6.2 10.9 15.0 21.0 14.9 32.0 0.3831
Sources: Actual distribution of income for 1973/74 is from World Bank, World Development Report 1984. table 28, p. 272. 
and the actual distribution of income for 1976/77 is from World Bank, World Development Report 1986. table 23, p. 226.
The results here are much more dramatic and we see a steadily decreasing 
Gini Coefficient indicating an improvement in the distribution of income that is quite 
dramatic.
If we compare this trend to the income distribution situation between 1963/64 
and 1968/69 for the two areas for which the data is comparable, the lowest quintile and 
the highest quintile, (see Table 4.4). Between 1963/64 and 1968/69 the proportion of 
national income going to the lowest quintile increased from 7.7 per cent to 9.3 per cent, 
while in our model, Case III, it decreases from 6.9 per cent to 6.7 per cent but the 
second, third and fourth quintiles all show distinct improvement. At the upper end of the 
scale during the 1963/64 to 1968/69 period the share of the top quintile dropped from 
45.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent. In Case III, if we removed foreign aid their share of the 
upper quintile would drop from 41.6 per cent of the national income to 36.9 per cent.*
*The ninth and tenth deciles in Table 5.13 are added together.
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FIGURE 5.3
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Conclusions: Essentially what can be concluded from the foregoing is as
follows. If the estimated allocation of aid is predominantly to projects that benefit the
already relatively privileged, the poorer elements of society become worse off. In Case
II sensitivity analysis, which allocates more benefits from the sale of food aid to the poor,
the situation is similar. Although the Gini Coefficient has risen slightly, it is still well
below the actual for 1976/77. We note, however, that the proportion of income to the
poorest quintile is still decreasing although not to the extent that the empirical evidence
showed that it did during the period. Essentially the elimination of aid would, the model
predicts, contribute to either an increasingly equitable distribution of aid or a diminishing
of the deterioration of distribution of income. The Case III sensitivity analysis, where
the upper class is reduced, as Farouk and Sobhan has claimed it is, shows a trend that is
similar to the actual situation in the 1960s prior to which, Sobhan claims
Pakistan appropriate[d] 100% of all external resource inflows. . . . Only in the 1961/61 to 1968/69 
period was this process modified as Bangladesh moved into deficit with the rest of the world. Here 
only 11% of net external inflows coming into Pakistan accrued to Bangladesh. . . , 104
We find that very little aid actually benefits the poor who are, we will recall, 
are the principal justification for giving foreign aid. There are few targeted programmes
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in such areas as rural development population and manpower. The nature of foreign aid 
in Bangladesh is such that the poor do not have access even to the crumbs that fall from 
the capital intensive table of the government and the donors. They do not benefit from 
such things as employment. The majority of the employment provided by aid such as 
construction in the industrial or energy sectors or through the construction of such things 
as food storage facilities demands skills that they do not have. Where the poor do benefit 
directly from such programmes as Food for Work the beneficiaries of the work done to 
create the capital structures are the wealthier elements of the rural society. They do not 
benefit from investments in power and natural gas; in fact with the capital intensive 
propensity of Bangladesh, they may even be deprived of livelihood as capital intensive 
projects eliminate jobs. They do not benefit from investment in agriculture which is 
skewed heavily toward the capital intensive approach to irrigation as de Vylder has 
demonstrated.105 They benefit only marginally from the improvements in agricultural 
technology because they do not have the resources with which to meet the increased costs 
such approaches. Most food aid provided is distributed to the middle class and even to 
the upper classes. We have seen that even a large share of targeted food aid is caught in 
what BRAC terms "the net" held by the rural power structure. A very large proportion 
of rural development programmes does not reach the poor because they cater to the 
cooperative system which is dominated by the rural elite.106 The Government’s own 
efforts largely neglect the poor and the donors accept this approach and support 
investment in activities that benefit the middle class. With the distribution of income 
already skewed in favour of the upper classes, this approach contributes to their 
increasing wealth providing them with the means to increase their share even more
All of these biases translate into a situation where aid, given ostensibly to 
benefit the poor, ends up benefiting the relatively well off. If aid were distributed in the 
same proportion as the existing distribution of income, there would at least be no 
deterioration in the distribution of income. Other factors such as the population problem 
would still favour the well off as employment opportunities for them far outstrip the 
skilled work force.
If a concerted effort were made to direct aid at the poor giving them access to 
the resources that they lack now the potential in achieving growth would be quite 
significant.
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CHAPTER VI 
SUCCESSES AND COMPARISONS
Selected Successes
The Garment Industry. In recent years, since 1980, only one industry, garment 
manufacturing, has grown quickly. From exports of US$3.24 million in fiscal year 1981, 
when it accounted for 0.5 per cent of export earnings, it has grown to an estimated 
US$116.2 in fiscal year 1985, accounting for some 12.4 percent of exports.1 This makes it 
an important source of foreign exchange and the fastest growing export product. This rapid 
growth attracted attention in the importing countries and their response, the imposition of 
import quotas, set back the rate of growth.
Several external factors were responsible for this rapid growth. Other traditional 
exporters were completely utilising their quotas. Bangladesh, as a low income country, was 
not yet subject to quotas. The garment industry, being labour intensive, lent itself to rapid 
expansion with minimal risk to outside investors in terms of investment and capital 
equipment and maximum opportunity to local entrepreneurs. The cost of labour was low. 
Workers are easily trained. Thus, the industry was marked by a proliferation of 
manufacturers both from outside the country, and from within it. Growth has been 
somewhat chaotic. This has been complicated by the imposition of quotas and the resulting 
need devise a system to allocate export quotas. Nevertheless, it has been steady and 
provides ample evidence of the capacity of the country to respond to market opportunities. 
Ironically it has accomplished one of the objectives that aid has pursued with only marginal 
success: the introduction of women into the cash economy. Bangladesh does not have the 
repressive reputation of some other Islamic countries with respect to its treatment of women. 
It does, however, restrict their participation in the economy. Women who do enter the 
economy often do so because extreme poverty has forced them to. They are largely
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agriculture, except where poverty has forced them to break social taboos. To the casual 
observer in Dhaka before the emergence of the garment industry women were rarely seen 
on the streets. By the mid-1980s their presence was evident in both Dhaka and Chittagong, 
the two main production centres, as they travelled to and from work. It is estimated that 
some 100,000 women have found employment in the garment industry and have joined the 
cash economy.
The World Bank, in its internal paper Innovative Approaches,2 identified three 
critical factors in the success of the Garment Industry. The first was a foreign catalyst, in 
this case Daewoo of South Korea. The second was a local entrepreneur with vision, Noorul 
Quader of Desh Garments Ltd. The third was a willingness and ability of both the workers, 
some of whom were potential entrepreneurs, to learn quickly. The analysis points out that 
they did not rely on ". . . drastic import liberalisation or huge export incentives—policies 
that would equalize the effective incentives for exporting with those for substituting imports? 
Or with heavy help from the public sector." Each party gained. Daewoo gained a market 
for its machines and a slice of the profits from garment sales. Quader gained access to 
foreign skills in production,management and marketing. The relationship was severed 
within two years. By then Quader and Desh had gained the ability to manufacture for 
foreign markets and had some appreciation of the marketing side of the business. By 1987 
garments were being manufactured by many factories, most of which owed their origins to 
Desh Garments Ltd. since they had been trained in Korea but had left to start their own 
garment factories upon return. By then the industry also accounted for 28.2 per cent of 
exports, up from 0.5 in 1981.3
Wheat Production. One area in the agricultural sector that strikes a strong 
contrast to the rest of the sector has been the phenomenal growth of wheat production. 
From a minor crop at the time of independence it has risen to account for more than 6 per 
cent of cereal grain production.
At the time of independence there were only some 200,000 acres under 
production. The general view held by most people at the time was that wheat would not 
adapt to growing conditions in East Pakistan although a small amount was grown in some 
areas. Against this prevailing view there were two groups of people who believed that 
wheat to a viable crop in the country. One group was made up of a few officials within the 
Government bureaucracy and the second group was in the international research community.
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International wheat research is centred at the CIMMYT in Mexico. These two groups 
believed that wheat could be grown and that the conditions in the country were right for 
the introduction of modem varieties. The factors that argued for the introduction of wheat 
were as follows:
It was a non-competitive crop in that it could be grown in the dry winter season when 
rice is only a minor crop. There were some areas where the soil had sufficient 
residual moisture that given appropriate varieties they should in theory thrive without 
irrigation;
The varieties presently in use were inefficient and research in other parts of the world 
had in recent years developed new varieties for tropical climates that might prove 
adaptable,;
Since most land was fallow in the dry winter season the introduction of wheat would 
not displace any other crop and would increase both the cropping ratio and the 
productivity of the land;
Since the crop and the technology were new their introduction would not be displacing 
a tried and true technology that had served farmers well in the past and from which 
they might be reluctant to deviate;
Although it could utilise irrigation to good advantage, wheat could be grown 
successfully using the residual moisture in the soil and hence was not dependent upon 
the introduction of a large capital investment in pumps or canals.
The new varieties of the crop were introduced and variety testing was undertaken 
at the Bangladesh Crop Research Institute. Since 1983 the work has been supported by 
CIDA. CIDA’s contribution has amounted to some $5.0 million from 1983 to 1986, a very 
small amount when compared to the investment in food aid or railways.
What sets the aid given by CIMMYT off from the more favoured types of 
assistance: commodities, food and capital infrastructure, is that it is largely in technical 
assistance. This investment in the transfer of knowledge has had a significant return for the 
country both in terms of additional production and import substitution. The nature of the 
crop is such that it did not displace other food crops, but contributed to a net increase in 
production. "Appropriation" of technical knowledge is difficult under any circumstances, 
and even where it does occur it nevertheless contributes to increased production or 
efficiency.* For this very reason it is the type of aid most eschewed by recipient
* While the opportunities for "appropriating" technical assistance are less than other types of aid one cannot altogether dismiss them. 
It was alleged that some foreign experts paid their local superiors to request their continued presence past the time where their real 
contribution had diminished to nothing. This tended to occur in agencies where the critical appraisal of effectiveness was lacking usually 
through inadequate supervision.
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bureaucrats. It is often accused of perpetuating dependence and depriving local scientists of 
the opportunity of making a contribution.
We can identify the same three factors that led to the success of Desh in the 
garment industry. The entrepreneurship resided in the Bangladesh scientists who believed 
that wheat was a viable crop. CIMMYT was the foreign catalyst; its mandate as an 
international research institution calls for it to support local initiatives. The ability of 
Bangladeshi farmers to learn quickly and adopt new methods was the final prerequisite for 
success.
The example of wheat production in Bangladesh demonstrates to success of
putting together a blend of local expertise with international expertise with spectacular
results. Not all technical assistance meets with the same success. Much is justified by the 
donors need for accountability, distrust for local institutions and the donors’ underestimation 
of the recipient country’s ability to manage programmes. The question of management, of 
course, is still a weak point in Bangladesh. There are many qualified Bangladeshi scientists 
who, with the proper financing and motivation, could be better used to meet development 
objectives.
The Grameen Bank. Another example of a successful enterprise was the
founding of the Grameen Bank, a specialised credit institution designed to allow access to
resources by the poor. Established in 1978 as a research programme by Professor 
Mohammad Yunus, professor of economics at the University of Chittagong, it has grown to 
the status of a full-fledged bank with 108 branches.4
A pilot study was started in 1976 in the village of Jobra near the University of 
Chittagong.5 After three years, it was expanded with the assistance of the Bangladesh Bank. 
It was not until 1982, some 6 years after the inception of the project that it accepted aid 
from IFAD.6 In September 1986 it was converted into a full fledged scheduled bank with 
an authorised share capital of 80 million taka and a paid up share capital of 30 million taka. 
Forty per cent of the share capital was provided by the Government, 40 per cent by clients 
of the bank, 10 per cent by Bangladesh Krishi Bank and 10 per cent by Sonali Bank.7 It has 
also accepted funding from Norway and Sweden,8 but, and this is significant, has refused to 
accept funding from other donors in order not to be subjected to donor pressures.9
The objectives of the Grameen Bank are as follows:
1. To extend banking facilities to the poor men and women.
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2. To eliminate the exploitation of moneylenders.
3. To create opportunities for self-employment for the vast unutilized and underutilized manpower 
resource.
4. To bring the disadvantaged people within the folds of some organizational format which they 
can understand and operate, and can find socio-political and economic strength in it through 
mutual support.
5. To reverse the age-old vicious circle of "low income, low savings, low investment, low income"
into an expanding system of "low income, credit, investment, more income, more investment,
'  «  10 more income .
The manner of operation of the Grameen Bank is to encourage persons who own 
less than 0.5 acres of land, or whose total assets do not exceed the value of one acre of land, 
to form groups. They were then trained by Bank personnel in the fundamentals of financial 
management. Each member deposits one taka’ per week into a group fund account and in 
addition 5 per cent of each loan is also deposited in the fund account. Members of the 
group are then eligible to borrow up to 5000 taka for some commercial activity. The loan 
must be repaid in weekly installments at a rate of 16 per cent.11 The principle behind the 
project is that the people eligible to borrow are effectively cut off from the regular banking 
system since they have no collateral to offer as security. They are therefore at the mercy of 
professional money-lenders who charge interest rates that range from 30 to 300 per cent. 
The payment of such usurious rates means that loans often cannot be repaid. The little 
collateral that the borrower has is lost, thus contributing to the increasing impoverishment 
and, often, loss of land of the individual.
Important features of the Grameen Bank are that it was the brainchild of a 
Bangladeshi, not the suggestion of an aid agency. It initially refused to accept financing 
from agencies because it did not want to find itself tied to donor requirements. Once it had 
established itself, and the Grameen Bank became a model for rural credit in many countries, 
the organisational structure had the strength to resist changes which donors might wish to 
impose. Professor Yunus believed originally that accepting aid would alter the fundamental 
self-help philosophy, and was prepared to forego more rapid development in favour of 
continued autonomy. Once the model was established and growth became a paramount 
object, financing became a bottleneck which could only be overcome by increased funding.
In Rahman’s study it was found that the average per capita income of the 
borrowers questioned had risen 53 per cent in real terms between 1982 and 1985.12 There
‘About US$0,038.
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have also been some benefits to non-borrowers who have gained from their proximity to 
borrowers through improved access to such things as irrigation facilities.13 Rahman also 
found that in the study area there had been considerable flood damage and pauperisation of 
people who had lost their crops but, significantly, none of the Grameen Bank borrowers, all 
drawn from the poorest elements of the society, were forced to accept emergency relief.14 
The loan recovery rate was excellent for Bangladesh, overdue loans at the time of Hossain’s 
study were only 1.9 per cent.15 The marginal propensity to save was calculated to be 0.13 
and the elasticity of expenditure for the acquisition of productive assets to be 1.54.16 The 
programme is not without its problems. It has been found that there is decreasing marginal 
productivity of subsequent loans. Some of the activities undertaken have very low 
productivity. Finally, there is the finite capacity of the managing director, Professor Yunus, 
to continue to take the personal interest in the selection and motivation of bank workers, a 
critical factor in the bank’s success, in an institution that is expanding rapidly. These are 
all problems remaining to be overcome.17
What the Grameen Bank effectively demonstrates is that investment in the poor 
can be economically viable and produce a significant rate of return. What it also points out 
is the need to provide training for the poor to enable them to diversify their enterprises in 
order to achieve sustained growth.
Finally in examining this programme some of the same elements as the previous 
two cases are evident. The entrepreneurship and the catalyst resided in the same individual, 
Professor Mohammad Yunus. He both conceived of the original idea of bringing credit to 
the very poor and put it into action. The poor demonstrated the capacity to learn quickly 
how to use credit to improve their standard of living. This last example, standing alone 
without foreign participation in its early stages, demonstrates the essential capability of the 
country to move ahead with self-sustained development.
Bangladesh Biman.* Bangladesh Biman (Bangladesh Airlines) is an example of 
an enterprise which was run for years with the same degree of inefficiency as characterises 
most ministries in Bangladesh. Although some effort had been made to put it on a 
commercial basis, it was still hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape and was continuously in 
the red until 1985. Previous to that, the whole enterprise was in danger of foundering due
*This example is anecdotal and drawn from the writers knowledge of the personalities involved during the period.
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to the acquisition of three DC 10s from Singapore Airlines and the accompanying debt 
incurred. In August 1984 it suffered a fatal crash on its domestic service further sullying 
its reputation. A new Managing Director was appointed. While he had no previous airline 
administrative experience he brought with him imagination, an openness to listening to 
advice and the entrepreneurial spirit necessary to manage a commercial enterprise. He 
argued vigorously for autonomy in the handling of personnel, acquiring the right to hire and 
fire without reference to higher authority. He put pilots and other skilled personnel, who 
traditionally left at the first chance of a higher salary, on personal service contracts which 
were more lucrative, though still not internationally competitive, but which could be 
terminated on short notice. He stopped the practice of the Managing Director accompanying 
the President on all his overseas travels, delegating this to subordinates, on the assumption 
that there was better use to which he could put his time. He imported foreign technical 
assistance to manage the maintenance operations. He pursued business aggressively both in 
the charter business, principally the transport of pilgrims to Mecca. He took advantage of 
market opportunities. For example, as other airlines increasingly cut flights to Libya he 
negotiated carriage rights from Athens to Libya and maintained an almost 100 per cent load 
factor. While Bangladesh was not particularly sympathetic to Libyan aspirations, Biman 
could maintain a low profile while maintaining a profitable route. He cultivated the small 
foreign community in Dhaka and within a year of taking over had won back much of the 
confidence lost in the 1984 crash, through rigourous attention to keeping the planes flying 
on time and making known the quality of maintenance they were receiving. By comparison 
with Indian Airlines, Biman was soon regarded, even in Bombay and Calcutta, as the airline 
to fly if you wanted to reach your destination on time. Biman aggressively pursued the 
backpack fraternity by offering the cheapest fares between Europe and Asia. As oil prices 
dropped he sought jobs for Biman cabin personnel on Middle Eastern airlines to replace 
higher priced European and American staff.
Good public relations were another important factor in making inroads to markets 
which had been the preserve of foreign airlines. In October 1985 he made one of the regular 
aircraft available for the medical evacuation of a Canadian aid worker on three hours notice 
and obtained the overflight clearances for Burma in record time. While Biman charged fair 
charter rate for the evacuation, their speed and helpfulness made many friends in the foreign 
community. Within a year Bangladesh Biman was in the black for the first time and an
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enterprise which had for years been a drain on the treasury was contributing its fair share 
to the economy.
Once again we can identify the keys to success. There was the same 
entrepreneurial spirit in the Managing Director of Bangladesh Biman, even within the 
Government bureaucracy, that had made Quader’s garment enterprise a success. The use of 
foreign expertise in critical areas where Biman had lacked the capacity to perform effectively 
was the second factor. Finally the staff of the airline, when provided with the challenge to 
respond to new opportunities, did so enthusiasm.
Selected Comparisons
The foreign bias: imports and Nigeria. The emphasis on the importation of 
goods in Bangladesh,18 rather than investment in productive enterprise is not without 
precedent. The influx of oil money into Nigeria provided a source of foreign exchange that 
encouraged entrepreneurs into the business of imports. It discouraged investment in the less 
profitable industrial and agriculture sectors.19
While Nigeria received a glut of free foreign exchange from the proceeds of oil, 
Bangladesh received a glut of aid money from the international donor community. It is easy 
to see how entrepreneurs would prefer to make a quick S4.0 million from the importation 
of irrigation equipment, the example cited in Chapter III, to earning a much more modest 
profit from establishment of an industrial firm to manufacture the same pumps.
Aid as "habit of mind": Malta and NATO. The same attitude towards aid that 
we have seen in Bangladesh, that it is the perceived obligation of the international 
community to support the less developed countries, prevails elsewhere. White20 cites the 
case of Dom Mintoff’s government in Malta. Upon being returned to power it forced the 
withdrawal of the both the Governor General and the NATO commander, but sought and 
expected the United Kingdom, which had contributed to the Maltese economy through the 
expenditures and employment provided by the NATO base, to replace this loss with 
increased aid.21 In fact Malta sought, and received, aid from several NATO countries 
including Canada.* As White points out the failure of Mintoff’s Government to see the
*During the time this writer was Country Programme Manager for Egypt and Sudan, from 1980 to 1982 he was responsible for 
some of the details in closing the line of credit Canada had made available to Malta as compensation for the economic privation suffered
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inconsistency of this action suggests that aid had become a "habit of mind". The fact that 
in response to this expectation some aid actually was rendered to Malta suggests that, in the 
minds of the donors, aid has also become a "habit of mind".
In Bangladesh there were frequent examples of aid as a "habit of mind" on the 
part of both the recipient and the donor during the period studied. The most obvious 
example in Bangladesh was cited by McHenry and Bird in Chapter III, and termed the 
"policy effect", where Bangladeshi officials refused pay attention to realistic long term 
strategies designed to lead the country towards food autarky in the belief that the donors 
would never let the country starve. This view is substantiated by the donors who do 
continue to make foodstuffs, surplus to their own needs, available to countries such as 
Bangladesh. The belief that this can be sustained indefinitely, however, is naive and an 
examination of the rise and fall of food aid availability with surplus harvests will confirm 
this.
Poverty as a resource: Somalia and the refugee problem. In the late 1970s, 
against the advice of its Soviet patrons, the Government of Somalia declared war on 
Ethiopia. Its intent was to effect the recovery of the part of the Ogaden desert that had once 
been part of traditional Somalia. President Barre had hoped to restore the "Greater Somalia" 
that had once been made up of the five areas still inhabited by Somalis: (former) Italian and 
British Somalias, the Ogadan, Djibouti and Northern Kenya. The war was disastrous and 
the Somali army was routed and forced to retreat within its frontiers. The USSR had in 
the meantime decamped taking with it virtually everything that had been provided in support 
of its military presence. The retreat of the army was followed closely by a huge influx of 
refugees from the Ogadan.*
The number of refugees in the country varied with the seasons and was made 
up for the most part of women and children. The men drifted back into their traditional 
grazing areas. The actual number of refugees was a continual point of contention between 
the donors and the Government. The former were trying to calculate how much food was 
needed while the latter were trying to maximise the amount of aid flowing in. The issue
from the withdrawal of the NATO forces stationed there. While White points out the illogicality of a country asking for aid while acting 
against the interests of the donor we must surely also question the rationale behind rendering the aid requested.
‘ Somalia has had some refugees since as early as the middle 1960s who have settled camps which have almost become part of 
the community.
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was a very delicate one and workers in camps had been cautioned not to count the number 
of people in the camps. Initially during the early part of 1981 there had been considerable 
misappropriation of food, but this had been brought down to manageable proportion with the 
appointment of CARE International to monitor the distribution. They were able to do so up 
to the camp gates, but once inside there was still scope for misappropriation by the camp 
management.
In December 1981 a census of the refugees was held, ostensibly monitored by 
foreign observers. It was acknowledged by the foreign observers of the process that despite 
safeguards to prevent double counting there were many abuses. For example, indelible ink 
was used to mark those who had been enumerated. There had been considerable preparation 
on the part of the Government to provide cleaning facilities to remove the ink. Refugees, 
who were somewhat confused the first time they were counted, were expert on the required 
procedure by the third or fourth turn. The government, it was reported, also provided 
military transport to move refugees to different enumeration stations. In the end the number 
of refugees was negotiated between UNHCR and the Government.
The issue was the sort which can easily be exploited by a government that is 
ruthless enough. Ultimately, the donors only weapon was the threat of the withdrawal of 
food that was not destined for Somalia, but rather for the refugees who were in Somalia. 
The Government had, in principle, nothing to lose. Granted it would face international 
censure, but then it could plead that the donors had impinged upon its sovereignty. It, 
therefore, used every opportunity to maximise its gains from the aid coming in and to limit 
the ability of the donors to determine what the real situation was.
The refugees were a political resource that attracted aid.* There were many 
Somalis who benefited from their presence since aid destined for refugees that could then be 
"appropriated". Secondly, the presence of a large number of refugees provided adequate 
justification for requesting additional aid to help Somalia deal with the problem.
Resource windfalls: Cambodia. America and the IMF. The case of Cambodia 
has certain similarities with that of Bangladesh, although it was complicated by the American 
military presence. There are really two cases of a resource windfall in Cambodia. The first
*The writer was responsible for Canadian aid provided to Somalia from 1980 to 1982 and led a mission to examine the problems 
of food distribution in late 1981. The situation described is base upon recollection of discussions with aid and Government personnel there 
and notes.
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period of generous United States aid was from 1955 to 1963 when about $350 million was 
disbursed. The second period was from after aid was resumed in 1970 until the fall of 
Phnom Penh to the Kymer Rouge in 1975.
Aid was renounced in 1963 by Sihanouk.22 In a press conference Sihanouk is quoted 
as saying the following:
In the first place I would cite the prospect of the withdrawal of American aid, aid which has 
more and more irritated not only myself but above all Cambodian circles of all tendencies, from 
progressives to nationalists of the right, for once in agreement. I must admit that the withdrawal of this 
aid will be an immense relief for us. For one thing, we won’t have to hear any more talk of that aid 
as indispensible for our survival. For another, we will be obliged to devote infinitely more energy to 
the development of production.
. . . Everyone agrees, above all the foreign residents in Cambodia, that the rich are amassing 
fortunes at an inadmissable speed while the standard of living of the great majority of the population 
is improving only very slowly.23
In the years following the cessation of United States aid under Prince Sihanouk 
the economy had stagnated.24 As late as 1969 Cambodia had nevertheless continued to earn 
some 20 percent of its GNP through exports. Foreign Exchange reserves in February 1970 
were $69.3 million against imports the previous year of $76.9 million or about 11 months 
coverage.25 The debt service ratio was 8.7 percent of exports.26 By the end of 1970, 
following the invasion and the resumption of aid, exports had virtually stopped.27 Corruption 
under Sihanouk had existed, but had been small because of the Prince’s authority, and 
because the small self-sufficient economy offered limited opportunities. With large amounts 
of economic aid the consumer price index climbed from 348 in March 1970 (1949=100) to 
11,052 by the end of 1974. As Payer recounts "Internally, the class which had once 
enriched itself from US aid (prior to its having been discontinued in 1974 at Sihanouk’s 
request)28 still pined for its resumption".29 In addition to the aid provided by the United 
States, the IMF had established an Exchange Support Fund. This was supported by the US, 
Japan, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia, and was implemented through the sale 
of foreign exchange on a semi-weekly basis. The proceeds were mainly used to import 
luxury goods that were not eligible under the Commodity Import Program.30 Asian Survey 
commented in 1971 that Cambodia "seemed to have entered a new era of economic 
dependence with no end in sight".31 In summary, the case of Cambodia supports the 
contention of this paper that foreign aid in large quantities, particularly when a small 
influential middle class have access to it, leads to both increasing inequity among the 
population and a breakdown of those institutions that build self-reliance. The effects of the
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war also had a deleterious effect on such parts of the economy as the external sector and 
agricultural production in the war-affected areas. This contributed to the increasing 
dependence, but the role of foreign aid, particularly foreign aid, as liberally distributed as 
it was in Cambodia, was no doubt a major contributor to the country’s eventual breakdown.
Aid as disincentive: Korea and American aid. Korea, often cited as the economic 
miracle of Asia, scarcely seems to be a candidate for our model, however, in the concluding 
annex on aid effectiveness in Robert Cassen and Associates report to the Task Force on 
Concessional Flows which was established by the Development Committee of the Joint 
Ministerial Committee of the Board of Governors of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, the writers concludes as follows:
Until 1961, the Korean economy followed a policy of import substitution. It was completely 
dependent on donor support for food and consumption goods, as well as raw materials [emphasis added] 
and military assistance; Korean policy stressed the maximization of foreign assistance, . . . Charges that 
donor support was concentrated on consumption goods, and that the PL 480 food import programme 
retarded realistic pricing policies, were generally accurate, as the policy goals of donor and recipient 
were different.
President Park, . . . internally consolidated and centralized economic and political power, and 
externally, . . . shifted economic policy to an export promotion programme. . . .
Income distribution, although relatively favourable, worsened as the government until the early 
1970s virtually ignored the rural sector. . . it is evident that, first the creation of urban employment 
in manufacturing and, later, subsidies and development in agriculture lowered the percentage of the 
population in poverty from 40 to 10 per cent.32
Melvyn Krauss takes the argument further. He argues that:
Foreign aid on a large scale is known to lead to corruption on a large scale. The case of the 
Rhee regime in Korea, aid-financed agriculture and industrial projects were used to prop up Rhee’s 
political fortunes rather than the Korean economy. As a result, one-fifth of all such projects financed 
by U.S. aid from 1953 to 1963 proved unsound . . . Korean GNP grew at an average rate of 1.9 
percent during this period compared with figures three time that magnitude after aid and the government 
were scaled down in the 1970s.33
Krause maintains that what the case of Korea demonstrates, is that the selection 
of policies in which a government becomes heavily reliant upon foreign aid, leads to 
dependence. It was only after American aid was discontinued, and the foreign exchange 
situation critical, that the Korean Government was forced to turn to promoting private 
investment and export led growth.34 He also argues that the case of Taiwan is similar. The 
counter-argument is that aid provided the necessary initial investment to make export led 
growth possible. There may be some validity in this argument, but if we recall the example 
of the garment industry in Bangladesh, there was no aid involved. Indirectly such things as 
the generation of electric power may be the result of aid. This does not necessarily justify
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the very large flows of food and commodities that form the bulk of the aid Bangladesh 
receives.
Conclusions. In summary, the negative characteristics which we have found in 
Bangladesh are not unique to that country. They are identifiable in other aid recipient 
countries, some of which, like Korea, are frequently touted as proof of the success of foreign 
aid. In a similar fashion we have also seen that Bangladesh has the capacity to respond to 
market opportunities, both at home and in the international marketplace. Bangladesh has 
proven that it can rise above its reputation as an "international basketcase". Aid, in the 
quantities in which it is presently given, seems not to be a major determinant of whether this 
takes place or not. In fact, some of the side effects of aid may militate against the three 
factors we discussed above, which are prerequisites for dramatic growth. It does have the 
capacity to respond to opportunities when the three critical factors are combined: 
entrepreneurship, a foreign catalyst and the willingness to learn a new skill or technology 
quickly. A fourth factor which might be added is improved management skills. While our 
examples of successes do work, they could be improved by the application of the transfer 
of western, or eastern, management techniques. Alternately there may exist some melding 
of the two with local customs which matches Bangladesh unique needs.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
The Relationship Between Donors and Dependence
Our hypothesis stated that when the "resource windfall" began to exceed the 
opportunities for productive investment, the proportion that could be "appropriated" from 
the total resources available would rise and that the upper classes would seek to further 
improve their standard of living.In Chapter III we documented numerous examples of 
"appropriation" of other types of aid.
We established in Chapter IV that Bangladesh is dependent on foreign aid even 
to meet such things as the salaries of employees who are engaged in activities financed under 
the Annual Development Plan which is financed almost completely by the proceeds of 
foreign aid. In addition to this they transfer nearly 10 per cent of the taka component the 
Annual Development Plan to the recurrent budget, a further "appropriation" of aid 
resources.
In Chapter V we explain that donors have provided aid to Bangladesh without 
appropriate knowledge of the country’s needs, often without appropriate knowledge of the 
technology being introduced, and with little regard for how the aid is used an no 
appreciation for the unplanned effects that aid has had. This is so because the structure of 
the aid bureaucracy does not lend itself well to the kind of creative approach needed to solve 
the problems encountered in development, nor even to listen to those who do understand 
them.
The political economy of the regime. From 1971 to 1986 corruption became 
synonymous with the regimes that have predominated: from the financing of the Awami 
League coffers through the sale of emergency aid provided to the Bangladesh Red Cross, 
through the corruption that characterised the Zia regime to the allegations that have been 
made against the Ershad regime.
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We have not been able to document the export of "appropriated" aid, through 
we can speculate that with a relatively free foreign exchange market, made possible by the 
significant balance of payments support provided by the donors, at least some of the profits 
of "appropriation" are exported. The situation is not much different, except in scale, from 
that of the Marcos regime in the Philippines whose members are estimated to have 
misappropriated and exported billions. Marcos himself, for example, was able to divert, 
for example, some $2 million USAID project funds to help finance his re-election.1 In 
Bangladesh such diversion appears to be on a somewhat more modest scale, but allegations 
do exist.
Aid permeates virtually every activity. The institutional structure in Bangladesh 
is weak and the absorptive capacity of the economy limited. The first Planning Commission 
never had much power. Short term political imperatives tended to predominate. Legitimate 
objectives such as the alleviation of poverty, no doubt conceptually a real priority of the first 
government during its early days, were soon displaced and became a "presentational" 
strategy for successive governments. Financial allocations in succeeding development plans 
did not reflect stated economic objectives. Rather they mirrored donor priorities in sectors 
where it was easy to disburse aid, and also relatively easy to "appropriate" resources. The 
Government encouraged this trend as opportunities arose to dispense patronage. Corruption 
became institutionalised even, as we have seen, in the parliament. The Government even 
opposed the few donors who sought to redirect the attention of the donor community towards 
the poor.
From the early attempts to pursue a self-reliant course, Bangladesh became a 
country seeking aid at almost any cost. We characterised the government of Sheikh Mujib 
in its early days as being "intransigently adaptive". That is to say that its officials were 
disinclined to bargain with their environment.2 Their spurning the early initiatives of the 
World Bank attests to this, as does their cool attitude toward the United States during the 
same period. Yet, within three years we see Mujib, hat in hand, in Washington to ask for 
aid and Tajuddin, still an outspoken critic of the United States and now a critic of his own 
government’s wastage, removed from office. During the next period, we see Zia "courting" 
McNamara for additional aid.3 Finally, we see Ershad struggling to lend an air of legitimacy 
to his government while still retaining power. These are the characteristics of what Rosenau 
calls an "acquiescently adaptive" country which he describes as having:
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. . .  a readiness to adjust external behavior and internal institutions to the demands emanating from at 
least one segment of the environment (usually the nearest superpower).4
We can replace "superpower” with "donor" in the above quote. In discussing 
the transformation of countries, Rosenau maintains that transformation from "intransigently 
adaptive" to "acquiescently adaptive" is highly unlikely. Indeed, in describing Israel as a 
"intransigently adaptive" country, he predicts that the society would be destroyed before 
changing. Yet in Bangladesh, we have seen a country that been transformed into a nation 
whose prime purpose seems to be the attraction of more foreign aid. Why?
The combination of weak institutions and surplus resources has shifted the 
determining forces onto individuals who pursue profit maximising strategies. These need 
not be simply for their own personal profit. They may be to improve their ministry, their 
party or their family, but this shift means that conventional economic forces are subverted 
and decisions are made for the wrong reasons.
The Food Distribution System. Food provided, ostensibly either to benefit the 
poor or for balance of payments support for a food deficit country, has allowed the 
Government to subsidise the relatively privileged in the society to an extent that would 
simply be impossible without aid. It has thus been "appropriated" by the Government in a 
largely unproductive form of patronage as a subsidy to the middle class. The people, for 
whom it was ostensibly intended for humanitarian reasons, have seen only a small 
proportion, less than 10 per cent, for Emergency Relief and the Vulnerable Group Feeding 
Programme, and about 15.0 per cent for the Food for Work Programme (see Table 3.6). 
In the latter we have seen that, while that some of the food benefit does reach the poor in 
the form of employment generating programmes, much of it is diverted to other ends.
In the case of the United States, food aid has been used to encourage "economic 
reform", an American foreign policy objective. This use of aid may be acceptable if the 
appropriate economic reforms are carried out, yet at the end of the period covered by this 
study the United States had still not succeeded in substantially reducing the amount of food 
going to Statutory Rationing and Priority Categories, although it has been successful in other 
areas such as privatisation of state corporations. In the case of other low conditionality 
donors, however, such as Canada and Australia, the rationale has been to help achieve 
humanitarian objectives and balance of payments support,5 yet by force of the Government’s
Chapter VII
258
"appropriation" food aid has actually contributed to an increasing inequitable distribution of 
income as much was diverted to the military, the civil service and patronage.
We have shown considerable evidence that even the small piortion of food aid 
that was targeted at the poorest has been "appropriated" on a regular basis. During the 1974 
famine, we recall that candid estimates put the amount of aid actually reaching the needy as 
only a small fraction of that given by the donors. Donors have seen fit to tolerate this 
situation either because they were unaware of it or because to have withheld aid would have 
interfered with other objectives: disbursements, political profile, their humanitarian image, 
etc. The revenue derived from the Food Distribution System, even though it may not 
represent the full value of the food distributed, has continued to allow the Government the 
luxury of ignoring the issue of domestic resource mobilisation.
Agriculture. Agriculture, the major sector which for the moment, is the only 
sector besides the garment industry with potential for growth and employment generation, 
could benefit the poor through employment generation, but it has been systematically 
deprived of the market that could provide the incentive to generate a surplus in the rural 
areas. As de Vylder points out, one of the fundamental assumptions of the "green 
revolution" approach to agriculture is that the existence of a market to absorb the surplus 
production, yet cheap food aid to the urban areas has deprived the rural areas of this market.6 
Higher domestic production would have decreased the need for such large balance of 
payments support and allowed food aid to be used in much smaller quantities for the benefit 
of those who might genuinely suffer from the an increase in food prices.
Investment in agriculture has tended to be capital intensive and as such we have 
seen that it is easily "appropriated" by the rural middle class. Small scale agriculture has 
been ignored by all but a few donors, reflecting their capital intensive bias. Institutional 
development has been slow and the agricultural potential of the country remains largely 
unfulfilled.
Economic Growth. Economic growth while acceptable, has not been dramatic. 
It has taken place mainly in the capital intensive sectors that are not likely to provide the 
needed employment for the growing labour force. An increasing number of unemployed 
continue to flow to the urban areas. Investment has taken place largely in the "hard" sectors, 
industry, power, natural resources, transport and communications, all essential to the basic 
infrastructure of the country, but benefiting relatively few in the short term. It is little
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wonder, therefore, that growth in those sectors has led agriculture/. Industry is a mainly 
urban phenomenon. Natural resources development, gas in Bangladesh, benefits mainly the 
urban areas. The traditional transport of the country, the country boat, has been ignored for 
investments in railways. Communications facilities serve only a small minority. The energy 
sector serves mainly the upper classes as only 3.5 per cent of urban dwellers and a negligible 
per cent of rural dwellers have access to electricity.7 This lack of attention to rural areas has 
stimulated rural/urban drift to a point where Dhaka is becoming a demographic time bomb. 
In the meantime, the areas with the most potential have stagnated. So, while economic 
growth has been acceptable, it has been it has been strongly biased towards the modem 
sector. Consequently, the poor have benefited little.
Business and industry. Business has continued to grow, perhaps even at rates 
that surpass other parts of the economy, however, the capital intensive nature of most 
investment does not provide the employment required to fulfill the country’s needs, with the 
notable exception of the garment industry. Businessmen still prefer the generous returns on 
importing to the more modest returns from investment in local industry.
The model did not predict the most successful development in the business 
sector, the garment sector. Nor did it predict that the donors would demonstrate that their 
own domestic priorities would take precedence over efforts to constrain an industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry, that many believe has acted irresponsibly in many developing 
countries and has put profits before the national good. Nor again did it predict that the 
probably one of the most dramatic success stories, the growth of the garment industry, 
would take place in the modem business sector with positive effects for both employment 
and foreign exchange earnings.
What it did predict was that there would be under-utilised capacity and that the 
import business would remain paramount, which it has.
Equity: growth of the middle and upper classes. Increasingly, a few local 
businessmen have benefited from the proceeds of aid. The notable exception is again the 
garment industry. These businesses have in turn become influential forces in the community 
for the continuation of aid. Consequently, the benefits of aid have been concentrated in the 
hands of a relative few. These few, however, have maintained considerable influence in the 
Government.
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While we have not established the size of the upper class, the orders of 
magnitude still make it an infinitesimal proportion of the population. Sobhan’s estimate is 
1000 families. Koht Norbye suggests 50,000 who could be classified as making over a 
million taka a year. Farouk estimates 250,000 families. Whichever we select, and the 
criteria obviously vary from estimate to estimate, we are still only talking about 1 per cent 
of the total population. Sobhan and Mahmood’s estimate that 1000 families have benefitted 
from loans totalling US$500 million, largely unrepaid, suggests a great concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a very few and a substantial concentration of the benefits of aid.
Foreign aid. We can conclude that donors are unable, or unwilling, to 
effectively target their aid at the poorest. The major constraint is the structure of the donors 
bureaucratic system, which demands performance in terms of disbursements, but is weak in 
assessing the impact of the aid actually delivered. Thus, food aid ends up supporting a 
system of perquisites for the armed forces, the civil service and fixed salary urban workers, 
rather than feeding the poor. Donors financed locomotives, gas development, and fertiliser 
factories.
The Bangladesh bureaucracy in turn has been conditioned, not only by their own 
culture, but by donor attitudes, to think of social problems in a paternalistic manner,8 
Decision-making is centralised in donor capitals, thousands of miles in away from where the 
projects are being implemented, and from which the local bureaucracy is largely excluded. 
This does not encourage the development of creative and innovative approaches to solving 
the problems of development. Nor does it utilise as fully as possible the knowledge of local 
experts. The donors’ approach to aid, administered by a privileged elite isolated in the 
relative luxury of Gulshan, reinforces this attitude and the local bureaucracy emulates it, 
with only a few exceptions.
We proposed a model that demonstrated how, when the benefits of aid were 
"appropriated" the distribution of income shifted in favour of the upper class.
Conclusion. The bright spot is that, in small but important segments of the 
economy progress has been made achieving some development objectives. Bangladesh has 
demonstrated that it does have the capacity to respond to new initiatives, such as the garment 
industry and the growth of wheat. The Grameen Bank has shown that significant returns can 
be achieved using local resources. These achievements have been attained with very modest 
financial inputs of foreign aid and carefully limited, foreign intellectual input. The
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proliferation of foreign aid, motivated primarily by bureaucratic elites in the recipient 
country and an aid donor bureaucracy driven to achieve objectives, such as disbursement 
targets and the support of their own domestic manufacturers, in a country with few natural 
resources of its own, has resulted in the formation of a regime dependent on the continuation 
of foreign aid. We saw in Chapter IV that the Government could probably not continue to 
operate if food and commodity aid were cut, so dependent are they on the revenues these 
forms of aid bring to the Annual Development Plan.
While some countries have successfully resisted this pressure Bangladesh, twice 
bom in the last half-century, has not yet developed the institutional maturity to be able to. 
Short term micro-economic decisions to maximise individuals’ utility, i.e., to make their 
own bureaucracy work better, to increase personal wealth, or to promote family interests 
have neutralised many of the broad policy objectives of aid.
Many of the types of aid provided are inappropriate.9 Capital intensiveness in 
a labour surplus economy does not provide jobs for the unemployed. Bauer is correct:
Official aid does not go to poor people, to the skeletal figures of aid propaganda. It goes instead 
to their rulers whose spending policies are determined by their own personal and political interests, 
among which the position of the poorest has very low priority, [emphasis added] Indeed, to support 
rulers on the basis of the poverty of their subjects is more likely to encourage policies than to deter 
them, the familiar references of ‘aid to the poorest’, to describe transfers to governments of countries 
with low incomes, confuses rulers with their subjects.10
Although aid may be justified to the donors’ taxpayers on the basis of poverty 
and given to the poorest countries with that justification, little of it reaches those for whom 
it was justified. We have criticised the Bangladesh government for "appropriating" aid to 
serve its own needs, which often have little to do with helping the poor to secure 
employment or achieve a higher nutritional intake, or gain access to better housing. The 
same criticism must also be made of the donor governments. The administration of aid in 
the field is clearly inadequate, with the notable exception of USAID and UNICEF who at 
least have a strong presence in the field. Most aid is heavily tied to domestic procurement 
and as such, without close and knowledgeable monitoring is often unsuitable for local 
conditions
We have seen that, as capital intensive and urban oriented as the Government of 
Bangladesh has been, the donors have been even more so. Their inability to administer 
programmes effectively from their centralised headquarters has led them to continue to rely 
on capital intensive projects and ignore a more broad based approach to development.
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The "Report on Poverty in Bangladesh" found that aid was used as a form of 
patronage,11 but, although it is beyond the scope of this study, we can also surmise that aid 
is also used as a form of patronage by the donors to reward support from that part of their 
domestic private sector that is interested in easy access to external markets. This is a facet 
of aid that deserves attention.
Where to? Would a stop to aid lead to breakdown? The Bangladesh Country 
Study concludes that the elimination of food aid would have a very serious impact on the 
economy, and particularly on the poor since the total availability would drop by about 10 
per cent, but it does not speculate on the incentive effect this would provide for farmers. 
A reduction in commodity aid might not have the same dramatic effect on the poor that a 
reduction in earnings in some sectors would have. The loss of project aid would slow the 
economy.12 It also cautions that there is cause for concern as visible signs of wealth 
proliferate among the well off, and counsel that Norwegian aid should concentrate on forms 
of assistance that benefit the poor.13
Farouk argues that the poor benefit little now and would not lose much from the 
loss of something they have little access to at present. For example, the loss of aid 
commodities, such as cotton, would stimulate production and local business benefit from 
the protection they would receive from the loss of foreign exchange. The Annual 
Development Programme would be severely curtailed and Government forced into a serious 
domestic resource mobilisation effort.14 He concludes that:
Aid made power so valuable in our society that a share in power is considered more important than 
efficiency and hard work. . . . Aid . . . has made power-politics more important than gainful, 
productive employment.15
But aid will not be cut. The Bangladesh bureaucracy’s ability to cater to the 
donors’ wishes has become an art honed to perfection by bureaucrats who have spent a 
large proportion of their careers operating in a regime dedicated to the procurement of 
foreign aid. The Third Five Year Plan stresses the alleviation of poverty as enthusiastically 
as did the First Plan in the days of heady idealism after independence, but there is little to 
indicate in the actions of the Government that "appropriation" of aid will be curtailed and 
it put to more productive use. Even the term "test case", coined by Faaland and Parkinson 
has been "appropriated" to justify aid. In a letter to the Swedish Prime Minister, Torbjom 
Falldin, President Zia said: " . . .  Our country is a test case for ourselves and for the free 
world . . ."16
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The rapid growth of wheat production is a direct result of the technology transfer 
given Bangladesh during its early days and was developed without the assistance of donors, 
although one could attribute its success indirectly to donor support for CIMMYT. This was 
aid that did not spread resources around ripe for "appropriation". It was the transfer of 
technology, the right technology at the right time, and the time was right because the market 
was right. There had been a demand created for wheat by the food aid provided during 
emergencies which actually did reach the people for whom it was intended. Finally it was 
the addition of a new crop that complemented rather than competing with the traditional 
crops.
The growth of the garment industry, is totally unrelated to the efforts of the 
donors and not directly attributable to the efforts of the Government, although the policies 
of the latter have to some extent provided the climate in which success has been achieved. 
If anything, the donors have sought to curtail the growth of this sector by the imposition of 
quotas under the Multi-Fibre Agreement.
The growth of wheat production from 110 thousand tons, 0.9 per cent of grain 
production, in 1971, to 1,192 thousand tons, 7.7 percent of grain production in 1984, 
growth that averaged 20.1 per cent per annum, is the direct result of the change in tastes 
brought about by the provision of large quantities of food aid and the fortuitous circumstance 
that the climate and geography of Bangladesh allow the cultivation of crops during seasons 
that do not conflict with the more traditional staple crops grown. The success of wheat is 
evidence that the traditional "green revolution" approach of high yielding varieties of crops 
combined with more inputs delivered at the correct time can lead to spectacular results.
The spectacular growth of the garment industry has dominated the growth of 
Bangladesh’s non-traditional exports and provided new jobs for more than 100,000 people, 
most of them women. The garment industry was an almost insignificant sector of the 
economy in 1980 and it has grown to account for 12.1 per cent of the country’s merchandise 
exports in 1984/85 making it the third largest export after jute manufactures and raw jute.17 
This has had more impact on the economy in terms of generating growth and the 
redistribution of income than any foreign aid programme. Furthermore, it has done more 
to promote the role of women, a current donor preoccupation, than the combined efforts of 
the donors through traditional aid programmes.
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The transformation of Bangladesh Biman from a chronic money-loser to a profit 
center was the result of sound local management, a willingness to use foreign expertise and 
at least the partial suspension of some of the bureaucracy’s more confining rules.
What these modest successes demonstrate is that Bangladesh does have the 
capacity to rise above its image as an "international basket case". There is the potential for 
entrepreneurship to emerge from what has hitherto been considered by some to be a nation 
of traders. Bangladesh is not, on the basis of these few successes, suddenly going to emerge 
from the economic doldrums that have characterised its economy since before independence, 
but it does show that there is the potential to develop the skills necessary to transform the 
economy from its overwhelmingly agrarian base to a more diversified economy.
The final conclusion of this study is not that traditional economic policies have 
failed, but rather that traditional approaches to development have ignored the micro- 
economic aspects of underdevelopment. Undeveloped institutions, lack of skilled personnel, 
scarcity of resources have all conspired to put a great deal of power in the hands of a very 
small group of people who have in many cases sought, quite conventionally, to maximise 
their own short term benefit. Given the imperfections in the institutional development 
developing countries their objectives have been able to subvert traditional market forces at 
the macro level. The monopolistic or oligarchical positions of decision-makers has,in 
essence often subverted the end to which foreign aid resources were aimed. Foreign aid was 
not all diverted to corrupt ends. The nature of bureaucracies demands that they grow or 
perish. Resources are used to develop influence, build empires, and better one’s own 
position. Conventional liberalisation policies as advocated by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have increased the resources under decision-makers control by 
large amounts. In Nkruma’s Ghana, when foreign exchange was gone, the shops were 
empty. In Ershad’s Bangladesh the shops are full despite an imbalance of trade that has 
ranged between 11 and 14 percent of GDP. The World Bank’s conventional response to this 
state of affairs is that comparative advantage will triumph in the end. This does not, 
however, provide and answer to the challenge that the benefits of liberalization are going to 
the importers of foreign goods while manufacturers struggle against established industries.
"Appropriation" and corruption in Bangladesh have flourished because well- 
meaning donors have continued to pour money in with little regard for how it is used. 
Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs have seen the opportunities to maximise their own benefits,
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as opposed to those of the majority of the population. The result has been a diversion of 
funds from their intended use to other uses. The poor have remained poor. The wealthy 
have gotten a little more wealthy and the donors have felt better for their contribution.
This study is not an outright condemnation of foreign aid. Bangladesh represents 
the extremes of poverty and geographic vulnerability. The problems of aid and development 
are magnified in this environment. For that reason we should be particularly careful in 
other environments where the shortcomings are not as evident.
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P a ra g u a y P a r 33 .0 1.52 15.3 1.18 2 3 1 1.40 1 .799 6 2 9 4 6 0 .979 9 .5 1 9
Z a ire Z ai 29.7 1.47 1 0 6 1.03 2 1 7 1.05 1.510 32 3 6 1 1.003 1 0 0 6 3
C o lum bia C ol 28.4 1.45 3.1 0 .49 2 1 1 0 2 4 0 7 1 4 5.177 1.013 1 0 3 0 3
T a n z a n ia T a n z a n ia 21.5 1.33 2 6 0 1.41 1.78 2 0 0 1.885 76 8 0 1 1.077 11.934
M o rocco M or 21.4 1.33 13.4 1.13 1.77 1.27 1.500 31.588 1.078 11.967
S u d a n Sud 21.3 1.33 28.9 1.46 1.76 2 1 3 1.941 87.222 1.079 11.993
K en y a K enya 19.6 1.29 2 2 1 1.34 1.67 1.81 1.737 54.613 1.098 1 2 5 3 1
P e ru Pe 18.2 1.26 17.0 1.23 1 5 9 1.51 1 5 5 0 35.518 1.115 13 .030
N ep a l Ne 161 1.21 1 2 3 1.09 1.46 1.19 1.315 2 0 6 6 9 1.143 13.901
S n  L a n k a S L 15.9 1.20 29.5 1.47 1.44 2 1 6 1.766 5 6 3 2 7 1.146 13.993
U g a n d a E g 15.0 1.18 1 0 9 1.04 1 5 8 1.08 1.220 1 6 6 0 0 1 .159 14 .430
M o zam b iq u e M oz 13.4 1.13 19.3 1.29 1.27 1.65 1.449 2 6 1 1 6 1.165 15.315
G h a n a G b 12.3 1.09 17.5 1.24 1.19 1.55 1 5 5 5 2 2 6 3 6 1.205 1 6 0 2 3
Syria S y n a 10.1 1.00 85.1 1.93 1.01 3.72 1.938 8 6 7 5 0 1.250 17.779
C a m e ro o n C am 9.9 1.00 19.0 1.28 0 9 9 1.64 1.273 1 6 7 5 7 1.255 17.968
C o te  d 'Iv o ire C l 9.9 1.00 13.0 1.11 0 9 9 1.24 1.109 1 2 8 5 5 1.255 17.968
A n g o la A n 9 9 1.00 10.9 1.04 0 .99 1.08 1.033 10.787 1.255 17.968
M a d a g a sc a r M g 9.9 1.00 15.8 1.20 0 9 9 1.44 1.193 15.611 1.255 17.968
C u b a C u b a 9.9 1.00 1.2 0.08 0 .99 0 0 1 0 0 7 9 1.199 1.255 17.968
E c u a d o r Ec 9.1 0 .96 14.9 1.17 0.92 1.38 1.125 13.339 1.274 18.785
Z im b ab w e Z im babw e 8.1 0 9 1 36.7 1.56 0 .83 2 4 5 1.421 2 6 3 9 2 1.300 19.975
Y e m e n  A R Y A R 7.8 0 8 9 40.4 1.61 0 .80 2 5 8 1.433 27.105 1.309 2 0 3 7 7
G u a ta m a la G u 7.7 0 .89 6.4 0.92 0 .79 0.85 0 .819 6 5 9 7 1.312 20 .516
M ali Mali 7.3 0 .86 43.6 1.64 0.75 2 6 9 1.415 2 6 0 2 6 1.324 21 .102
T u n isia T u 7.0 0 8 5 25.8 1.41 0 7 1 1.99 1.193 15.594 1.334 21.574
M alaw i M ai 6 8 0 8 3 23.2 1.37 0 6 9 1.86 1.137 13.702 1.341 21 .907
B u rk in a  F a so BF 6 6 0.82 28.7 1.46 0 6 7 2 1 3 1.195 15.660 1.347 2 2 2 5 5
Z am b ia Zen 6 4 0 8 1 37.1 1.57 0.65 2 4 6 1.265 18.416 1.354 2 2 6 1 9
Sen eg a l S en 6 4 0 8 1 5 2 2 1.72 0 6 5 2 9 5 1.385 24.252 1.354 2 2 6 1 9
N ig e r Nig 6 2 0 7 9 26.1 1.42 0 6 7 2 0 1 1.127 13.260 1.362 23.001
Bolivia B o 6 2 0.79 27.7 1.44 0 6 7 2 0 8 1.143 13.900 1.362 23.001
D o m in ican  R D R 6 1 0 7 9 3 2 4 1.51 0.62 2 2 8 1.186 15.356 1.365 23.199
G u in e a G u 5.9 0.77 20.8 1.32 0 .59 1.74 1.016 10.376 1.373 23.611
R w a n d a Rw 5.8 0.76 28.2 1.45 0.58 2 1 0 1.107 1 2 7 9 9 1.377 23.825
H aiti Ha: 5.4 0 7 3 25.1 1.40 0 5 4 1.96 1.025 10.595 1.39? 24.741
E l S a lv a d o r EIS 5.4 0.73 48.6 1.69 0.54 2 8 4 1.275 17.190 1.393 24.741
Som alia Som 5.2 0.72 69.4 1.84 0.51 3 .39 1.318 20.817 1.402 25.278
C h a d C h ad 4.9 0 6 9 23.6 1.37 0 4 8 1.88 0 9 4 8 6 8 6 3 1.416 2 6 0 4 2
B u rund i B ur 4.6 0 6 6 30.7 1.49 0.44 2 2 1 0.986 9.674 1.430 2 6 9 2 5
H o n d u ra s H o 4.2 0 6 2 68.6 1.84 0 .39 3.37 1.144 13.947 1.451 28 .249
B en in B en 3.9 0 5 9 19.7 1.29 0 3 5 1.68 0 7 6 5 5.823 1.466 29 .376
S ie r ra  L e o n e SL e 3.7 0 5 7 1 6 5 1.22 0 3 2 1.48 0 6 9 2 4.918 1.480 3 0 2 0 3
L ao s L aos 3.5 0 5 4 9.6 0.98 0.30 0 .96 0 5 3 4 3.423 1.493 31.102
Jo rd a n J o 3.4 0 5 3 200.0 2 3 0 0 2 8 5.29 1.227 1 6 7 0 9 1.499 31.582
P a p u a  N ew P N G 3.4 0 5 3 94.0 1.97 0 .28 3 .89 1.049 11.186 1.499 31.582
N ica rag u a Nic 3.2 0.51 36.0 1.56 0 .26 2 4 2 0 .786 6.112 1.513 3 2 6 0 8
T o g o T g 2.9 0 .46 37.3 1.57 0 2 1 2 4 7 0 7 2 7 5.330 1.536 34.347
C A R C A R 2.5 0 .46 45.1 1.65 0.16 2 7 4 0 6 5 8 4.553 1.570 37.145
C o s ta  R ica C R 2.5 0.40 8 6 0 1.93 0 .16 3.74 0.770 5.886 1.570 37.145
Jam a ica Jam aica 2.2 0.34 77.6 1.89 0.12 3.57 0 6 4 7 4.437 1.599 39.737
L ib e ria L ib 2.1 0 3 2 6 2 6 1.80 0 1 0 3.27 0.579 3.792 1.610 4 0 7 2 5
Y em en  P D R Y P D R 2.0 0 3 0 41.9 1.62 0 .09 2 6 3 0.488 3.078 1.621 41.787
M ongo lia M e 1.9 0.28 0.1 -1 .00 0.06 1.00 -0 .279 0 5 2 6 1.673 4 2 9 3 4
C o n g o C o n g o 1.8 0 2 6 53.9 1.73 0 0 7 3.00 0 4 4 2 2 7 6 7 1.645 44 .176
M au ritan ia 1.7 0 2 3 101.5 2 0 1 0 0 5 4.03 0 4 6 2 2 9 0 0 1.656 45.529
L eso th o Les 1.5 0.18 64.8 1.82 0.03 3.31 0 .320 2 0 9 0 1.687 48.638
B h u tan B hu 1.2 0.06 4.8 0.68 0.01 0.46 0.054 1.132 1.738 54.716
M auritiu s Ms 1.0 0 .00 35.1 1.55 0 0 0 2.39 0.000 1.000 1.780 60.241
B o tsw an a B o ' 1.0
0.9
OS
O '7
0.6
0 5
0.4
0.00
-0.05
-0 .10
-0.15
-0.22
- 0 3 0
-0 .40
99.2 2.00 0 .00 3.99 0.000 1.000 1.780
1.804
1.831
1.862
1.897
1.939
1.990
60.241
63.686
67 .770
72.717
78.880
8 6 8 4 6
97.698
3064.3 71.7324
X
1974.4
r = -0.4
90.30
Y
97.77
X ~ 2
159
Y ~ 2
74.578
X *Y
90 .299
R e g re ss io n  O u tp u t
C o n s tan t 1.77989?
S td  E r r  o f  Y  Est 0 .481694
R  S q u a re d  0.310612
N o. o f  O b se rv a tio n s  72
D e g rees  o f F re e d o m  70
X  C oeffic ien t! -0 .527696 
Std E rr of C oe  0.09391 Ue
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